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The Institute for a Greater Europe established the Greater European Journal in 2019 as a continuation to its work publishing articles for students and young professionals from across the world. Created in 2013, the Institute promotes European integration across the traditional borders of Europe and beyond. In this first edition, papers were collected from writers working within the institute and through calls for papers. The Journal is to be published annually and aims to be peer-reviewed by its second edition.

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In order to select pieces for the Journal, our editors followed a rigorous process of submissions and revisions. Following a call for papers, all the submitted papers were read by our editorial team and those that reached a high quality were selected to be formally edited by our team. Following the editing and review from both of the editors of the region, or by another editor in the case of the editor having been the writer, the piece was then read for a final time by our editor-in-chief who then approved the papers with a high enough level of quality. Not all submitted papers achieved this.

Our Editor-in-Chief is George Baines.

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OUR PARTNERS



EDITOR IN CHIEF'S NOTE

Dear reader,

We are pleased to welcome you to the Institute for a Greater Europe's debut journal. Herein you will find a broad range of pieces which were produced against the backdrop of a European national-populist renaissance. Our contributors have delved into both historical and contemporary socio-political case studies within 'Greater Europe' to reveal various developments which its states have experienced in their histories.


Our academics focus foremost on European interpretations of sovereignty. The British aversion to supranational integration is one such example on the one hand, with De Gaulle's proto-EEC blueprint on the other. 'Debalkanisation' is meanwhile an unfinished business. Ottoman bordering of ethnic Balkan populations remains a pertinent theme within EU integration discourse while the 1990s remind us of the region's tinderbox-like volatility.

No less controversial a topic of national identity is that of Israel and its Basic Law - a social contract intimately tied to centuries of European anti-semitism and the Jewish diaspora's longing for a nation to call their own. The consequences of European colonialism are to be felt further abroad in Nigeria, where religious discrimination has similarly led to a society divided along religious boundaries.

Elsewhere, Russia's European statecraft is explored prior to the Napoleonic invasion, while one similarly deals with Soviet Romania's post-independence economic transition. Both pieces highlight the aspiration for eastern European states to join a more prestigious community of nations at points in their histories. And in a contemporary context, Ukraine's Euromaidan revolution reiterates a more dramatic clash of civilisations as it finds itself at a juncture in its national identity. And the fundamental catalyst for all contemporary developments within the black box of the nation state is of course mass media. Its role in amplifying illiberal democracy is touched upon, and it is certainly a Greater European phenomenon which has major implications for the type of nation our continent's statesmen and -women are campaigning for.

Our contributors illustrate the universality of nationalist processes in action, be they geographically in Europe, or triggered by continental actors' historic involvement abroad. We hope you find these readings revealing and enlightening and decide to support or contribute to our vibrant society as we look forward.

Best,



George Baines

Editor in Chief

ATLANTIC AND WESTERN EUROPE

A STUDY ON THE QUESTION OF NATIONALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW: BREXIT

By Carla Bassu¹, Diego Sánchez² and Philippe Mombaers³

Abstract

The phantom of unilateralism through the rise of populist and nationalist governments in Europe poses several questions on the essence of democracy itself. These include, but are not limited to, the role that public opinion plays and the effectiveness of the rule of law. Furthermore, the question of Brexit introduces the well-known factor of the direct *versus* representative democracy dichotomy.

This paper, briefly and concisely, seeks to analyse the question of Brexit through an interdisciplinary style, using both law and political science and focusing on the 2016 UK referendum on membership of the EU. Relying on the adaptation of law to a direct democracy model (based on Swiss case-law), the article will compare this to the legal status of the referendum in the UK, understood as a *sui generis* representative democracy model.

The authors find that the question of the rise of the nation state in the topic of Brexit is central to the issue of the influence exercised by leave campaigners to manipulate public opinion and exclude the United Kingdom from the European integration process.

The analysis centres on two sections: the first one is devoted to the background of nationalism in 21st century Europe, the second one develops the case study of Brexit based on two parts; the first explains the influence played by nationalism in the pursuit of the goal of leaving the EU, and the second argues through comparative law whether the annulment of the referendum is possible.



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Background

The European Union is facing an identity crisis due to many different background factors which are exacerbated by its economic situation. The problem with the EU is more than merely institutional, as there is a widespread sentiment of distrust towards decision-making bodies, which are perceived as hostile and insensitive to common people's interests.

The major criticism of the European Union concerns the democratic deficit corresponding to a lack of representation of European citizens in EU institutions. (Manzella, 2014, p. 6) The recently renovated European Parliament has gained more and more importance over time but still it is not able to fully comply with the demand of representation expressed by the people in every member State. In such a delicate moment for supranational integration, it can be said that the future of the EU is related to an identity issue. (Caramani, 2015)

As shown by the Brexit story, the main obstacle that still prevents the achievement of a proper constitutional integration is Euroscepticism, based on the negative consideration of European institutions which, according to the *vox populi*, do not take enough care of the people's needs. Euroscepticism must be the starting point for a reconsideration of how the EU institutional structure can have strong representative spaces.

Moreover, the EU is targeted by populist movements which are the centre-stage of politics in many countries of the "old continent".

Anti-europeanism is a common feature of political parties which claim to be outsiders and different from traditional parties. These invoke new forms of participation and involvement of the people in public decisions, in other words, a new conception of direct democracy. In addition to the generalized wish for the crumbling of the European Union under the flag of sovereigntists, as an example we find: *Movimento 5 Stelle* in Italy, *Podemos* and *Ciudadanos* in Spain, the anti-Euro *AfD* in Germany, *UKIP* in the UK, and more radical xenophobic parties such as *PVV* in Netherlands.

The lack of democratic mechanisms, and limited representation, are key factors for the EU crisis. Reforms introduced to strengthen citizens' participation, such as the enhancement of European Parliament, have turned out to be unsatisfactory. A deep reconsideration of the decision-making process in EU institution is needed in order to overcome nationalistic issues and avoid squandering the European constitutional heritage.

Nation State

Seeking to define "Nation State", each concept will be discussed separately.

Regarding the word "State", its very essence varies depending on whether it's conceived through the perspective of legal positivism or natural law.

Through positivism, it is conceived as an independent and neutral legal, social and political entity deprived from historicity and attributed individual personality. Kant summarised it as "the logical formal operation disconnected from all historic temporality". (González Vicen, 1952, p. 7)

Conversely, through natural law, the definition of State has been heavily influenced by the work of both sociology and international law. It acquires a prominent role in the consolidation of the internal order of the State and its defence from external elements, namely other states, ideological or cultural groups


(contributing to the rigorous reduction from the international to inter-state sphere). (Carrillo Salcedo, 1976 in Calduch, 1991, p. 2) This definition benefited from development of geopolitical circumstances since the concept was created.

Regarding the second part of the definition, 'Nation', the Legal Dictionary of the Royal Academy of Jurisprudence and Legislation provides a dual definition of the word "Nation" comprising the main theories about it:

Community of individuals that live in the same territory under the sovereignty of a State recognized as such by the international community. The modern definition of nation, born after the liberal revolutions, was built from two essential theories: the one that sustains nation is defined by its linguistic, ethnic and cultural unity, and the other understands national unity based on the existence of a community of free citizens that have kept alongside their history a will to live together in a Nation-State (Real Academia de Jurisprudencia y Legislación, 2016, p. 741).

As observed, the second theory invokes both the concepts of state and nation, as well as the definition introducing each concept. The crux of the matter is found in the will to partake in a homogeneous culture and society, regulated under norms, and recognizing the external elements of the group (in other words, the remaining international community).

Therefore, the definition of Nation State, as coined in the Peace Treaties of Osnabrück and Münster concerning the new-born states after the fragmentation of the then-empires, would be as follows: The community of individuals that share language and culture, recognized by the international community with a perennial will of living together under a legal-political structure.



Case Study: Brexit

A sociological perspective

There is no doubt that the identity crisis flourishing within Europe in the last few years reflects the dichotomic battle between those supporting European integration, and the Eurosceptics opposing it.

Sociological theses currently dominating academia aim to demonstrate the existence of a unique identity that could replace the concept of Nation State. Zygmunt Bauman (2006) argues that collective identities (as the European Union) are in perpetual flux, notwithstanding that singular identities (classic Nation State) assimilated into the super-structure (EU) for the sake of partaking in a continuous path towards progress. Conversely, Giovanni Sartori (2001) contends that Nation States need an external identity to determine their own, because Nation States, by themselves, endow an international community of personality; in other words, create a reciprocal relation based on a mutual need.

This academic confrontation is a palpable reflex of political reality, in which part of the population keeps believing in the so-called super-structure. Although, following Sartori, this would not suppose a detriment of the national identity, but rather, somehow confirms it. However, many others perceive it as a threat to their national identity, unchaining a considerable collision of identities unleashing the creation of new nationalist parties returning to manifestos full of traditional values and prioritising the nation over the community - so-called Euroscepticism.

In that sense, globalization does not presuppose change in national identity (see Treanor, 1997 in Martí, 2001), especially if both fragmentation and homogenization, unique features of this process, act as two forces that self-compensate to reorder society in a prematurely changing world. (Boutros-Ghali, 1992, para 11)

Sociological and political analysis of Brexit campaign propaganda

Manipulation reminds us of the controversial enterprise Cambridge Analytica which significantly influenced the outcome of the EU referendum. This occurred because it centres mainly on exploration and data analysis seeking patterns within a great data volume, mostly extracted from Facebook, which serve to influence each user on a personalized basis.

This personalization undoubtedly follows the classic AIDA (Attention, Interest, Desire, Action) model that empowers it significantly compared to the traditional TV announcement or advertisement. Serving the interests of the Leave.EU group, this data served to transform social networks into a massive propagandistic tool.

A clear example of fake news is found in an article elaborated by the Express newspaper entitled: “Merkel calls for EU army to defend Europe as relations with UK and USA weaken”. (Gutteridge, 2017) The article explains how the chancellor demands the EU creates a unified army led by Germany. However, the so-called statement was a declaration of intentions regarding NATO. (NBC News, 2018)

Under a sociological criterion, what is attractive is the effect these types of news create amongst its readers. The Confirmation Bias is the unconscious predisposition that reinforces our preconceptions, regardless of whether these are positive or negative, in whatever field of reality. (see Wason, 1968) In the current case, very commonplace in the media, a piece of fake news pretends, through a fallacy, to strengthen the favourable opinion to the withdrawal from the EU. This is a misrepresentation of reality to a large scale, both because of the target volume, and the daily rising proportion of fake news created that impacts public opinion to the extent it may have even altered the preferences in the EU referendum.

Likewise, another example is found on Boris Johnson’s *BrexitBus* that read: “We send the EU £350 million a week - let’s fund our NHS instead. Vote Leave. Let’s take back control”. An unrealistic proposition if considered the UK’s net contribution to the EU in the 2016-17 financial year equates to approximately 8,1 million pounds. (HM Treasury, 2018, p. 13) To claim the UK pays more weekly than annually simply constitutes both a misrepresentation of reality and an undoubtful miscalculation that influenced irreversibly on British voters.

This proves the cognitive bias of anchoring. It consists of the tendency to focalize an issue from a single perspective, excluding or subjugating any other information to the first one perceived. This is an instinctive mental reaction aimed at conserving an idea through a single perspective, due to the complexity of attempting to break a well ascertained mental structure.

This controversial slogan constitutes indisputably a key point to understand the genesis of the Euroscepticism materialized in the Brexit.

The legal perspective

UK legislation defines a referendum as an “other poll held, in pursuance of any provision made by or under an Act of Parliament, on one or more questions specified in or in accordance with any such provision”. (*Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act* (PPERA) 2000, section 101, subclause 1) In addition, case-law distinguishes between a legally binding, and a non-legally binding referendum. (R (*Wilson and others*) v *The Prime Minister*, paras 35-36)

Courts can annul or set aside any binding referendum result if “general corruption, bribery, treating or intimidation” are proven. (*Representation of the People Act* (RPA) 1983, section 164, subsection 2) Hence, common law has the power to avoid any vote outcome, but only if these conditions are met.

Likewise, acknowledging the advisory (non-legally binding) nature of the EU referendum, (R(*Miller*) v *Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union*, para 121) case-law considers that for any court to set aside the vote, it shall ascertain a *material breach of rules*, in addition to the elements of *certainty* and *finality* to allege misconduct. (*Wilson*, paras 36, 37-38, 49) In other words, (a) it must be proven that the result of the vote would have been different if there was no breach of rules, and it (b) excludes facts pending judicial confirmation. (*Ibid.*, paras 38-39) Thus, the law responded to adapt adequately and proportionally to significant challenges, such as the EU referendum.

Conversely, the Venice Commission understand referendums in a dual perspective; (a) from the *principle of rule of law*, they must abide by the law, including procedural rules; (b) and from the *principle of sovereignty of the people*, as they materialize people’s capacity to decide. (Venice Commission 2018, para 26)

Hence, both the international and domestic perspective on a referendum share the element of compliance to the law, whereas *a priori* a dilemma arises on the question of sovereignty within the UK legislation, a question of which the following part deals with.

Professor A. V. Dicey explains Parliament sovereignty as “the right to make or unmake any law... and... that no person or body is recognised... as having a right to override or set aside the legislation of Parliament”. (Dicey, 1915, p. 3) It’s important to note that the legitimacy of this right to legislate derives directly not from the transference of sovereignty from the people through vote, but from the power of the Crown, (*Miller*, para 43) as the sovereign, something alternatively referred to as “what the Queen-in-Parliament enacts is law”. (Bogdanor, 2009, p. 13 in Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, 2017, p. 9)

On the contrary, the practice of popular initiatives covering a wide range of subjects constitutes the roots of Swiss direct democracy (Rayner & Voutat, 2014, pp. 61-62) - a reason why referendums in Switzerland are considered “as an effective defense against unpopular legislation”. (Rappard, 1912, p. 116)

Moreover, the Swiss case-law posits that the freedom to vote is guaranteed on the sincerity of the compulsory debate that ensures the legitimacy of decisions is realized through direct democracy. (1C_338/2018, consid. 2.1.) Therefore, it affirms that any vote result shall be unlawful if it does not translate in a faithful and surely manner into the expression of the voters’ free will. (*Ibid.*, consid. 2.1.) However, how do you prove the unlawfulness of a vote if it is secret?

As an example, after the vote on the UK membership to the EU, many campaigners for a second referendum backed their claim on surveys to prove Leave voters changed their minds. But, if ballot papers are anonymous due to the vote secrecy within the right to vote, what would be the rationale of a survey if there is no empirical way to truly demonstrate what someone really voted? (BGE 90 I 69 S. 73, consid. 2.b) For this reason, Swiss case-law excludes surveys from examination. (1C_338/2018, consid. 4.3.). In fact, it considers a vote result as distorted when citizens were misinformed about the objective and the scope of the project under vote. (*Ibid.*, consid. 2.1.)

The process to reach that conclusion varies depending on whether the petition was submitted, (a) before or shortly after the scrutiny, or (b) a long time after it. *Grosso modo*, the former contemplates the effect of a serious faulty procedure, whilst the latter, requires examining; i) vote difference, ii) the possible influence of irregularity on the outcome, and iii) legal certainty, in order to sustain the annulment. (*Ibid.*, consid. 4.1.) To sum up, the misinformation shall transcend the mere individual to the global perspective in order to claim the vote was contrary to the truthful voters' opinion.

Swiss case-law allows for a wide variety of factors which could make it legitimate to avoid a binding vote result, in contrast to the specific grounds set forth in UK legislation. Even though both legislations adopt a duty of the executive power to inform, in the judicial practice, this varies significantly regarding the enforcement of any measure against the result.

The EU Referendum Act established a duty of the government to publish information about membership of the EU, in addition to introducing restrictions on the people's ability to legally challenge its result. (*European Union Referendum Act* (EURA) 2015, section 7, subsection 1) Recalling case-law on the grounds for courts to set aside a vote result, a violation of this government's duty towards voters (see EURA 2015, section 7) could have had constituted a material breach of rules as it may have irreversibly influenced voters to cast their votes favouring one specific option. (see *Wilson*, paras 36-37)

Comparing Swiss-UK case-law unfolds a solution to clarify the application of UK law regarding annulment. (*White v Jones* [1995] UKHL 5, Lord Goff of Chieveley, p. 13) Consequently, to examine the violation of this duty of information, which could ultimately affect the exercise of the freedom of vote, it is necessary to prove voters' misinformation due to an error made by the Government. However, in the case of the EU referendum, the allegations derive from the campaigning of the Leave parties. (see *Marcus Ball v Alexander Boris de Pfeffel Johnson*, 2019, para 3; Electoral Commission, 2018, paras 4.86-4.90.) In contrast to Swiss constitutional proviso, which acknowledges political parties contribute to the free formation of opinion of voters, (Constitution fédérale suisse, Article 34, incise 2) in the UK legislation parties are not held responsible for misinformation in the way that governments are. (PPER 2000, schedules 19 and 20) For this reason, if campaigners are not bound by a duty to provide correct and accurate information to voters, there would be no grounds to set aside the general outcome.

Conclusions

Our work reaffirms that nationalist rhetoric during the EU referendum campaign won immediate popularity due to the lack of connection between the people and the common project of EU integration. To identify with the project means there exists a knowledge proved upon the immediate experience of each person about the EU. Thus, if little or no knowledge exists, no involvement or solid relationship is established between society and the supranational structure it belongs to.

Through the diffusion of fake news, eurosceptic groups exploded voters' bias by blaming the EU for the issues the UK nowadays deals with. It created the ideal conditions to compromise the formation of

opinion of each voter and manipulate them towards voting in favour to the Leave alternative. In other words, this misinformation consisted of providing more attractive, concise and circular arguments to exploit weak awareness of the implications of EU membership.

Furthermore, the rule of law constitutes one of the pillars of contemporary democracies, ensuring it duly performs its duties. However, following Swiss democratic experience, there cannot be an exercise of the right to vote without the respect, by the Government and political parties, to the duty to inform voters in an accurate and manner. This transcends the mere formality as it pretends to guarantee the majority was truly cognizant of the text or proposal under vote. Hence, it is not the individual vote, but the diligent exercise of this duty by the Government and political parties, that would be subject to judicial review in order to determine whether voters' were able to form, without any inaccurate or wrong information, their own opinion that would then translate into a vote.

Finally, the EU referendum experience demonstrated the UK's current legislation does not safeguard the substantial content of the right to vote: the free formation of voters' opinion. Because political parties were not subject to any duty to inform, no ground would exist to legally challenge the vote result based on their campaigning propaganda. As such, it remains in Parliament's hands to empower voters through a more comprehensive electoral legislation that protects them in case parties seek to dishonestly or unfairly obtain their votes.

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CHARLES DE GAULLE AND HIS “EUROPE OF NATIONS”

By Adrian Waters



Introduction

Charles De Gaulle (1890-1970) was France's President from 1958 to 1969 after leading the resistance movement known as the 'Free French Forces' during World War Two. When he became France's head of state, he devised a new constitution which founded the French Fifth Republic that lasts to this day. His idea of France being an independent great power influenced his policy towards European integration as he envisaged a continental confederation that would become a third superpower after the US and the USSR. Worried about the decline of national influence in the European Economic Community (EEC), De Gaulle proposed the Fouchet Plan, a blueprint for the formation of an intergovernmental union of nation-states. While it was never implemented because other countries were unenthusiastic, the Fouchet Plan endures as an inspiring document for a democratic European alternative. It also demonstrated De Gaulle's forward thinking and the significance of cooperation between different countries in an increasingly interconnected world (Project for Democratic Union, 2013). This research piece will aim to explain the French President's ideal European confederation and how he tried to make it a reality.

De Gaulle's background

Charles De Gaulle fought as a lieutenant in World War One and became a brigadier general at the onset of World War Two, a rank that he retained for the rest of his life. After the former Great War hero Marshal Philippe Pétain had taken charge of France in order to sign an armistice with Nazi Germany, De Gaulle fled to the UK, where he led the Free French Forces against the Axis powers and collaborators like Pétain. He was completely devoted to his country and had the strength of character to fight for French national interests. His broadcasts from London, the actions of the Free French Forces and the contacts of French resistance groups either with De Gaulle's organisation or the British secret services brought national recognition of his leadership. However, his relationship with the British government was uneasy (Pickles, 2019). De Gaulle was interested in re-creating the French state and in pursuing this objective he acted like an “awkward customer” with the other Allied statesmen (Duroselle, 1966:3-4). Winston Churchill, the British prime minister, recognised the French general's greatness and overlooked the irritations he frequently caused. The US president Roosevelt, on the other hand, did not understand him at all and disregarded De Gaulle's popularity in France. The French general misunderstood the American leader too, hence the roots of De Gaulle's anti-Americanism can be traced to this period (Ibid).

From September 1944 until January 1946 he headed two successive provisional administrations before returning to power as French head of state in 1958. Eleven years later he resigned after losing a referendum on constitutional reforms (Pickles, 2019).

The Gaullist vision of a united Europe

It had been the French general's ambition since 1940 to get together "the states which border the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees" as "one of the three global powers and, if necessary one day, the arbiter between the Soviet and Anglo-Saxon camps" in global politics (Teasdale, 2016:7). A unified, powerful Europe in international affairs was essential to De Gaulle's political thought. As long as individual countries could maintain separate military structures and exercise the right to veto during the decision-making process, common defence and foreign policies could be valuable to France's rebirth as a major power. Europe therefore could be used as a platform from which France could project an influence beyond its capacity as a single state and in which Paris could lead the other nation-states and act as their spokesperson in the wider world (Ibid).

In an attempt to define the former French president's hypothetical Europe, J.B. Duroselle (1966) identified four key characteristics: a Europe of independent states with no supranational authority; a Europe free from American influence; a Europe in which the dominant power in foreign policy would be France; and a Europe open to its Eastern neighbours, i.e. the Soviet Union and its satellite states.

A Europe of independent states with no supranational authority

From the standpoint of De Gaulle, any coherent Europe had to be a union of independent states in which national sovereignty would always control the European institutions and could only be the outcome of cooperation between individual countries. According to Ronald Tiersky (2016), Gaullism, which he considers to be the first form of euroscepticism, is the idea that the fundamental unit of international politics is a nation-state built on people with a particular history. In De Gaulle's mind, the nation-state was genuine and a factitious organisation run by faceless bureaucrats could never replace it (Ibid). Therefore, from his perspective, states are bound to survive ideologies and cannot be absorbed or merged into something larger and supranational (Duroselle, 1966). A federalised Europe could never work because a federal entity could not express a will that is acceptable to all members of the EEC (Mammarella & Cacace, 1998).

The General's alternative to supranational/federal institutions was a confederal/intergovernmental union. His deep-rooted nationalism meant that he despised any schemes for international order that were not based on coherent nation-states. During a press conference held in 1962 he stated that "the only possible Europe...is that of states" (Moravcsik, 2000:12-13). De Gaulle opposed the pooling and delegation of sovereignty in the form of qualified majority voting or commission autonomy. He often described the debate over European integration as a battle between the "utopian myths [of] supranational power" and the vision of a confederation in which France would not have to face the possibility of being overruled on social, economic and political matters, as in the EEC (Ibid).

As early as 1947, the General had spoken of the need to establish a European 'federation' based on the primacy of the sovereign nation state. In 1950 his long-time confidant Michel Debré clarified this notion into that of a confederation and over the next few years the Gaullist leadership developed their alternative to the supranational blueprint of the Founding Six (France, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, West Germany). Later, in 1953 De Gaulle drew upon these ideas in asserting his plans for European cooperation. He once remarked that there should be an association of nations that would involve a

regular and organic council comprising all heads of governments who would make decisions on politics, economics, culture and defence; a deliberative assembly and a referendum held in all member states that would involve the people and ensure that the confederation had popular legitimacy (Teasdale, 2016).

In essence De Gaulle wanted to impose his view of a “political Europe” as opposed to supranational institutions that would allow the European continent to be ruled by technocrats without a mandate and specialists without spirit or vision. The French general thought that technical rule would negate every form of human greatness based on the ability to develop new courses of action and assume responsibility for the consequences (Mações, 2018). However, even though he was critical of the excessive power held by the Brussels bureaucracy, which in his opinion had no national legitimacy, he supported the aims of the Common Market, while defending French national interests (Mammarella & Cacace, 1998). So he devoted himself to the implementation of the 1957 Treaty of Rome (the founding document of the EEC) and called for the deregulation of trade resulting from this accord to be subordinated by the creation of a common agricultural and customs policy. The enactment of such policies contributed to the modernisation of French industry and agriculture (Sirinelli, Vandenbussche & Vavasseur-Desperriers, 2003).

A Europe free from American influence

De Gaulle had been suspicious of the United States ever since he met Roosevelt in 1943 at the Casablanca conference. He believed that the US had “yielded to the spirit of intervention” and that its president wanted an “American peace” dictated on his (Roosevelt’s) terms (Duroselle, 1966:6). Although De Gaulle was in favour of the Western Alliance, he never hesitated to denounce America’s interventionist tendencies (Ibid).

Those who study European integration learn that it began with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). However, as the former Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis (2011) highlighted, European integration was in reality a concept implemented by American diplomacy. De Gaulle saw this clearly and when the ECSC was formed he denounced it on the basis that it was creating a unified Europe in the shape of a restrictive cartel under Washington’s influence. This is why he and his associates voted against the formation of the ECSC in the French parliament (Teasdale, 2016). His anti-Atlanticism also explains why he opposed the European Defence Community, which envisaged a supranational European defence structure under NATO control (Ibid), and instead preferred an alliance of independent states with a combined General Staff (Anceau, 2016). This line of thought is linked to his rejection of supranationalism as he once remarked that “a supranational Europe is a Europe under American command” (Ibid).

In his attempt to reduce American influence on the continent, De Gaulle withdrew France from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966 (Moravcsik, 2000). He also vetoed Britain’s entry into the EEC twice in 1963 and 1967 because he regarded “perfidious Albion” as a US Trojan Horse (Anceau, 2016). In essence, the French president envisioned an independent Europe that would act as a ‘third force’ between the United States and the USSR (Mammarella & Cacace, 1998). He was a unique figure in the context of the Cold War, as he was one of the few European leaders who took a non-aligned stance.

A Europe dominated by France

In the General's head, European integration was also a means of ensuring France's place in the world (Anceau, 2016). He believed that every state should follow an independent policy to seek their rightful place in the world. France, in his view, was supposed to become a "principal player" on the global stage (Moravcsik, 2000:9). So, although he contributed much to European integration, he always advanced the interests and augmented the prestige of his country (Djilas, 2010). De Gaulle desired a Europe dominated by France in which Germany would be politically subordinate, but at the same time a strong economic partner (Williams, 1997). Unlike Britain, West Germany could not aspire to compete politically and culturally with France, and so the French president developed a partnership with the German chancellor Konrad Adenauer, culminating in a friendship treaty being signed in early 1963 (Sirinelli, Vandenbussche & Vavasseur-Desperriers, 2003). Afterwards, Franco-German relations became strained because of Adenauer's Atlanticist successors. This policy is considered to be another reason for De Gaulle's blocking the UK's accession into the EEC, as Britain was seen as an obstacle to French influence (Anceau, 2016).



A Europe open to the East

De Gaulle viewed Europe as a product of history and geography, transcending artificial and ephemeral divisions. In 1959 he famously stated that "it is Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals ... which will decide the fate of the world". He regarded historical and geographical Europe as a way of combining and increasing the power of each nation-state in order to play a prominent role on the global scene (Ibid). He followed a policy of détente and cooperation with the Soviet bloc by encouraging trade and cultural relations with the USSR and its satellite states (Pickles, 2019). The French president correctly foresaw the collapse of the communist regimes and believed that afterwards Western Europe (led by France) would reintegrate the continent (Djilas, 2010). Nevertheless, his theory of 'de-satellisation' was invalidated in the short-term by the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Furthermore, as the political and economic crisis of May 1968 demonstrated, France had neither the domestic cohesion nor the financial resources to play the role of leader in De Gaulle's idealised Europe (Pickles, 2019).

The first Fouchet Plan (1961)

In 1961, a committee headed by Christian Fouchet, the French ambassador to Denmark, produced a draft treaty for the establishment of a 'union of states', now known as the first Fouchet Plan (Teasdale, 2016).

The document envisaged a common defence and foreign policy, close cooperation in the fields of culture and science and the protection of human rights and democracy. This hypothetical Union included three main institutions: the Council, the European Parliament and the European Political Commission. The Council would comprise the heads of state or government of each member country who would meet every four months and all decisions had to be unanimous. The European Parliament is the one that already existed at the time and its role would be to "deliberate on matters concerning the aims of the Union" and to submit questions and recommendations to the Council (CVCE, n.d.). The European

Political Commission would consist of senior officials from the Foreign Affairs ministries of each member state. It would be based in Paris and would deal with the deliberations of the Council and implement its decisions (Ibid).

The reaction to these proposals was mixed. West Germany, Italy and Luxembourg suggested that they could work with the text, whilst seeking additional guarantees with regard to the importance of NATO (even though the draft treaty acknowledged that the Union's defence policy would be conducted "with other free nations", i.e. with the US-led military alliance) and the integrity of the existing EEC. However, the Netherlands and Belgium opposed the first Plan. They had serious reservations about the proposed intergovernmental union and its defence provisions. In addition, they thought that the UK should participate in the discussions, and if that was not possible, then negotiations should be postponed until it had joined the Community. The head of the British negotiating team, Edward Heath, indicated that his country supported the idea of a political union and that it would be willing to take part in the debates. De Gaulle eventually met with Harold Macmillan, the UK premier, to clarify the British position. It was revealed, much to the dismay of the Dutch and the Belgians, that Britain preferred the intergovernmental approach to defence and foreign policy, and also that it was not necessary for its representatives to participate in the negotiations (Teasdale, 2016).

The Second Fouchet Plan (1962)

The discussions witnessed a stalemate in late 1961 and the prospects of success for De Gaulle were decreasing. Although most EEC member states agreed with the first Plan, he needed the backing of the Netherlands and Belgium for its implementation. Later in January 1962 a revised Plan was tabled. It was marked by a hardening of the French position, thus accentuating the intergovernmental character of the Union and its ability to act independently without American consent (Ibid). As a matter of fact, Article 2 of the second Fouchet Plan stated that the objective of the Union would be "to reconcile, co-ordinate and unify the policy of member states in spheres of common interest: foreign policy, economics, cultural affairs and defence" (CVCE, n.d.). Other major changes included: the creation of a Committee of Foreign Ministers and a Committee of Ministers of Education that would report to the Council; a Political Commission comprising delegates appointed by each member state which could draft the Union's budget; and the possibility of the European Parliament to "deliberate on questions concerning foreign policy, defence and education on which the Council asks its opinion" (Ibid).

What distinguishes the Fouchet Plan from all previous EU reforms is that De Gaulle wished to establish a strong executive that would make decisions on important matters. To ensure its legitimacy the European Commission and Parliament would not participate in its deliberations precisely because the French president was convinced that power should be preserved where it existed and installed where it does not, but never cancelled or undermined. He also believed that this framework should have its public support confirmed by means of a "solemn European referendum" (Mações, 2018).

The General ended up facing opposition to his second Plan from all the other EEC members. Even those who previously supported the first draft indicated that they could not subscribe to a Union along French lines. In February 1962 they circulated a counter-treaty, which comprised a common defence policy within the framework of the Atlantic Alliance. This was a major diplomatic defeat for France (Teasdale, 2016). De Gaulle decided to placate Germany and Italy by re-inserting references to NATO in the Plan. In March the document was verified by the Italian, Dutch, Belgian and Luxembourgish foreign ministers to include the military alliance in the treaty's preamble (Vanke, 2001). However, the Dutch and Belgian resolve to thwart France's ambitions was hardened after Heath made a speech which tacitly

upheld that supranationalism should be strengthened and that common policies would have to operate “shoulder to shoulder with the US” (Teasdale, 2016:45). So on 17th April, despite pressure from Adenauer to accept a compromise, the Dutch and Belgian foreign ministers postponed negotiations over the Plan until it was clear that the UK would enter the EEC. Discussions did not resume again afterwards (Ibid, 46-48).

De Gaulle explained this failure partially as a result of fears over France’s supremacy and partially because in the context of the Cold War everything else was secondary unless US protection was guaranteed. Although this justification seems biased, it is historically acceptable. It is also obvious that while Germany and Italy were less hostile to the Gaullist project, Belgium and the Netherlands gave the Plan its *coup de grace* since they wanted to counter French influence through Britain’s accession into the EEC (Mammarella & Carace, 1998). As Jeffrey W. Vanke (2001) outlined, the Dutch were against De Gaulle’s proposals from the start and neither side would find a middle ground. Revealingly, France’s leader admitted that in the place of the Netherlands he would have done the same, thus recognising “that French interests did not necessarily represent all European interests” (Ibid, 109).

Conclusion

De Gaulle certainly had a distinctive vision of a united Europe that was the opposite of what European federalists proposed. He dreamt of a French-dominated intergovernmental confederation that would be free from American influence and would eventually include the Soviet satellite states. Although he failed to implement this idea via the Fouchet Plan (particularly because of Dutch and Belgian opposition), his criticisms of supranationalism and his views on the importance of sovereignty, the genuineness of nation-states and the necessity for Europe to be an independent power are still valid and are being vindicated even today. Like it or not, De Gaulle initiated a trend of euroscepticism that is sweeping the continent and undermining the stability of the EU institutions. If these wish to survive it would perhaps be wise to take his theories into consideration.

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CENTRAL AND SOUTH EAST EUROPE


DEMOCRATISATION AND GROWTH: POST-COMMUNISM AS A MODERN OR POSTMODERN PHENOMENON?

By Daniel Petcu

The phenomenon of post-communist development in Europe to this day eludes a clearly-defined conceptualisation due to its multi-dimensionality. The study of post-communist political economy must commence with a discussion of common property resources; this is achieved through explaining and examining the relationship and interplay between common property and collectivism, and the monumental impact that both liberal and neoliberal thought have had on the social economies of Eastern Europe following the fall of communism (Pickles, 2006). This paper aims to provide a multi-layered critique of the diverse perspectives towards post-communist growth in Europe has been variously understood and assessed, with a focus on Romania. The overarching theme of this paper is framed within the wider debate surrounding modernity and post-modernity, employing the work of Jacques Derrida, Jurgen Habermas, Zygmunt Bauman and Pierre Bourdieu. The main argument proposed in this paper is that post-communism ought to be seen as neither a modern nor postmodern phenomenon, but rather as part of a development along an alternative trajectory of Western modernity; one which is characterised by a struggle for identity reaffirmation.

Contemporary understandings of both communist and post-communist common property resources have been shaped and molded by the neoliberal crusade. As a result, a new definition of the commons arose in Europe; one that is unable to harmonize legal and political aspirations for a peaceful, inclusive and tolerant European Union with a common economic project and space of harmony between markets and trade policy (Meurs, 2001). This project of a 'common economic union', as well as what a public, a commons and a universal value entail, are becoming increasingly amalgamated with postcolonial ideas and with deeply-entrenched historical and racialized views of common identity (Stark and Bruzst, 1998).

For many political commentators representing both sides of the Iron Curtain, the revolutions of 1989 underscored what Vladimir Tismaneanu (1999: 69) labeled "the triumph of civic dignity and political morality over ideological monism, bureaucratic cynicism, and police dictatorship." Strongly founded upon individualistic notions of freedom, said revolutions appeared, at least on the surface, to be liberal. On the contrary, other scholars have shown far less optimism about the transition process that followed thereafter, that is, the immediate consequences of the emerging liberalism across the region (Dauphinée, 2003). Rather, for others, the alignment of economic and political institutions under the umbrella of a monolithic anti-communism highlighted the dawn of a new hegemony for the capitalist project, and with it a refined market ideology following those of Margaret Thatcher's Britain and Ronald Reagan's America; as Derrida (1994: 51-52) asserted: "No one, it seems to me, can *contest* the fact that a dogmatics is attempting to install its worldwide hegemony in paradoxical and suspect conditions... This dominating discourse often has the manic, jubilatory, and incantatory form that Freud assigned to the so-called triumphant phase of mourning work. The incantation repeats and ritualizes itself, it holds forth and holds to formulas, like any animistic magic. The rhythm of a cadenced march, it proclaims: Marx is dead, communism is dead, very dead, and along with it its hopes, its discourse, its theories, and its



practices. It says: long live capitalism, long live the market, here's to the survival of economic and political liberalism!"

In essence, Derrida's pessimism reinforces the view that the project of 'Westernising' the formerly communist countries after the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1991 was a hegemonic one, one of the subversion of socialist identity, and the forging of a new, neoliberal union of states with the exercise of power inevitably skewed towards those wishing to enforce the aforementioned ideology. This crusade was waged with a fearsome and obdurate force by the Bretton Woods agreement and its associated transformative institutions, most notably the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and with their agenda to privatise collective property and to 'liberalise' markets (ibid.). Consequently, this post-communist process of transition could only refer to the advent of private property, market logics, political individualism, and a profound devotion to the universalism of a common neo-liberal European project (Gowan, 1996).

Furthermore, on a latent level, there appeared to be a much broader positivist and objectivist belief in what was understood throughout the 19th Century as the *stationary state*, that is, a state of generalized social balance stemming from the manners in which rational market decisions are made by individual social actors. For example, for Balibar (2004: 106): "The result of this is not, of course, to render any further transformation impossible; cultural and technological changes can, in fact, go on and even accelerate. But transformation would henceforth occur without essential conflictuality between classes, social groups, powers, and counterpowers, 'systemic' and 'antisystemic' forces." This very much framed a "return to Europe," the restitution of an unrestricted path to democracy and capitalism in which history had come to "an end." (Fukuyama, 1992).

In Eastern Europe, this new liberalism triumphed, often with the support of groups and individuals as varied as right-wing communists, left-wing liberals and internationalist-free-marketeers (Verdery, 1996). The radical individualism and its associated anti-collectivism that quickly and vigorously spread through the region denounced collectivism and common property regimes, some which had long pre-dated communism, as barriers to economic development and 'efficiency' (Pickles, 2005). Throughout this transition process, social complexity and diversity were thought of purely through the lens of a new universalism. Economic governance was thereafter to be structured by price signals among so-called autonomous and equal economic actors, and the then-existing diverse economies of socialism and capitalism were considered to be a sign of 'backwardness' (ibid.). The above points of discussion relating to the nature of post-communism and the direction that it took after the fall of communism in 1991, broadly speaking, form part of overarching debates about the nature of modernity and its relationship with politics, which the following section of this paper seeks to address.

The majority of responses to the issue of the collapse of communism in Europe, Central and Western Asia have accounted for communist and post-communist experience through Western sociological frames of reference (Ray, 1997). This very much reflects the way in which sociological theory has largely been founded upon the experience of modernity in North America and Western Europe, and it has subsequently tended to conceive of state-socialist systems as variants, albeit deviant ones, of familiar social forms, such as 'industrial society.' (Ray, 1997). Consequently, with regard to post-communism, the debate over modernity and postmodernity revolves around the question of whether the "civilizational distance within Europe is at stake," (Zybertowicz, 1994), that is, whether the former eastern and western sectors now share a common culture and trajectory (ibid.). The crisis of communism has often regularly been understood by scholars as highlighting a crisis endemic to the modernist project in general. This

warrants an examination of two popular claims: first, that communism was the epitome of modernity, and secondly that the crisis of communism thereby foreshadows a crisis of modernity per se.

The first claim stems in part from Weberian notions of bureaucratization. In a Weberian vein, communism has been viewed as a nightmarish form of modernity; for example, Zygmunt Bauman (1992) adopts a Promethean outlook on modernity, which starkly contrasts with the fluid, differentiated and anesthetized cultural forms of postmodernity. For Bauman (1992: 166-167), “communism was modernity in its most determined mood and most decisive posture... purified of the last shred of the chaotic, irrational, the spontaneous, the unpredictable.” Soviet modernism, therefore, was associated with gigantism, Fordist mass production and unrelenting consumption; in other words, an extensive, corporatist and rationalized state holding a secular, etatist ideology (Murray, 1992).



Now, if communism was the epitome of modernity, then the crisis of communism could serve as the trigger to a generalized crisis of modernity or, at least as Kumar (1995: 151) points out, the end of communism and the end of modernity perhaps possess an “elective affinity” for one another. Crook et. al (1994: 42) develop this point even further by arguing that Soviet-type societies were essentially variants of an industrial society which is currently converging with the West in a ‘crisis of corporatism,’ marked by decentralization, new social movements, privatization and a ‘shrinking state’, deregulation and globalization. Furthermore, Bauman (1992) argues that as a result of the allure of the postmodern consumer society in the West, the ‘obsolete head-per-steel’ philosophy was no match for the narcissistic culture of self-enhancement, self-enjoyment and instant gratification.

Consequently, postmodernism has the advantage of releasing new energies and subversive forces. However, to say that there is an ‘elective affinity’ between post-communism and postmodernism are somewhat misguided. For instance, Bauman’s (1992) nightmarish vision of modernity as being characterised by carceral power stresses ‘discipline’ at the expense of the contrary tendency towards ‘liberty’ (Wagner, 1994). Not only is the implementation of disciplinary systems generally more slapdash, partial and fragmented than Bauman suggests, but they are also dulled by the countervailing power with which those who are subject to them are able to develop

Rather, a more persuasive argument than that of postmodernization is that the fall of communism opened up new spaces of struggle for modernity (Ray, 1997). As Eisenstadt (1992) indicates, the anti-communist revolutions occurred within already modernized societies, and the rebellions did not topple traditionalistic *ancient regimes*. Instead, regime changes took place within the confines of existing political institutions and were ratified by legal frameworks of the outgoing states (ibid.). In a similar view,

Habermas (1994: 62) conceives of the Eastern-European Revolutions of 1989 as ‘revolutions of recuperation’, ‘overcoming distance’ with Western Europe. Contrary to the classical revolutions of modernity, such as the American, French and Russian revolutions, which were oriented towards the future, the anti-communist revolutions espoused a desire for a linkage to the inheritance of bourgeois revolutions, taking inspiration from the repertoire of the modern age (ibid.). Therefore, ‘being modern’ is an extremely complex process that transcends mere polarities. For example, while the modernist revolutionary tradition since 1789 has been associated with notions of heroism, self-sacrifice and certainty, modernity is typically associated with Weber’s ideas of disenchantment, rationalization, professional impersonality and formal legality (Cohen and Arato, 1992). Having discussed at length where post-communism temporally fits on the spectrum between modernity and postmodernity, the final section of this paper proceeds to put such discussions into perspective, namely through a consideration of economic development in Romania during the 1990s.

During the 1990s, the Romanian governments were considered to be consistently failing to establish credibility in what regarded democratic consolidation and market reform (Pop, 2007). The supposed ideological rupture with the nation’s communist past was very much called into question as ‘neo-communist’ political parties were in power until the end of 1996. Equally, the ‘shock therapy’ attempted in the period of 1997-1998 by the ‘democratic’ parties resulted in a three-year economic recession, the second during that decade (ibid.). That said, by the early 2000s, Romania had become a fully functional market economy and was reaching a standard of competitiveness that allowed for significant progress in the process of EU accession (ibid.). More importantly, Romania is very unique among the Central and East European countries in what regards the intensity of its relationship with the IMF during the 1990s, which thus accentuates a complexity in Romania’s post-communist economic development during the 1990s.

The theoretical toolkit employed here in order to understand this phenomenon heavily builds on the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu, which is extremely sensitive to the ways in which macrostructures delineate and delimit what is possible and impossible in micro-interactions (Leander, 2006). Bourdieu’s understanding of the different spheres and fields of social life and the way in which actors are embedded within these were developed through anthropological and sociological research in national contexts, particularly France and Algeria (ibid.). The national context remains very much relevant here, for some of the determining factors in the relationship between Romania and the IMF originate in domestic economic and political circumstances. Most importantly, the post-communist transformations that took place can be defined as processes of gradual differentiation of the economic and political spheres or fields that had been tightly integrated under the communist regime (Adler, 1997). This therefore means that all of the elements that are characteristic of fields in general, namely, identifiable actors, the distribution of their assets, the structural relationship between the numerous positions of the actors in the field, the stakes of field-specific struggles and the boundaries that separate the insiders from the outsiders all are in a process of evolving (ibid.). Nevertheless, the actions of the Romanian economic and political actors can only be sensible and have significant consequences when considered beyond domestic field-creation and with respect to the need to use economic foreign policy to place the country within the international political economy (Pop, 2007). Henceforth, to conceive of the international state-system as a *field* is to acknowledge that said field is constituted as a *distinct sphere* which only particular actors may have access to, where there are clearly-agreed-upon rules of engagement and where the distribution of resources is relatively stable and therefore has a structural quality.

In order to fully understand the dynamic relationship between states and the international field, in this case Romania and the IMF, it is worth recalling another major element of Bourdieudian sociology: the concept of *habitus*, which consists of “systems of durable, transposable dispositions, structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992: 58). In other words,

structures manifest themselves in the actors' internalized *sense* of their own place in a particular social context, or within a particular *field*, and the *rationalizations* that they employ in order to understand their position (ibid.). By acting in this sense, often unconsciously, both individual and collective actors *structure* distributions of material power.

For Bourdieu, certain practices arise out of the interwoven and dynamic interaction between *habitus* and *field*. However, the practices that are most relevant for the study of the international sphere are those associated with what Bourdieu (1991) identifies as the *logic of honour* and which brings along with it the issue of contestation. This pressure to shield declared norms from open contestation is visible in interactions in the international field; because states and intergovernmental organizations embody the highest forms of political authority in relation to their domestic constituencies and in relation to each other, there is a heightened sense of danger about their interactions (ibid.). As a result, high-level interactions between actors in the international sphere occur in accordance with elaborate rules of protocol that are supposed to shield and satisfy the sense of identity, and the *sense of honour*, of all the legitimate participants (ibid.). Consequently, this Bourdieusian analysis of the relationship between the state and the international political stage can serve as a reinforcement of the Derridean critique of the hegemonic neoliberal project and its subversion of socialist identity; that is, neoliberal 'honour' must be kept safe from the prospect of challenge at all costs.

As such, on one level, the relationship between the successive Romanian governments of the 1990s and the IMF can be seen as an example of attempts to maintain the existing social fabric and to reproduce existing hierarchies. For example, the Romanian governments, throughout repeated applications for international financial assistance, accepted all conditions as supplicants who have to function according to established practices and conventions; they did not give into the temptation to issue a challenge to the IMF's authority (Pop, 2007). A case in point is the 1997-1998 Democratic Convention of Romania (CDR) government led by Victor Ciorbea. In its eagerness to demonstrate to the international community that Romania was a true neoliberal reformer, the government implemented a shock therapy program that by and large ignored previous experience with price liberalisation and the difficulties inherent in implementing structural reform (Pasti, 1998). Eventually, the government was forced to acknowledge the fact that ensuring social peace was rewarding in and of itself, even in the eyes of foreign actors; by giving in to protesters and delaying either the restructuring or closure of some of the greatest loss-makers in the economy, Ciorbea strengthened Romania's case as a factor of political stability in the region (Pavel and Huiu, 2003). In general, thus, the CDR enjoyed far greater trust and recognition on the part of their foreign counterparts and this was perhaps the result of their unwavering pro-Western rhetoric (Pop, 2007). Consequently, this Bourdieudian discussion of economic development in Romania during the 1990s and following the fall of communism lends credence to the argument that post-communism has opened up a new space for understanding modernity; one of constant struggle to redefine an identity and to find a place in the new world created by drastic structural and political shifts.

In conclusion, this paper has provided an extensive and elaborate examination of the phenomenon of post-communism by paying close and careful attention to the modernity-postmodernity juxtaposition. The neoliberal project, or struggle, is one that highlights the hegemony of so-called campaigns to create 'free-market economy', which in reality serves as a pretext to impose a certain politico-economic agenda, or to defend a sense of 'honour', as per Bourdieu's understanding of honour. The consideration of Romania's relationship with the IMF is a case in point; governments' desires to emancipate the country and modernize it, as it were, were inevitably going to be constrained by international influence, and national development was equaled to an alignment with Western post-communist economic projects.

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BALKAN NATIONAL REPUBLICS: BETWEEN VIOLENCE AND MALAISE

by Jakub Stepaniuk



Introduction

As evidenced by the results of Brexit referendum in the United Kingdom; the rising popularity of Marine Le Pen in France and Matteo Salvini in Italy; and the reforms conducted by the Fidesz or Law and Justice parties of Hungary and Poland, respectively, we can easily observe a common phenomenon. Both the *old* and the *new* Europe has started thinking in a *national* way. Transformation of political agendas within various segments of state governance including economic protectionism, reversal of historical policies, greater attention to the cultural demographics of a community, or public security can be inscribed into a general pattern of the so-called renaissance of nation states. In order to understand the meaning of this *renaissance* phenomenon, we have to bear in mind that only a couple of years ago, national epithets were usually associated with the irreversible past. Domination of liberal discourses underpinning Francis Fukuyama's vision of a globalised, democratic paradise shoved the idea of a nation state towards the old-fashioned ideological margins or dark sides of alternative online journalism. Governmental predecessors including Hungarian MSZP or Polish PO were too ashamed to tackle the issues of national identity as they believed the identity values lost their significance in wake of successful economic transformation. Representatives of the new national parties were expected to enter the public space by sneaking into private houses on colourful leaflets; no one however believed their flamboyant slogans could ever step into parliaments and executive offices. Annexation of Crimea, war in Donbas, cyber interference into elections, or terrorist attacks – all of these instances prove that European security or relative *Pax Europaea* are not the subjects of perpetual warranty, as antagonistic national interests still play a considerable role.

Nationalisation of governmental agendas is definitely a continuous process, but is it actually a pattern spreading equally throughout our continent? Let me focus for now on the geographical area of the Balkan Peninsula (sometimes known as Southeastern Europe). Indeed, any contemporary event encompassing politics (the most recent elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina), security (conciliatory dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina), as well as more social themes including sports (celebrating Croatian success at 2018 World Cup) or architecture (Skopje 2014 project) are predominantly defined through national discourses. It is worth pointing out, however, that in contrast to the rest of Europe, the *national renaissance* in Southeastern Europe cannot be limited to the last decade. Whereas Fukuyama's dream of economic and social liberalisation was usually realised by the governments of other post-communist states during

the (post)-transition period, the newly sovereign nations of the Balkans were drowning in a domestic slaughter aroused by the ideas that Fukuyama had sent to the ideological dustbin of history. As a result of profound wounds, post-war reconstruction in the late Twentieth Century only prolonged the dominance of national discourses, which continue today.

Hence, in this paper I would like to first explain Balkan exceptionalism, focusing on the ontological factors which have led towards different perceptions of the nation state. The analysis will then proceed to evaluate the major flaws within the current project of nation state building and conclude with an examination of possible alternative solutions.

Are the Balkans Actually Different?

Imagining the Balkans, written by the Bulgarian sociologist Maria Todorova, has been regarded as one of the most ground-breaking works attempting to conceptualise the notion of the so-called *Balkan otherness*. Having a parallel linkage with the theoretical assumptions derived from Edward Said's *Orientalism*, *Balkanism* can be recognised as nothing more than a demeaning Western stereotype portraying the region of Southeastern Europe in colours of backwardness, barbarianism, or despotism (Todorova, 2009). It is significant to emphasize the fact that *Balkanism* serves, in its essence, as an invented concept for particular, discursive means, whereas its emergence was virtually associated with distinct socio-political phenomena occurring during the pre-WWI period (Bakić-Hayden, 1995). Therefore, *eastern* or *oriental* epithets portray something to be politically fragile and sluggish. The constructivist origin of the *Balkanisation* concept is especially visible when juxtaposing it against the ones which it is supposed to address. Since the *Balkan ghost* of economic deficiency, sanguine lords, and callous violence floats around and does not determine any specific borders, anyone who can manipulate their own geography struggles to deny its regional affiliation and flees either to *better* Central (Slovenia, Croatia, Romania) or Western (Greece) *Europes*.

"If the Balkans hadn't existed, they would have been invented," claimed the German philosopher, Hermann Keyserling (Todorova, 2009). In his 1928 thesis, Keyserling ascertains that the existence of a conceptualised Balkan region within dominant, national, and comparative discourses ensures that somewhere in Europe exists something worse, lagging politically and economically. It's not very difficult to recognise the artificiality of *Balkanism* as particular deficiencies might occur anywhere. After all, Greater Serbia or Albania do not really differ in their essence from Greater Hungary or Italy. With a quizzical tone of Ziemowit Szczerek's *Intermarium*, social and political oddities observed in Poland are identified with allegedly similar oddities evidenced in Kosovo. This shows how universal the use of *Balkanisation* is, instead of criticising the quality of roads or mentality of people in *civilised* parts of Europe it is easier just to compare everything with Kosovo (Szczerek, 2017). Does it still make sense to apply Balkan exceptionalism in theoretical deliberations on nation state policies if apparently there is nothing really exceptional? Even though the constructivist perspective undermines the notion, I would like to present a couple of arguments supporting the idea of Balkan *otherness*, limited to the sphere of nation state perception. The reasons for the national renaissance in the Balkans (which has lasted for the past several decades, not just the past couple of years, as has been espoused by those in Western/Central Europe) stem from historical factors out of which I would like to identify the three major ones.

First, the Durkheimian modernity processes present in Western Europe during the Nineteenth Century perfectly fit nation state building projects. The governments of these states played an important role in the dissemination of obligatory and common education, the standardisation of dialects in the form of a common language, the emergence of inclusive culture, institutionalised bureaucracies, and rapid industrialisation; in sort, these projects acknowledged the special role the nation had in serving as a cementing ingredient of a given community. These applications of positive intervention by the state

demonstrate an utterly different understanding of reality when looking at the region of Southeastern Europe. As it arrived with serious delay, the purpose of national identity for the sake of constructing nation states was completely reversed and perceived as a consolidating factor against the Ottoman and Habsburg Empires. Increased national identity enabled and strengthened antagonisms, rising insurrection, and the eventual deconstruction of their administrations and authorities. This might explain the assumption why common application of nationalism primarily leads towards resistance against alleged foreignness and consequent use of violence.

Secondly, in contrast to the majority of Western and Central European states, the Balkan ethnic composition includes communities with a various distributions of identities divided along complex religious and traditional lines. Moreover, a lack of geographical separation has posed and continues to pose an enormous challenge to the efforts of establishing a relatively consistent and homogenous nation states in the region. This presumably explains the decision of the first group of post-Ottoman leaders who united the region and established a multi-ethnic state of Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SHS) (renamed in 1929 for Yugoslavia).

Thirdly, no other European region possesses a strong Ottoman legacy (with exception for Hungary, although the Ottoman influence vanished there by the end of Seventeenth century). The presence of an Ottoman administration in Balkans, which lasted for more than five centuries, not only hampered the progression of modernity (which completely reversed the application of nationality in state building projects), but also influenced ethnic structures through partial Islamisation of Slavic populations in Bosnia. Such conversion profoundly mixed various ethnic communities to the extent where it was impossible to identify exclusive ethnic affiliations. Post-feudal model of social stratification was also deranged by favouring those who converted to Islam.

By understanding these three historical factors, we can better comprehend the reasons as to why the entire history of modern Balkan statehood was immersed in the issues of mutated national states, while its renaissance has been rampantly flourishing since the emergence of the SHS. What is less obvious, but genuinely worth mentioning in this analysis, is the existence of nation building concepts and efforts even during least expected periods, namely the socialist Yugoslav times. Dexterous manipulation between two extremes of the creation of pan-ethnic, Titoist Yugoslavian identity on the one hand and recognition of ethnic rights on the foundations of World War Two nationalism on the other, was a key tactic of the communists rulers in enabling the coerced existence of the federation. The awakening (or emergence) of a national identity among Macedonians or Muslim Slavs, the ousting of Prime Minister Aleksandar Ranković in 1966 for alleged unitary tendencies (associated with a fear of excessive Serbian domination), and the violent suppression of revived national identity during the 1971 Croatian Spring serve as arguments against those who believe that the issue of nationality was successfully quelled and vanished from Yugoslav policymaking (Sekulić, Massey & Hodson, 1994). Instead, these examples show a significant tenacity of nation state concepts regardless of the preferences for national sovereign separation or *fraternal* unification.



Is There an Alternative to Balkan Nation State Building?

What sort of political outcomes can we identify while reflecting on post-1995 efforts of nation state re-building in the Balkans? Croatia currently finds itself in the middle of reversing historical policies—seemingly attempting to assign the blame of inducing recent Yugoslav wars on Serbia. Moreover, the government is simultaneously scrubbing the record of its own cooperation with Nazi Germany which led to the creation of a fascist puppet Independent State of Croatia (NDH), whose leaders perpetrated massive ethnic cleansings in the Jasenovac concentration camp. The absence of agreement between Belgrade and Pristina presumably serves as one of the key reasons which is preventing Serbian progress in negotiations with the European Union. The most radical example, Bosnia and Herzegovina, since the end of the civil war has been notoriously threatened with separatist efforts of Serbian and Croatian constitutional entities while the political structure based on the Dayton agreement, instead of uniting and empowering, divides everyone and everything through subjugating any viable decision to identity concerns. If we would assume that nowadays political success can be measured by the condition of transparent and inclusive institutions enabling existence of democratic structures and economic prosperity, Bosnia would achieve a genuinely miserable feedback. Adding to this a pile of discrimination cases (Sejdić and Finci for instance), separationist education (e.g. national floors of primary schools) or national duplication of institutions even in the smallest towns only prove that nation state projects turn into ridiculous missions invigorating bureaucracy, providing more opportunities for corruption and slowing down reform processes due to structural complexities.

Let us focus on recent Macedonian politics and make a controversial assumption. The success of the so-called Colourful Revolution in 2016 and the establishment of a new socialist government resulted in achieving something which, during the authority of nationalistic VMRO-DPMNE, was perceived as unachievable – a breakthrough in relations with Greece and Bulgaria. Accomplishments including the enforcement of the Prespa Agreement and a friendship treaty with Sofia opened new paths towards profound reforms and comprehensive democratisation. They were positively received by European Commission, which in its most recent report suggested the possibility of initiating accession negotiations.

In observing these changes, we should ask ourselves why other Western Balkan governments have not yet embarked on Skopje's path which apparently proves that discarding national attitude in policy making precipitates reforms, enables democratisation, and makes the country more transparent and reliable for potential foreign investments.

However, political reality is slightly different. The reasons why the revolution was successful in Macedonia in 2016 and why it cannot erupt during ongoing protests in Tirana, Podgorica and Belgrade can be explained by the fact that, so far, no one has managed to capture the state better than the VMRO-DPMNE. In Macedonia, leaders who subordinated and corrupted the entire administrative structure, while simultaneously (and illegally) eavesdropping on more than 20 thousand people, polarised and outraged society enough to evoke rebellion. Although Aleksandar Vučić, Milo Đukanović and Edi Rama have timidly taken some steps in a similar direction, they are still too far from Nikola Gruevski's authoritarian trophies. Second, no one can assure that the currently protesting opposition in other Balkan states would follow Zoran Zaev's conciliatory path. Hence, there is a lack of confidence whether ventures such as Belgrade's natural recognition of Kosovo's independence or Banja Luka naturally approving decisions of federal government in Sarajevo would eventually take place. Third, a successful and democratic change has to be performed with a bottom up approach; undoubtedly, opposing the will of the people does not seem to be genuinely democratic. The challenge is not only ingrained in the fact that governments prefer national approach, it is also the attitude of the majority of population which these authorities represent. Even the case of Zaev should not be that idealised. For many, the concept of

“North Macedonia” is seen as nothing more than a callous betrayal and disgrace against an entire nation, which can explain the huge protests opposing the implementation of Prespa Agreement.

National Future?

A sudden withdrawal from the national discourses dominating the societies of Southeastern Europe does not seem to be very realistic. By agreeing with the assumption that nation states in Balkans are just inevitable, let us try to identify possible solutions which might *debalkanise* the region, prevent massive migration, and improve economic prosperity. Some time ago, *Balkan Insight* published a couple of commentary pieces outlying an interesting polemic between two academics: Jasmin Mujanović and Timothy Less. While both agree that national identity is going to shape further policies in the region, Mujanović hopes that ongoing languid efforts of developing civil society, recognizing the rights of national minorities, and improving inter-ethnic dialogue will eventually legitimise the sense of multi-national states. Any alternative sounds better than a violent confrontation meaning that the status quo should be maintained even for the cost of maintaining the current malaise state.

Alternative perspectives provided by Less critically assess the contemporary Balkans and suggest the need for an urgent change. At best this urgent change can be accomplished by redrawing state borders to ideally correspond to the ethnic divisions since fostering current inter-ethnic state would only deepen the despair we can observe. British academic repeats here the same narrative of local radicals saying that division of Bosnia or Kosovo apparently would solve all the regional problems. In case the division and homogenisation would make everyone happy I would like to just ask the advocates of these ideas how exactly they intend to perform them in political practice. How are they going to separate ethnically mixed regions and cities of Northern Kosovo, Sanjak or Bosnia, how intricate and unpractical the new borders would be, how three Muslim microstate entities of Bihać, Sarajevo and Novi Pazar would even function, how realisation of de facto Greater Albania vision would be approved by the rest of a new Balkan homogenous team, and, finally, how peacefully the new order would be accepted by the communities feeling unsatisfied with the new borders. More likely than not, the upcoming years are going to show consecutive outcomes of nation state policies. The fate of the deepening malaise terminating peacefully or violently lies in hands of leading executives and the maturity of their societies.

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
EASTERN EUROPE AND RUSSIA

THE ERA OF CHAOS: HOW THE SYMBIOSIS OF MEDIA AND THE RIGHT-WING WAVE ARE RUPTURING THE FOUNDATION OF DEMOCRACY

by Mikhail Zakharov

For many years, democracy has been well served by journalists. Their accuracy and impartiality has supported the basic norms of truth in society. The public and politicians have been able to rely on healthy mixture of domestic and foreign news. It stimulated the sustenance of the reasonable world politics, where there were few places to tell half-truth and outright lies.

However, recently the traditional model of journalism around the world has been gutted and replaced by a new approach to the coverage of events. The decreasing popularity of traditional media has coincided with the retreat from democracy, generated by the rise of right-wing ideas. The far-right is rising in Europe (but not only here), riding a wave of anti-immigrant rhetoric, anti-Semitism and Islamophobia. In Europe, it appears as a phenomenon of marginal media that constitutes a toxic combination of devotion to a political cause and passionate right-wing ideology. It led Britain down the Brexit road, it was deeply involved into the story with President Trump's success, it has helped populists to take control over Europe during elections (and probably will help them to get more seats in European Parliament next time). Its hostile and xenophobic messages provoke real hype storms and demolish society, turning politics into mind-numbing chain of scandals, like Trump's Twitter feed does.



The new wave of media is full of violence, hate-fueled rhetoric and fake news. This new phenomenon, closely connected to platforms such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, is a bizarre symbiosis of internet media, which promotes a sense of severe crisis in the world, with right-wing leaders and their twisted vision of liberal society. These leaders promise to return people to normality but to a normality under the conditions they deem appropriate. The far-right reject political correctness, which neoliberalism developed as a way of shielding hate speech. They brand themselves as “the true rebels” and, in fact, provide a host for ideologies that embrace actual violence to come in. (It's Going Down, 2017b)

Trump wants to Make America Great Again; Bolsonaro wants to Make Brazil Great Again, Alternative for Germany (AfD) wants to Make Germany Great Again. They offer to close borders and to get rid of migrants to make their countries safe. In France, far-right leaders, such as Marine Le Pen, the President of the National Rally (formerly known as the National Front until June 2018) warn that “without any action, this migratory influx will be like the barbarian invasion of the IV century, and the consequences will be the same.” These leaders further advocate that it is the burden and responsibility of the right wing to take charge and “immediately stop this madness to safeguard our social pact, freedom and identity.”(International Business Times, 2015) Populists ride the wave of protests against immigration, turning them into cascades. Today they embrace new technologies as the best way to get their message across. As more people have gained access to the Internet, far-right websites, like the page of the National

Front in France, have started speaking about subjects regarded as taboo in the press that spun a relatively narrow range of customary views. (BBC, 2017)


Right-wing media outlets like Fox News frequently use public communication against particular individuals or groups. They spread rumors, like the idea that the migrant caravan, making its way from Central America to the United States, is linked to George Soros and they are connected with the rise of anti-immigrant rhetoric. (Slate, 2018) They invert every criticism of itself back onto its enemies, like militias and right-wing biker groups proclaim in the USA: “Anarchists are the shock troops of the Communist, Democratic Party, and are funded by George Soros!” (It's Going Down, 2017a)

They also utilize media outlets to unify their supporters: the right-wing firebrand Steve Bannon does this through *Breitbart*. But if today's right-wing populists of Europe are concentrating their efforts on the issue of immigration locally, Bannon's idea is to create a pan-European think tank “The Movement”, which seeks to develop their economic and social ideas. (Deutsche Welle, 2018a.) If he succeeds, the old continent will also have an access to *Breitbart* – and now in local languages, with local news. Moreover, the views of people divided by the Atlantic ocean are very similar: a struggle against immigration, support of “traditional values” in the areas of family, gender relations, and nationalism. This interaction between two continents will be of great help for the right-wing politicians and eurosceptics in their fight against other cultures and Brussels as a symbol of globalization – meanwhile, their countries may undergo a more precipitous decline in democratic freedoms.

Before the rise of today's social media network, right-wing followers were often gathering in local communities. But today their messages circulate with incredible speed across mainstream social media platforms. A good example of it is The Reconquista Germanica (RG), an right-wing channel running on the Discord application, which was set up to disrupt the 2017 elections in Germany. (Deutsche Welle, 2018b) They were instructed to create as many Twitter accounts as possible and to re-tweet their nationalistic materials as much as possible. Thus, the impression of RG representing a predominant point of view was created. (The Guardian, 2017) Today they are not a lonely marginal group of marginal: the far-right AfD, represented in the German Parliament today, as well as its supporters, were far more active and adjusted quicker than mainstream parties when it came to promoting their agenda on social media in the past few years. This effort helped the party to win seats in the national parliament for the first time in 2017 – with 12.6 percent of the vote. Half of all retweeted messages during the campaign were about Alternative for Germany, and its Facebook posts were shared five times more than those ones of any other party. (Reuters, 2018) According to Juan Carlos Medina Serrano of the Technical University of Munich's political data science team, “[AfD] used very aggressive and polarizing messages – that caused people to react more.” (Reuters, 2018)

Furthermore, they continue to gain further popularity by posting on issues such as crime committed by migrants and triggering negative emotions towards them, which is widely supported by far-right activists.

These various right-wing theories have become known to the vast majority of internet users. Being supported by social media, they have also resulted in a growing number of people committing violence. “Right-wing media is a gradient pushing rightwards, toward violence and oppression,” data scientist Emily Gorcenski wrote. (The Verge, 2018) It can be clearly seen on the example of far-right activity in Britain, ranging from Brexit to a rise in anti-Semitism. As the British anti-extremism commissioner Sara Khan has noted: “We are seeing a new wave of the far right: modernized, professionalized and growing; supported by a frightening amount of legal online extremist material”. (The Guardian, 2018) British lawyer Anthony Julius agrees with Khan about the anti-Semitism that the Jewish community in Britain faces today: “I am concerned by the threat from a disaffected, street smart, social media-adept right in this country that is learning from the populist right in Hungary, Poland and also the United States”. (The



Times of Israel, 2019) Maybe, nowadays it can happen seemingly at random, but in future we will face it more often.

Perhaps the global rise of populists and the influence of big platforms are not clearly correlated. But today large right-wing news channels make their stories go viral on Facebook and other social network sites, where the right-wing

influencers can create more content to share, like memes, and promote hate speech across the globe. They utilize digital technologies to create new channels of alternative media and to change existing platforms. When Facebook or Twitter attempt to clean up offensive content and misinformation, they grow their own social networks, like Gab – the free speech social network, as it's called. "You know, this social media starts as a place to be free and open and share a bunch of thoughts and ideas all willy-nilly is the way it should be," says one of its followers and writers. "I don't want you to feed me – I want a buffet, where I can pick what I want. I don't want an algorithm to control my news feed, I want to decide for myself." (NPR, 2017)

Mainstream media may also contribute to the overall radicalization of public discourse by covering the preferred topics of right-wing populist forces and providing a platform for their position to reach the public. Right-wing populist forces capitalize on these communication channels to actively provide interpretive frames of events in an attempt to impact the general media discourse. "Their discourse still has a strong power of attraction on the population ... [and] a big part of their game is to influence politics by influencing culture and public opinion in some ways, without ever doing politics directly. They've maintained that power", says Maxime Fiset, a former neo-Nazi who now works at the center for the prevention of radicalization leading to violence in Canada. (Al Jazeera, 2018) This radicalization can grow the new sort of people that will be much more careful with their language and be certainly less aggressive on the streets, distancing itself from the violence but simultaneously advocating it. Nonetheless the radicalization of public discourse will feed the movement, pushing the public towards the far-right.

By supporting the media hype, contaminated with this kind of discourse, we legitimize the populism of Le Pen and Trump, Bolsonaro and Nigel Farage. This legitimization is their desire: populists want to create the perception that they speak "for the people", even though they may only represent an angry and vociferous minority. (HuffPost, 2017) We can say this is true for all politicians, but the willingness to claim that they speak for the majority can lead to hazardous outcome. We should not underestimate the threat posed by this ideology, and the intense media attention can only fuel their achievements. But after the years of extreme media hype, today we see that the far-right figures are reaping the fruits of their victories in elections of all levels.

Therefore, the symbiosis of internet media with right-wing leaders can lead to the overall change of the current world-order. It didn't create a whole new media platform but it shifted the discourse in a different direction – towards rupturing society as we know it. Right-wing figures reform discourse, identities and the concepts of power and culture, using media. That makes a picture of a dangerous world where people need protection and where only right-wing politicians can protect them. It influences not only voting – it pushes people to take matters into their own hands and to resort to violence.

Today we ought to try to filter out media hype and not let hype storms obscure the important issues in today's changing political agenda. Social media platforms together with agencies should find ways to decrease extremism, or these texts, memes and hate speech will continue to manipulate people and rupture the foundations of democracy. If we challenge their propaganda and debunk the conspiracies that can provoke hatred and distrust we can beat this appalling symbiosis.

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THE RISE OF THE EUROPEAN RUSSIAN STATE: HOW THE DIPLOMACY AND FOREIGN POLICY OF THE EARLY RUSSIAN TSARS AND PETER THE GREAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE EUROPEANIZATION OF RUSSIA

by Jack H. Lashendock⁴



Abstract

The use of foreign policy and diplomacy to advance the interests of the State has remained at the core of statecraft since the earliest days of its practice. Its successes and failures are evident throughout history and its tenets continue to be practiced by people from all reaches of the globe. Particularly in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Century, the use of diplomacy and foreign policy helped to define, and oftentimes, redefine the borders of European empires. This impact on power and prestige was not lost on the emerging nation to the East— the Muscovite State.

This paper seeks to examine the foreign policy strategies of Muscovy and the succeeding Russian Empire (which formed the foundation of the modern state). As the Muscovite/Russian state grew in size and power, leaders from both time periods understood the importance of the European empires. The author finds that by means of warfare, conquest, political actions, and personal and cultural diplomacy, Russian Tsars attempted to not only establish themselves as powerful continental actors but forge closer ties with Europe in the process. Their motivation was an effort to redefine the Muscovy/Russian nation and combat the ideas of backwardness which were so often associated to its people and society. By heavily adopting European values and creating an empire modeled after those of Europe, it was the hope of Russian leaders that their European counterparts would take the Eastern nation seriously and treat it as an equal.

The piece is divided into two sections, the first section of this piece will be devoted to foreign policy goals and success of the early rules of Muscovy: Grand Duke of Moscow Vasili II (1425-1462), Ivan III (1462-1505), Vasili II (1505-1533), and Ivan the VI (1533-1584). The second section will place a particular emphasis on the reign of Peter the Great (1682-1725) and his efforts to reform the Russian state into a nation more on par with the societies of the Central European Empires.

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Introduction

The annals of history are filled with the ambitious actions of kings, princes, and ruling dynasties as they sought to expand their rule, their wealth, and above all, their power. Nowhere is this more exemplified than in Europe and over the course of the last millennium; principalities, kingdoms, and empires have risen to enormous heights only to be dissolved from the map by more powerful actors or the failure of statecraft within their borders.

At the beginning of the 16th Century, a new power was emerging from the East, seeking to upset the status quo of European nations. The Muscovite State, which would later become the Russian Empire, was beginning to exert control in the region and establish ties to Europe. Throughout its history, Russia has always had a connection to Europe and powerful rulers have never hesitated to use the full extent of diplomacy to capitalize on this connection. From the ancestors of Ivan IV to Peter the Great, each leader conducted their own diplomacy and foreign policy in very different (and perhaps even contradictory) ways, yet each was committed to the betterment of the state, the exertion of greater central Muscovite power, and the establishment of a European Russian state.

In an effort to redefine their nation and combat ideas of backwardness, Russian Tsars used foreign policy and diplomacy to advance a modern Russian Empire based heavily on the characteristics of the nations of Europe. Over the course of several hundred years, Muscovite leaders and Russian Tsars transformed their small and comparatively weak nation state into which could compete with the powerful, continental European allies.

The Early Russian Empire Under the Muscovites and Expansion into Europe

The growth of the Muscovite state first began under Grand Duke of Moscow Vasili II following victory in a civil war during the mid-15th Century, however expansion into Europe was not yet a priority of the young state. During his reign, Vasili II expanded the control of Moscow, capturing ethnic Russian lands, such as Novgorod, via warfare and treaty (Vernadskij, 1936). Through the use of absolutism, he abolished all perceived political threats within the Moscow dominion by “[eradicating] all vestiges of sovereignty or even autonomous government in its comment parts” to prevent the destruction of his power (Florinsky, 1969, p. 63). Under such a system of governance, the decisions of the state were not subject to approval by anyone other than Vasili III himself and, due to the somewhat universality for the time, absolute rule served as one of the first common denominators between the Russian state and the European empires. The two entities would continue to share similar progression of governance styles with pure authoritarianism giving way to governments influenced by elite driven legislative system.

Following the death of Vasili II in 1462, his son, Ivan III, continued his father’s legacy. Likewise relying on absolutism, the new leader expanded Muscovite influence and power over the weaker regional principalities, until finally incorporating them as part of his young nation. Over the course of his reign, Ivan III skillfully acquired Vereia, Yaroslavl, Rostov, Tver, and Viatka with a foreign policy strategy of treaties, military conflict, and absolutism (Florinsky, 1969). Perhaps his greatest contribution to the establishment of the Russian empire was his part in the defeat of the Mongol Golden Horde via a complex network of alliances and war tactics. In doing so, Ivan III opened further opportunities for the Muscovites to expand their state eastern ward. In addition to exerting control over local lands within *Great Russia*, Ivan III began to expand Moscow’s power in Europe. By marrying the niece of the final Byzantine Emperor, Ivan III solidified the early relationship between Moscow and Europe. This politically advantageous marriage allowed him to claim the legacy of the Emperor, and moreover it began – perhaps a few centuries early – the Europeanisation of Russia. Zoe, the European princess who took

the Russian name Sophia, brought with her European artists and architects who helped to Europeanize Moscow and the etiquette of the Russian court became more similar to the elaborate European courts upon her arrival (Vernadskij, 1936).

Ivan III's diplomatic efforts were not only contained within Muscovy. Seeking to change the perspective of Muscovy as an unorganized and unruly backwater state and redefine Russia's relations with Europe (at that time the most powerful collection of power), Ivan III began to cultivate modern diplomatic relations with nations West of Moscow. As a result, these two worlds, with very little in common, were soon working to become better neighbors. By the close of the 15th Century, Ivan III had cordial relations with a number of European entities. Foreign exchanges with the Holy See, the Holy Roman Empire, and Hungary amounted to little more than cordial embassy exchanges. Conversely, more meaningful relations with the Danes (for the purposes of checking the power of Sweden) and those with Italy (to facilitate the one sided transfer of artistic talent from the former nation to early Russia) emphasized the increased symbiotic relationships between East and West (Florinsky, 1969). Additionally, like other European powers, Muscovy under Ivan III expanded its foreign relations globally to the Ottoman Empire and India.

Vasili III, Ivan III's successor, continued to build these relations when he took the throne in 1505. During his rule, the monarch further extended diplomatic invitation to France, Pope Leo X of the Papal States, and returned peace between Muscovy and Sweden (Florinsky, 1969). Moreover, during Vasili III's rule the emerging European state began to establish early relations to the south with the Safavid Empire. In the early 1520s, the Russians received an envoy from Shah Ismail I, likely regarding trade relations and control over important routes, as well as a military alliance against the Ottoman Empire (Mattheem, 1994, p. 741). Beyond this, Vasili III's time in power was relatively uneventful in unique foreign policy, due to his emphasis on cementing the work done by his father.

By time Ivan IV assumed power of the Muscovite State in 1547, the land-area of the empire had nearly quadrupled in size since Vasili II began the modern state. Ivan IV's success in foreign policy was certainly due to his domestic policy and his unification of the Russian State into an empire. During his reign, he expanded the Russian state beyond the Ural Mountains by use of force, annexing Siberia to "bring Central Asia and the Middle East within the Russian sphere of interest" and maintain economic interests in both regions (Florinsky, 1969, p. 102). This interest in forceful diplomacy defined Ivan's tenure as the Russian Empire's first tsar. Additionally, Ivan IV did find some success in the continuation of diplomatic relations with Europe, and through correspondences and trade exchange, Ivan was able to cultivate a relationship with Queen Elizabeth I of Great Britain, gaining her support so much as to secure assurance of asylum in Great Britain should he need to flee Russia (Anon, 2016).

These contributions of the early tsars helped establish footholds in Europe, and various treaties, marriages, and even conflicts bound this rising eastern power with established powers in the west. The groundwork these men established provided enormous benefits to the future leaders of the Russian Tsardom.

Cultural Ambassador: Peter the Great and the Establishment of a European Russian Empire

When Peter the Great became the leader of the Russian Empire in 1682, he continued the aggressive European style diplomacy which had defined the reigns of his predecessors. However, more so than engaging with Europe in political diplomacy, Peter began also to style his own nation after his western neighbors in what can only be defined as cultural diplomacy. In the era of Peter the Great, the upper echelons of the Russian state, that is the rulers and aristocratic class, began to look more like the high

society of *Europe-proper*⁵, while remote peasant communities still reflected the uniqueness of traditional Russian society.

One of the biggest accomplishments of Peter the Great was the founding of a city, St. Petersburg, to control his increasingly European empire, aptly named after the great leader's patron saint. This city, located in the Europe half of Russia, became the capital of the Russian Empire, yet the city itself was far from Russian. In his comprehensive book on Russia, Orlando Figes (2002) writes of St. Petersburg: "Every aspect of its Petrine culture was intended as a negation of 'medieval' (seventeenth century) Muscovy. As Peter [the Great] conceived it, to become a citizen of Petersburg was to leave behind the 'dark' and 'backward' customs of the Russian past in Moscow and enter, as a European Russian, the modern Western world of progress and enlightenment." (p. 10). In his poem, *The Bronze Horseman*, Alexander Pushkin (1833) further writes of the city and describes it as "a window on to Europe"; Figes (2002) adds further that the city was modeled after places such as Amsterdam, Venice, and Versailles in terms of city planning and architecture (pp. 8-10). In these canaled cities, pedestrians and those in horse-drawn carriages could expect to travel across the waterways over bridges or a well maintained system of regattas. Inspired, Peter attempted to replicate this European system (mainly from the Dutch and English) in his new capital, yet Russian enthusiasm for this mode of transportation was not equal to that of their European counterparts (Huges, 2002, pp. 178-179).

Peter the Great's use of this European city in the East contributed heavily to the foreign policy of his reign. From the marshy city Peter 'exported' Russian intellectuals to learn in the great centers of knowledge in Europe. The expectation was that these 'cultural ambassadors' would bring back all they learned in Europe, while at the same time promoting Russian interests abroad. Yet, many Europeans regarded Russia as still backwards and looked down on the nation despite its efforts at establishing cultural relations (Huges, 2002).



While this Europeanization of Russia served as an important, and newer method of conducting foreign policy, Peter the Great was also very reliant on more *traditional* means of executing foreign policy. In March 1697, Peter and a 250-strong team set out for a tour of Europe "for the confirmation of ancient friendship and love" (Huges, 2002, p. 40) and the reaffirmation of a European alliance against the Ottoman Empire. This Grand Embassy, as it was called, traveled to cities across

Europe and at each stop, Peter was able to study the culture and politics of his host nation, as well as conduct important diplomatic business. Upon his arrival home to Russia nearly two years later, Peter was able to use much of what he learned in northern Europe to establish a modern continental army—very similar to other European powers—to enforce his own foreign policy. Russian historian Figes (2002) notes of Peter the Great's European travels that "in Königsberg, he studied artillery. From his travels he picked up what he would need to turn Russian into a modern European state: a navy modeled on the Dutch and the English ones; military schools that were copies of the Swedish and the Prussian; and a Table of Ranks adapted from the Danes" (p. 12). For his own court governance, Peter looked to the court of Louis XIV creating "the post of *reketmeister*, an office modeled on the *maître de requêtes* at the

⁵Term coined by author to geographically describe the landmass to the West of the Russian state. Politically, the term can also refer to the powerful and established empires of the continent, including (but not limited to) France, the Holy Roman Empire, the Habsburg Monarchy, and Spain.

French court, to whom appeals could be addressed by individuals complaining about delays, red tape and abuses in hearings of cases in colleges and other bodies” (Huges, 2002, p. 169).

These observations, lessons, and replicated ideas helped Peter to establish a very Western army and navy, able to withstand the fury of other European nations (such as the Napoleonic Empire or the Swedes). Prior to the reign of Peter the Great, the Russian military was not a powerful force in comparison to many European neighbors; the army was neither well trained nor permanent, and there was no established Russian navy. In his childhood years, Peter began to organize a modern military amongst children his age (and of all classes) and during his reign he founded a strong standing Russian army – organized by European standards and strict discipline as outlined in his Military Statute, the *Ustav voinskiĭ* (Raeff, 1971, 39). As aforementioned, on the high seas, Peter founded a powerful navy, combining the knowledge he learned in the Netherlands with expert Dutch shipbuilders in Russia (from his father’s reign) (Crescente, 2014). Much like the land units, this navy was well disciplined and organized like the navies of England and the Netherlands whose copied precepts formed the basis of his Naval Statute (*Ustav morskoi*) (Raeff, 1971, p. 39).

The strongest link connecting the Russian state to the established empires of Europe-proper is undoubtedly the previously mentioned Table of Ranks, an elaborate system defining the hierarchy of the Army, Navy, and civil servant bureaucracies. Peter the Great biographer Huges (2002) emphasizes the Table of Ranks’ unique creation as a Russian system of organization influenced by a number of European nations. In designing the Table of Ranks, “English, French and Spanish ranking systems were ... examined, [and] were regarded as less appropriate for Russian condition” (Huges, 2002, p. 22) whereas the systems of the Swedes, Danes, and Prussians was seen as more appropriate for the Russian empire and adopted earnestly by Peter. The Table of Ranks was also used to strengthen the noble classes’ commitment to serving the newly improved Russian state. Those who held rank on the Table, the “eminent people” of Russian society, “were expected to have clothing (Western, naturally), carriages and livery appropriate to their office and calling” (Huges, 2002, p. 167) as would any *eminent person* in Europe.

During his reign, Peter the Great transformed the Russian political and social landscape into a nation modeled after Europe. In large part due to his diplomatic efforts –both political and cultural – Peter was able to project Russian power and new culture into Europe. Moreover, his diplomatic missions into Europe afforded him the opportunity to learn more about the societies he was emulating. Therefore, he was able to copy established institutions to help make his own state successful in culture, politics, and military.

Undoubtedly, Russia would likely never have developed into the nation it is today if not the skillful foreign policy efforts of the Muscovite kings and Russian Tsars. The leaders of Europe’s biggest nation (in landmass, at the very least) understood the importance of following a European model of development. From humble beginnings, Moscow evolved from a small dot on the Europe map to an impressive actor on the international stage. In achieving this, the aforementioned skilled foreign policy of Russia, wittingly or unwittingly, followed a similar course to that of European states: firstly, steadily expand the borders by means of conflict to thus gain power and prestige; once achieved, the second step (so to speak) was to use the varied tools of diplomacy to legitimize these new borders amongst neighbors and build up a support network of like-minded monarchs; the final aspect of this process was to use these networks to help better the state from within, be it culturally, politically, or militarily.

Epilogue

Following the reign of Peter the Great, Russia never lost the drive for greatness that was so evident throughout her history. However, the Europeanisation of the Russian Empire that began under the early Muscovite rulers and reached its zenith with Peter the Great did not last forever. Following the War of 1812 in Europe and the Napoleonic invasion of Russia, many members of the new generation of aristocrats began to question their national identity. The harsh conditions of the front had begun to wear down the boundaries that separated the aristocratic officers from their peasant enlisted men and helped foster a shared Russian identity. Once back home, these young officers rejected the court language of French in favor of Russian and replaced their fine European looks with the rugged look of the Russian common folk. This led to the creation of a new Russian— a nationalist committed to the ideal of keeping foreign influence out of Russia. Yet at the same time, the Russian state continued to be involved in European diplomacy and foreign affairs, ensuring that the external power of Russia had not changed.

Yet at the same time, the Russian state continued to be involved in European diplomacy and foreign affairs, ensuring that the external power of Russia had not changed. Following the ill-fated and arguably misguided Congress of Vienna, Russia was as much an European power as England or the restored Bourbon dynasty of France. At the Congress's conclusion in 1815, Russia had expanded her holdings in Poland, and greatly influenced the weaker powers of central, southern, and northern Europe. Despite the nationalism brewing amongst the Tsar's Napoleonic War veterans during this time, "Russia had become more of a European state than at any other time in its history" (King, 2008, p. 317). It was this congress which build on the actions of earlier leaders of the Russian state; Tsar Alexander understood (like his forebears) the importance of diplomacy in expanding the empire's borders and ideology.

Undoubtedly, this control of central and eastern Europe has not been abandoned by the current Russian political structure. While the Russian Federation cannot maintain control over the Europeanized Russian sphere of influence in the same way Tsar Alexander's imperial forces could, or in the brutal way of the Red Army and Soviet Leadership, they have nevertheless adapted to meet the challenge.

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CIVILISATIONAL CLASHES IN THE POST-SOVIET SPACE

by Tom Wagenmakers

Introduction

In March 2014, Russia annexed the Crimean peninsula. The reasons for this move can be traced back to the denial of the former Ukrainian president Yanukovych to sign the Association Agreement with the European Union (EU). After this denial, protesters took the street in Ukraine. Yanukovych fled from Ukraine to Russia and a new, pro-Western government came to power in Ukraine. Subsequently, Russia annexed Crimea and in the east of Ukraine breakaway republics declared independence and are waging war with the Ukrainian government. The conflict in Ukraine severely set back EU-Russia relations. Right after the annexation of Crimea, the EU introduced sanctions against Russia. NATO responded as well, by suspending cooperation with Russia (BBC News).



This research puts the Ukrainian crisis and the resulting crisis in EU-Russia relations in a broader context, showing that the starting point of the Ukrainian crisis, when put in the context of the Clash of Civilizations, can be pointed out to be right after the end of the Cold War. The framework suited to accomplish this is thus the theory of the Clash of Civilizations, based on research focused on primary and secondary sources. Several scholars like Scuticchio have argued against the existence of a Clash of Civilizations in Ukraine. Scuticchio's argument is that Russian foreign policymakers follow national interests as their guide for foreign policy and that culture does not play that great of a role (Scuticchio, 2014). However, this approach is limiting from the start. This research holds that the Clash of Civilizations can be applied to events much broader than culture alone. The goal of this research is to answer the following research question: "To what extent can the Euromaidan Crisis be considered as a manifestation of a Clash of Civilizations between the European Union and Russia?"

To answer this question, this research will start with an explanation of the theory of the Clash of Civilizations. Accompanying this will be an explanation of why Ukraine is a striking example of a so called "torn country" to which the theory of the Clash of Civilizations applies.

Secondly, the research will show that the EU is a representation of the Western civilisation, whereas Russia, on the other hand, is a civilisation on its own. This is central in applying Huntingtons' theory.

The last chapter will show how both Russia and the EU are moving closer to each other in the post-Soviet space and the subsequent crisis in Ukraine are manifestations of a clash of civilisations between Russia and the EU.

Concluding, this research holds that the Euromaidan revolution and the subsequent crisis in Ukraine are a manifestation of a clash of civilisations between Russia and the EU, which has been dormant since the end of the Cold War and which the Ukraine crisis shed light on.

Chapter 1 – The Clash of Civilizations and Ukraine

The Clash of Civilizations

Huntington states that the fundamental source of conflict in the post-Cold War world will be cultural, neither primarily ideological nor economic. (Huntington, 1993) He holds that as the Cold War ended, international politics ended its predominantly Western phase and the main focus became the interaction between the West and non-Western civilisations⁶ and among non-Western civilisations. (ibid) This would end Western colonialism at the same time, since the non-Western civilisations would join the Western civilisations in shaping history.

Some of the civilisations Huntington states are the following: Western, Confucian, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American and African. (ibid) Huntington holds that the most important conflicts of the future would be along the cultural fault lines that separate these civilisations from each other. These fault lines are central. As the Cold War ended, the ideological division of Europe disappeared and the cultural division of Europe between Western Christianity and Orthodox Christianity and Islam re-emerged. (ibid) According to Huntington, this fault line separating the Western European civilisation from the Slavic-Orthodox civilisation goes right through the post-Soviet space and Ukraine, which brings us to the application of the theory to Ukraine.

“Torn countries”

Huntington introduces the notion of a “torn country”. According to Huntington, torn countries are countries that are divided over whether their society belongs to one civilisation or another. (Huntington) Usually, torn countries want to join the West, but their history, culture and traditions are non-Western. A torn country is thus engaged in a kind of identity crisis. To solve this, a torn country has to redefine its civilisation’s identity, and to do this it has to meet three requirements. (Huntington) First of all, the political and general elite in a torn country has to be generally supportive of and enthusiastic about a move towards the West. Secondly, the people of the torn country have to accept the redefinition of the country. Lastly, the dominant groups in the society to which the torn country wants to move have to accept the torn country.

Ukraine is situated right between the Russian Slavic-Orthodox civilisation and the Western civilisation represented by the EU. Being a part of the Soviet bloc until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine can be considered to have been part of the Slavic-Orthodox civilisation until the dissolution of the Soviet Union, if not only because of the Russification policies pursued by the Soviet Union. (Zbyr, 2015) Considering Ukraine’s political history, with swings between pro-Russian and pro-Western presidents, we can conclude that Ukraine is, in fact, a torn country. Thus, having shown that Ukraine is a torn country, it is now clear that the theory of the Clash of Civilisations is applicable to Ukraine.

⁶ The difference between “civilisation” and “civilization” stems from the difference in American English and regular English. This research is written in regular English, so it will use “civilisation” when not referring to the specific words of Huntington.

Chapter 2 – On the Both Sides of the Fault Line: Normative Power Europe and Russia as the Third Rome

Normative Power Europe

One of the main scholars on the EU as a normative power is Manners. He holds that the EU having normative power means that it is able to “shape conceptions of ‘normal’ in international relations”. (Manners, 2002) The Union’s normative basis has been developed through declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and conditions and can be called the *acquis communautaire* and *acquis politique*. Manners shows five core norms in these *acquis*: peace, liberty, democracy, the rule of law and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

Ferguson, Mansbach, Buzan and Little agree: the EU is a unique actor. (ibid) Manners argues that its uniqueness stems from its difference from pre-existing political forms, which “pre-disposes it to act in a normative way.” (ibid) This implies a deterministic view: the Union acts as a normative power because it is built to do so. According to Manners EU norms can be diffused in several ways, one example being procedural diffusion. Procedural diffusion “involves the institutionalization of a relationship between the EU and a third party”. (ibid) Examples are EU membership in the WTO and EU enlargement. The Union is thus a unique actor, which bases itself on the concept of normative power and the diffusion of that normative power. This makes the EU an important representation of Western civilisation.

Russia as the Third Rome

There are many theories concerning the search for Russian identity after the fall of the Soviet Union. (Ostbo, 2016) however, in light of the theory of the Clash of Civilizations, which is central to this research, Russia as a Third Rome suits best. The idea of Russia as the Third Rome is characterized by Longworth as “a ‘myth’ that ‘was to provide the state with a religious justification for uniting not just the Russians but all Orthodox Christians, whether in Russia, Ukraine, the Balkans or the Levant.’” (ibid) Ostbo identifies four writers on the idea of the Third Rome. All four of them agree on the importance of Orthodoxy for the Russian identity. (ibid) Thus, the Orthodox religion makes the Third Rome unique. It is not only religion that makes Russia unique: the concept of the Third Rome ‘demonstrates’ Russia as unique in general and thus different from all other countries. (ibid) Tsymburskii, for example, stresses that Russia is a civilisation of its own. Another writer, Kholmogorov, justifies Russian expansion with the idea of the Third Rome, stating that the ‘Russian soil’ includes not only the East Slavic regions which are traditionally perceived as the Russian core area, but that it could also include any location inhabited by Russians or governed by the Russian state. (ibid) Hence, the idea of Third Rome justifies Russian expansionism. Dugin’s ideas about the Third Rome rely strongly on bipolarity between Rome and Carthage. (ibid) He identifies a ‘Roman line’ in world history: when the Roman empire fell, Byzantine continued its mission of fighting against the sea power until it was conquered by the Ottomans and after that Russia continued the battle against the sea power, which would now be the United States. (ibid) Dugin thus identifies Russia specifically as the heir of the Roman empire. Dugin’s view of the Third Rome as a clash between two powers while focusing on the uniqueness of Russia can very well be interpreted in line with the theory of the Clash of Civilizations.

Summing up the views in Ostbo’s book, the idea of Russia as the Third Rome is a good theoretical background against which to analyse the Russian policies in the post-Soviet space in light of a



clash of civilisations between the EU and Russia. The idea of Russia as the Third Rome portrays Russia as a civilisation distinct from the West with its own norms, values, traditions, history, religion and uniqueness, justifying Russian expansionism. Considering the fall of the Soviet Union and the wish to expand the 'Russian soil' to include the former Slavic countries, the Russian aims for the post-Soviet space might very well clash with the European policies in that same space.

Analysis & Conclusion – A Geopolitical Civilizational Clash

Moving closer to the fault line

The EU as a representation of a Western civilisation tried to integrate and influence the post-Soviet space by persuading states to harmonize their legal system to that of the EU. This worked out when in 2004 ten countries joined the EU, of which eight were post-Soviet states. (Murphy, 2006) The negotiations for the enlargement started in the 1990s, at the same time when Russia made a first try at reintegrating the post-Soviet space by launching the CIS. The CIS as an integrationist project failed, partly because the newly independent countries had to search for an identity and most of them chose to be part of the Western civilisation represented by the EU, (Smith, 2016) Russia conceded, hoping that EU enlargement would strengthen the EU politically and hence balance against US hegemony. (Gower, 2000) However, Russia gradually found out that EU enlargement was not entirely positive, negatively affecting the general EU policies towards Russia. (DeBardeleben, 2013) This became even more clear when the EU launched the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP), policy frameworks designed specifically to influence the countries in the post-Soviet space. (Bruns et al., 2016) By trying to integrate countries with no perspective on EU membership, the EU created dividing lines between the EU itself, the countries inside the ENP and the EaP and Russia, which remained outside of the policy structures. (ibid) We can thus see that the 2004 enlargement and the subsequent policies created the first unequal balance in EU-Russia relations concerning the post-Soviet space. It expanded the Union's normative power deep into the post-Soviet space, while Russia had no feasible integration project of its own.

This is the moment Russia changed its policies to the EU. The case of the colour revolutions demonstrated this clearly. During the colour revolutions, Russia actively supported pro-Russian regimes, trying to win back influence in the post-Soviet space. In the case of Ukraine, after the Orange Revolution, Russia can be considered successful, since in 2010 the pro-Russian candidate Yanukovich won the presidential elections. (Mearsheimer, 2014) Russian attempts to try to undermine Western influence in the post-Soviet space thus started during the colour revolutions.

Still, Russia did not have an integration project of its own capable to compete with the EU. This changed in 2010, when Belarus, Kazakhstan and Russia formed a customs union, which was later transformed into a full-fledged economic union: the Eurasian Economic Union. (Khitakhunov et al., 2017) This integration project is more successful than the CIS. With the EEU, Russia managed to lure Armenia away from integration with the EU and instead, it got Armenia to join the EEU. (Vasilyan, 2017) This shows the attractiveness the EEU has towards some countries in the post-Soviet space.

Considering all these events, we can see two civilisations moving closer to each other in the post-Soviet space simultaneously. Both the EU and Russia are trying to influence and claim the same area. The crucial element which makes this process a clash of civilisations, is the fault line described by Huntington.

According to the theory of the Clash of Civilizations, conflicts would erupt along the fault lines. This is exactly what happened. The EU has gradually moved closer towards the fault line and at one point tried to diffuse its normative power over the fault line: all countries on the east of the fault line except Russia

are in the ENP and the EaP. The EU is thus trying to influence countries which are not part of its own civilisational sphere, but which according to Huntington's fault line are part of Russia's civilisational sphere. Russia accordingly took steps to prevent the EU from influencing those countries and conflicts emerged along the fault line, as was visible in the case of the colour revolutions, and as was visible in the case of Armenia joining the EEU. The most striking example of a clash however, is Ukraine. The fault line cuts right through Ukraine, separating Catholic western Ukraine from the Orthodox east. (Huntington 1993) It is in Ukraine where the most severe crisis since the end of the Cold War facing Europe is happening now. The Euromaidan revolution in Ukraine is a manifestation of the two civilisations trying to exert their influence on the country. The EU, moving closer to the fault line, wanted to sign an Association Agreement with Ukraine. Russia, also moving closer to the fault line, pressured the country not to do so. After this, the Euromaidan revolution started, Yanukovich was ousted and a pro-Western government came to power in Kiev. (Cadier, 2014) Russia used this moment to intervene and annexed Crimea from Ukraine and supported the breakaway republics in the east of the country. (ibid) This conflict completely follows the theory of the fault lines in Huntington's Clash of Civilizations. The Euromaidan revolution occurred along a cultural fault line and the subsequent events are thus a manifestation of conflict as predicted by Huntington. Since the fault line which cuts through Ukraine is the same as the one dividing the post-Soviet space, the Euromaidan revolution is thus a manifestation of a broader conflict involving the entire post-Soviet space. Russia and the EU have both been trying to expand their civilisation and their influence in the post-Soviet space and conflicts between the civilisations started to emerge when they got closer to each other along the fault line. After the events in Ukraine EU-Russia relations got severely strained and both sides acknowledged that the status quo which once was, is now gone. (Pasatoiu, 201) Therefore, it is the Euromaidan revolution which woke the dormant clash of civilisations and made it discernible for the whole world.

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MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

A STATE FOR ALL ITS CITIZENS? THE NATION-STATE LAW AND ISRAEL'S CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSFORMATION TO A NATION-STATE OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE

by Robin F.C. Schmahl

Abstract

The article examines the 2018 'Basic Law: Israel as the Nation-State of the Jewish People' on the grounds of Israel's state identity and the its definition of nationality. It argues, that the law, while carrying real ramifications for minority groups, is a symbolic document reemphasizing the Jewish character of the state and has to be understood as being part of a transformational process within the Israeli constitutional narrative.

Introduction

In the wake of the 2019 Israeli elections and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu might acceding into his fifth term in office, questions on the present and future identity of Israel have gained more and more attention in international discourse. Not only the state's relation towards the Palestinian population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip but also towards Israeli non-Jewish citizens has been a point of fervent discussions. Benjamin Netanyahu made his position on that topic clear during the election campaign of 2019 stating during a cabinet meeting:

"I would like to clarify a point that, apparently, is not clear to slightly confused people in the Israeli public. Israel is a Jewish, democratic state. What this means is that it is the nation-state of the Jewish people alone [...] of course it respects the individual rights of all its citizens – Jews and non-Jews alike. But it is the nation-state, not of all its citizens, but only of the Jewish people. [...] The national representation of the Jewish people is in the State of Israel. Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people and of it alone." (Wootliff, 2019)

Those remarks were a reaction to an earlier discussion between the Prime Minister and actress Rotem Sela on social media, in which Sela initially posted on Instagram:

"[...] When the hell will someone in this government convey to the public that Israel is a state of all its citizens and that all people were created equal, and that even the Arabs and the Druze and the LGBTs and — shock — the leftists are human"

To the surprise of the Israeli public Benjamin Netanyahu himself responded to Sela's post:

"Dear Rotem, an important correction: Israel is not a state of all its citizens. According to the nation-state law we passed, Israel is the nation-state of the Jewish people — and not anyone else." (Staff, 2019)

The argument between Sela and Netanyahu shows which recent event lies at the very core of the controversial issue of state's identity in Israeli public discourse: The Nation-State Law.



Drawing from a cultural science approach this article tries to provide an analysis of the Nation-State Law focusing mainly on questions of state identity. Via this approach the article tries to explore Israel's current understanding of nationality, and its self-perception as a Jewish and democratic state. By this, it tries to contribute to a broader understanding of the global phenomenon of the modern renaissance of the nation-state.

The Law and its notions of Jewish identity

The 'Basic Law: Israel as the Nation State of the Jewish People'⁷, commonly known as 'Nation-State Law', consists out of 11 articles subdivided into several sub-clauses, whereby the 11th article does not deal with a contentual, but legalistic issue, ensuring, that it can only be modified by another Basic Law. The law primarily addresses issues connected to the identity of a state, which have (a) a predominantly symbolic character, i.e. the [historical] self-perception of the state (article 1), the resulting implications for Israel's relationship towards the world's Jewry (article 6) and state symbols (article 2) as well as (b) a more tangible effect on daily life, i.e. the state capital (article 3), its official language (article 4), Jewish immigration (article 5) and settlement policy (article 7), the official calendar (article 8), memorial days (article 9) and days of rest (article 10).

The most obvious indicators for the state's identity are its symbols defined in article 2. All of those, i.e. the state's name, flag, emblem and anthem, carry exclusively Jewish-Zionist connotations, whereby no symbol alluding to any other cultural source of identity is mentioned, be it religious or secular.

Though (b) may touches organizational matters of everyday life, all of its articles convey a distinct notion of identity. Obviously calendrical questions do not merely regulate a society's perception of time, but, through its chosen mode of temporal order, display the governing cultural principle, by which communal life will be defined. Articles 8 – 10 construct a synthesis of traditional Jewish (the Sabbath, Jewish calendar) and nationalist-Zionist concepts (Independence Day and Memorial Days). The special emphasis on Independence Day within article 9 is probably due to the inner-Israeli debate on the true nature of the date, as Arab citizens used to commemorate it as a day of mourning.

Obviously, language is one of the most important identity carriers in itself, though within the Israeli context the issue of language carries a more complex dimension. Heretofore as a continuation of pre-Israeli British law, official state documents were also published in Arabic (IATaskforce 2018), the Nation-State law is the first document of its kind clearly elevating the status of Hebrew as Israel's official language to that of Arabic, which carries a non-defined "special status". Though, proponents of the law argue, that it is the first law to describe the role of Arabic within Israel, article 4 clearly generates a hierarchy within the Israeli cultural sphere and denotes Hebrew, i.e. Jewish culture as the primary source of state identity.

Interestingly, within the Israeli context, issues on the state's capital (article 3), its immigration (article 5) and settlement policy (article 7) can be understood as serving to define the state as primarily 'Jewish' in light of article 1 "Basic Principles". The first article stipulates, that the state of Israel has been established in "the Land of Israel", which is "the historical homeland of the Jewish People" (sub clause a), thereby

⁷ This article will mainly draw from several English translations of the original Hebrew text, which are the translation of Dr. Susan Hattis Rolef, issued online by the Knesset (Knesset, 2019), as well as the Knesset Press Release from July 19th 2018, preserved via the Webarchive, (Knesset, 2018), the translation used by the interagency task force on Israeli Arab issues (IATaskforce 2018) and the translation by its proposer MK Avi Dichter (Dichter, 2018). For the Hebrew original see (Ministry of Justice Israel, 2018).

establishing the state as the “national home of the Jewish people, in which it [the Jewish people] fulfills its [...] historical right to self-determination” (sub clause b), whilst “the right to exercise national self-determination in the State of Israel is unique to the Jewish people” (sub clause c). By defining the very *raison d’être* of the state as being an inherently Jewish state by and for the Jewish people, whilst exclusively granting only the Jewish people a right to self-determination in it, Israel draws a differentiation between citizenship and nationality (Lintl, Wolfrum 2018). Thereby it is possible to be a part of the Israeli Nation without being an Israeli citizen, whilst obtaining citizenship does not include nationality, which explains article 6’s focus on Israel’s relationship towards the world Jewry.⁸ Accordingly, Article 6, as a direct reference to the Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel (Provisional Government of Israel, 1948), sets the exclusive openness to Jewish Immigration as a central characteristic of the state.

The Nation-State Law differentiates between the ‘State of Israel’ and the ‘Land of Israel’, whereby the former has been established within the boundaries of the latter, though does not entail the whole of it. This explains why article 7 defines “the development of Jewish settlement as a national value”. By encouraging Jewish settlement activities, the boundaries of the ‘State of Israel’ and the ‘Land of Israel’ might align in the future, which includes the full incorporation of a ‘complete and united’ Jerusalem as Israel’s capital (article 3), while the status of the city is internationally disputed (UN, 1997). The distinction between the Land and the State of Israel is a distinction already made in the very first official document of the Israel: The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, which also distinguishes between ‘Eretz-Israel’ and ‘the Jewish State’ (Provisional Government of Israel, 1948). During its revision process from the preliminary Knesset reading in May 2017, the first Knesset reading in April 2018 to its final version, the Nation-State law lost several references to Proclamation of the State, most probably due to the fact, that the latter is an open document, offering minorities the right to ‘full and equal citizenship’ (Jamal, 2019). Additionally, it appears that the adopted version of the law omitted several articles, which would protect certain minority rights, e.g. the right to preserve unique ethnic or religious identity, the guarantee of protected religious sites, or offering public services for Arabic speakers (IATaskforce).

The Law within the Israeli constitutional narrative

Though Israel’s Declaration of Independence called for the adoption of a formal constitution until 1st of October 1948 by an elected constituent assembly (Provisional Government of Israel, 1948), no document as such has been adopted so far. Since the first Knesset failed to find a consensus on the constitutional issue MK Yitzhar Harari made a proposal on June 13 1950 to the assembly which states that “the First Knesset assigns to the Constitution, Law and Justice Committee the preparation of a proposed constitution for the state. The constitution will be made up of chapters, each of which will constitute a separate basic law. The chapters will be brought to the Knesset, as the Committee completes its work, and all the chapters together will constitute the constitution of the state.” (Knesset, 2007). Since the adoption of the ‘Harari Proposal’ the



⁸ Though, it has to be noted, that the law states in article 6, sub clause a, that “the state shall strive to ensure [...] the safety of its citizens, who are in trouble or in captivity, [...] due to their citizenship” and not exclusively Jewishness.

Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, one of the several permanent Knesset committees, has the ability to propose Basic Laws, which, after adoption by the Knesset, will be of constitutional character.

On July 19th 2018 the Knesset passed the Nation-State Law as the 13th basic law of the Israeli state with a slight majority of 62:55 and two abstentions. The first draft of the law has been proposed as early as 1999 by then Kadima MK Avi Dichter (Mustafa, 2018) and has underwent several changes until July 2018 (IA Taskforce, 2018). On first sight the law seems to be of a mere symbolic nature, though it carries drastic ramifications for minority groups and the Israeli society as a whole. Proponents arguing that the law merely reaffirms current realities do not consider the lack of reference made to the democratic character of the state, equality among Israeli citizens and the Proclamation of independence which precisely invokes those principles.

It seems that the law puts a reemphasis on the Jewish character of Israel after the adoption of the 'Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty' (Knesset, 1992) in the early 90s lead the Supreme Court (Oster, 2018) to focus on democratic and not exclusively Jewish principles dealing with issues that touch the identity of the state such as questions on Jewish settlement (Hostovsky 2018). Still today, in reaction to the Nation-State Law, people argue, that the supreme court shouldn't have influence on defining the state's identity (Bassok, 2019). In addition, with the stagnation of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the preservation of Israel's Jewish character became the new essential social goal for the majority population, especially with post-Zionists and minorities determined to define Israel as a primarily democratic state and delegitimizing efforts by other states and institutions (Lintl, Wolfrum 2018). As a reaction to all of these developments one could observe a series of legislative measures introduced by more conservative and religious forces (Benvenisti, 2018) which tried to initiate a transformation of the constitutional narrative (Loevy, 2018) in order to identify Israeli nationality as Jewishness and the state's identity as primarily Jewish. The Nation-State Law of 2018 seems to be the culmination of the process of counterweighing the emphasis on the democratic character of the state (Israel Democracy Institute, 2018). Currently the law is in the process of being reviewed and perhaps disqualified by the Supreme Court on the grounds of it possibly contradicting the 'Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty', which enjoys a certain status of immunity from emergency regulations and a degree of superlegality to disqualify subsequently passed Basic Laws. (Knesset, 1992) Therefore the law could either be disqualified by the Supreme Court or overruled by another Basic Law, which would require a majority of 61 votes to pass in the Knesset. (IA Taskforce, 2018)

Conclusion

Though the Nation-State Law has clear ramifications for minority rights, it is also a symbolic document that originated from a rather abstract discourse on Israeli nationality, identity and the manifestation of those within the constitutional narrative of the state. It is at the very core of the discussion on the influence of the Supreme Court on Israeli identity, Israel's relationship towards minorities and whether Israel is a state of, for and by all its citizens or primarily the Jewish majority. It is a law which touches the very nature of Israeli democracy itself. By dealing with such a wide range of issues, the document should not only be an object of studies in law, but also, obviously, for political studies, political philosophy as well as cultural studies. Especially in light of the electoral developments of 2019 and the uncertain future for Benjamin Netanyahu and his government, the fate of the Nation-State law within the transformative process of the constitutional narrative as well as public discourse will play a vital role in the years to come.

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WHY IS WESTERN EDUCATION FORBIDDEN? THE IMPACT OF COLONIALISM ON THE RISE OF BOKO HARAM IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

by Robin F.C. Schmahl

During his campaigning efforts for the current election in Nigeria, President Mohammadu Buhari announced that the infamous militant terrorist organization widely known as Boko Haram has been “fully decimated”. Maybe overly optimistic, or simply disillusioned, he neglected the reality of what is happening in Northern Nigeria and the ongoing fights with the Islamic State in West Africa, a faction of Boko Haram. The rise of the Boko Haram movement, which started in the early 2000s, led to its sudden transformation into a brutal terrorist organization after the death of its former leader and founder Mohammed Yusuf in 2009. This was followed by the organization’s expansion in West Africa, with the mass abduction of 276 school girls in the Nigerian town of Chibok in 2014 as an example. The incident resulted outrage and a campaign dubbed “#BringBackOurGirls” was established, demanding action for the wellbeing of the school girls.

A few attempts to understand Boko Haram in its historical and cultural context had been put forward, though most of those simply link the rise of the terrorist organization to the unfortunate history of Northern Nigeria’s sectarian violence during the second half of the 20th century.

So far, not a single comprehensive study establishing a convincingly cohesive contextual link between the several movements, factions or conflicts, let alone Nigeria’s history before gaining independence in 1960 had been written. This article tries to provide a first step to do so and highlights the factors, which find their roots within Nigeria’s colonial history, in an attempt to put forward an explanation to the rise of Boko Haram movement.

Divide et Impera: Colonialism and its consequences for modern Nigeria

Ever since the amalgamation of the colonies of Northern and Southern Nigeria into one state in 1914, a multitude of different ethnic, linguistic, cultural and sectarian groups were coerced together into the new administration of the colonial state, which naturally laid the groundwork for social tension on all societal levels (Ofongo, 2016). In fact, colonialism even furthered those tensions within the North by appropriating certain practices such as the encouragement of immigration without proper integration incentives, limited proselytisation zones for Christians, or sponsoring the Hausa-Fulani hegemony (Bolaji, 2013). Typically, British colonial administration would build on pre-colonial elites, who oftentimes were the rulers of the former Emirates of the Sokoto Caliphate in the North. The regime would gladly incorporate those power structures in the lower end of their administration to ensure a smooth transition of power and exert a tight grip over all of Nigerian society. As long as the prescribed tributes were paid and no major political disturbances were taking place, the elite could handle business as they like with strong support by the colonial regime. Naturally, this opened the possibility for arbitrary exploitation of the population and laid the groundwork for widespread corruption in Northern Nigeria (Pierce, 2006).

Transitional justice even preserved those colonial power structures to sustain the status quo for the ruling elite in the former colony. (Yusuf, 2018).

British colonial administration was aggressively pushing for the exploitation of natural resources by shifting agriculture from a subsistence-based economy to the promotion of cash crop farming in the north and heavily investing into the mining sector with a special focus on coal extraction, particularly within the south. With that, colonialism laid the groundwork for an ever-growing economic



discrepancy between the two parts of the country as the south experienced a rapid increase of its exploitative but still productive industry, whereas the north faced the destruction of its traditional subsistence-based farming economy in favour of a heavily extractive form of colonial agriculture, neglecting its own riches in mineral resources. The southern coal industry as one of Nigeria's most important industry sectors enjoyed a monopoly on the country's energy market, which led to a full dependency of the developing northern industry on South Nigeria (Chimee, 2014). Though, after the discovery of oil in the early 60s, coal production plummeted from 98% to 1.6% and came to a complete halt after the civil war of 1967, the major energy industry now focusing on the country's vast oil reserves was still located in the south and didn't bring an end to the economic dependency, though actually worsened as an overemphasis of government revenue projections by the northern states led to a focus on seeking crude oil rents from the south, a process which was continued after the establishment of democracy in 1999 (Suleiman, 2015). Those developments, beginning with colonialism and being catalysed by mismanagement and corruption of the subsequent ruling elite, left Northern Nigeria with huge untapped potential in mineral resources, which opened the doors for illegal mining activities by foreign enterprises of all kinds and deteriorated the agricultural economy as well as an underdeveloped energy infrastructure, that hinders the cultivation of other industry sectors. On top of that, the dependency on southern oil revenues led to a lack of diversification and the resources to build up an independent industry as well as overall economic instability with the concentration of wealth within the hands of a small portion of the ruling elite.

With economic underdevelopment comes a huge discrepancy between the North and South in terms of levels of education, health issues and poverty rates (Suleiman, 2015). Those factors increased tensions within the Nigerian civil and political society on three levels: First, the discontent of the Hausa majority population of the north towards the Fulani ruling elite. Second, the dissatisfaction of the northern society as a whole towards the central Nigerian government. Third, an overall disaffection from the predominantly Muslim society of the north towards the Christian south, which was increasingly interpreted along sectarian lines of conservative Sunni Islam over any other form of religion. In fact, when analysing the cultural and political context of Boko Haram as well as their demands, it becomes apparent that it gained so much initial support by the northern society by appealing to all three of those societal chasms within the country.

Corruption, Poverty, and Politics: Boko Haram's appeal to Northern Nigerian society

The popular discourse in Northern Nigeria addressing the relation between the population with state officials is mostly thematising governmental mismanagement and the widespread corruption to explain the economic hardships of everyday life (Pierce, 2006). The popular discourse often implies that this can be traced back to southern Christian heteronomy over the north, which in turn caused a moral deterioration of Islamic society. Following that, a strong demand to reform the north along Islamic lines would eradicate the economic hardships of everyday life and the moral corruption of civil society (Hansen, 2017). This sentiment led to widespread denunciations of governmental, democratic institutions and facilities propagating secular, western education, which became the symbols for southern, Christian heteronomy over Northern Nigeria. The concept of western education, especially for women, became a huge topic of discussion mostly brought into the public sphere by the Yan Izala movement, which propagated for either a reconciliation between traditional Islamic learning and the western style of teaching, or the complete eradication of modern, secular education in civil society as a form of protection of Islamic values (Roman, 2012; Ben Amara 2011). In addition, over a dozen northern states established sharia law within their federal system during the early 2000s, mirroring the trend of sentiment in their respective Muslim population, which called for a strengthening of traditional Islamic practices of conduct to protect society from corruption and Christian heteronomy (Hansen, 2015). Though, to the anger of

sharia proponents, the reforms apparently didn't bring the anticipated restoration of morals, as some of the practices of the ruling elite stayed more or less abhorrent in the eyes of traditional Shariatic moral concepts. This found its high peak after a high-ranking government official was recorded giving money to a prostitute in Dubai (Suleiman, 2015).

Boko Haram can be seen as the very result of those issues. It opposed most governmental institutions and negated the legitimacy of federal governments, although they have formerly introduced traditional Islamic legal practices, by advocating for an even more extreme adoption of sharia in all parts of society (Suleiman, 2015; Hansen, 2017). Yusuf, who called for a thorough reform of the entirety of Nigerian society along the lines of the Sharia Law in order to rid it completely from southern, Christian heteronomy, as well as its alleged moral corruption (Adediji, 2016). He called for performing hijra (Hegira; which refers to the migration of Prophet Mohammad and his followers from Mecca to Yethrib, according to Muslim belief) and jihad alluding to the hijra of the prophet Mohammed, and echoing Mohammad Dan Fodio, the founder of the Sokoto Caliphate, in his appeals to the Muslim Hausa population of Northern Nigeria (Iyekekpolo, 2016; Nachande, 2017). Both of those notions carry strong connotations of a delegitimized, morally corrupt society or postcolonial state structure (Pierce, 2006), which shall either be reformed, destroyed and replaced or evaded by the Islamic community (Roman, 2012). Some of Mohammed Yusuf's disciples even withdrew themselves completely from Nigerian society by founding their own ultra-religious, autonomous communities, from which they carried out attacks against state institutions, which gained the movement the nickname "Nigerian Taliban" in mass media (Adediji, 2016). Further, the intellectual origins of Boko Haram might be traced back to the Yan Izala movement, as Mohammed Yusuf was in contact with several of its proponents (Roman, 2012).



Indeed, this is reflected by its very Name "Boko Haram", the connotation would be somewhere near "Western Education is forbidden": "Haram", though nowadays a common word in the Hausa language, references the juridical Arabic terminology of Sunni Islam and alludes to something which is "forbidden", "sinful" or "to be avoided". The Hausa term "Boko" carries two connotation dimensions stemming from the early period of 19th-century colonialism in Nigeria. Originally denoting a "lie", "duplicity" or something "inauthentic", it was soon used for western, i.e. British colonial, oftentimes Christian education, when it began challenging traditional Islamic scholarship, the *sine qua non* in the upper hierarchy of public life during the Sokoto Caliphate (Iyekekpolo, 2016). This led to the association of the Hausa "Boko" with the English "Book" on phonetical grounds (Hansen, 2017). Those, who valued "Boko", i.e. the books of British education were seen as duplicitous collaborators with the colonial regime (Iyekekpolo, 2016). Over the course of the 20th century, the term transitioned from being a mere derogative to expressing not only colonial, Christian but also all kinds of modern and secular education.

Mohammed Yusuf used the term to point to the corrupted ruling elite, which was not only perceived as using their education to exploit the common people but was most probably corrupted by the very same education in the first place (Hansen, 2017). Especially the almajirai, graduates from traditional Islamic institutions of learning called mallams were drawn to the teachings of Mohammed Yusuf. Due to their traditional roots in society and low-cost education, the mallams are oftentimes the only possibilities for Northern Nigerians to gain at least some degree of education, which is simply memorising and reciting

the Qur'an. The almajirai, who, because of their inability to find work due to their lack of secular education, constitute a massive recruiting pool filled with deeply religious youngsters struggling under the deteriorating economy, perceiving western education as a threat to their livelihoods (Ofongo, 2016). Interestingly, Yusuf used a radical Sunni Islamic rhetoric with a Hausa twist to it, by referring to concepts like boko, hijra or jihad. This rhetoric was born out of Northern Nigerian eschatological Mahdist (Mahdism, a belief in a person who claims to be the "guided one" or the "Messiah") discourse on colonialism during the Sokoto Caliphate (Umar, 1999).

Lastly, one factor playing into the rise of Boko Haram was its affiliation with several northern politicians as those used the movement to gain power within the context of Nigerian politics. For instance, former governor of Borno State Ali Modu Sherif appointed Buji Foi, a disciple of Yusuf, as Commissioner for religious affairs, which enabled the movement to be financed through the federal budget. Yusuf himself was appointed as a member on the committee responsible for selecting Muslims for Hajj and there is cause to speculate that regular payments to Boko Haram leaders were made by the All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP) through official party funds (Iyekekpolo, 2016). Some scholars even suggested that Boko Haram played an important role within the competition of north and south to control the whole country. Some scholars even suggested that Boko Haram played an important role within the competition of North and South to control the whole country as, after the assumption of office by former president Goodluck Jonathan, who allegedly disrupted a tacit term based power-sharing arrangement between the southern and northern ruling elites, the increase of terrorist attacks and statements of several state officials supported this suspicion (Mbah, 2017).

Conclusion

Though a more thorough historical analysis of the rise of Boko Haram and the legacy of colonialism in Nigeria has to follow, this article serves as an initial attempt to connect the two. By observing colonial policies and their present-day consequences, as well as Boko Haram's *raison d'être* and its appeal to Northern Nigeria's society, the following insights can be gained concerning the impact of colonialism on the rise of the movement:

The roots of Northern Nigeria's main issues such as economic underdevelopment, widespread corruption, and dependency on the southern oil industry as well as the resulting political, sectarian and social chasms can be traced back to policies of the British colonial regime. Boko Haram profited from the resulting societal tensions by appealing to the popular discourse on economic underdevelopment, moral corruption, southern heteronomy, and modern education, initially even playing an important political role in the power game between North and South while using a rhetoric which is grounded on an anti-colonial Sunni Islamic terminology with historical allusions to the Sokoto Caliphate and the early days of colonialism during the 19th century.

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