

EUROPE:BEYOND

A Magazine of the Institute for a Greater Europe

Decolonising the Feminist Ideal

Examining Modern European
Colonialism

Unravelling European
Empires in the 21st Century
Indian Ocean

The Euro-African
Identity Crisis

SUMMER 2021 • ISSUE II • VOLUME 1



C O N T E N T S

DAPHNÉ CHAROTTE

CSDP MILITARY OPERATIONS:

A Matter of Post-colonial Ties?

THOMAS YAW VOETS

21ST CENTURY COLONIALISM:

The British Indian Ocean Territory

INÊS RAQUEL

DECOLONIZING THE WEST- CENTERED IDEA OF FEMINISM

How Can It Be Done

PHOTO SERIES

PLACES IN THE SUN

LITERATURE

IGE'S BOOK REVIEW & READING LIST

ACHIM ALAN DE MERLO

THE NOTION OF AFRICA AND THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY EVOLUTION WITHIN EU OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION SINCE 1973 TO THE NINETIES



Note from the Editor-in-Chief



Valentin Luntumbue
Editor-in-Chief

This issue of Europe:Beyond is a special one. It ties in with an ambitious project the Institute for a Greater Europe has been working on in the first half of 2021, in collaboration with our partners of the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum. Places in the Sun is a cross-media endeavour with the ambition of exploring decolonial movements in the Western world and the post-Socialist region. The project's centrepiece consists of a volume titled "Places in the Sun: Post-colonial dialogues in Europe and beyond" to be published this Summer, but the themes touched by the book will also be explored through conferences, podcasts, and online articles.

This issue of the magazine is not a mere annexe, however, rather a companion. It focuses on important themes barely touched upon by the book, namely the intersectional dimension of decolonialism, and its ontological links with global feminism. It adds an invaluable perspective to our fray into global decolonial trends.

We would like to take the time to solemnly thank all of the academics, writers, and editors that have contributed to the Places in the Sun project, and more particularly to this very issue of Europe:Beyond. Otherwise, we can but wish you a pleasant read.

Brussels, Région de Bruxelles-Capitale, Belgium





Note from the Managing Editor

Jack H. Lashendock
Managing Editor

This extraordinary publication represents one of the biggest projects undertaken by the Institute and I am honoured to play a role in it. While recent events and movements across the globe have drawn attention to the colonial impacts of European and Western empires, these horrors are neither historical nor relegated to the past. Rather, colonial legacies continue to impact territories, national and international policy, collective societal thoughts and norms, and even the very mechanisms which help us to understand the world around us. This intergenerational harm can not be undone in a single generation, or even just a few; it is for this reason I am proud of our second issue of *Europe:Beyond* and humbled to present it to you.

As much as some of us in the West may think (or wish) that the effects of colonialism ended the moment Western flags and royal standards were removed from the beaches, embassies, and colonial offices of 'far off places' (from a Eurocentric or American perspective), the work before the global community in as exhausting



as it will be rewarding. Issue II of *Europe:Beyond* follows in the footsteps of the Institute's recently published book, "Places in the Sun," which explores the complex legacy of Western Colonialism, and more critically the role of all of us (although some more than others) individually and collectively have in attaining a truly decolonized society.

This companion issue to our larger work reflects this mission; young scholars and professionals from across the world seized the opportunity to address such a globally systemic issue in a small, yet meaningful way. Like our first issue, this publication is the result of so many dedicated team members and colleagues from across the globe. As you read, think about the theses of these authors; I invite you to reflect upon, research, internalise, and even encourage you to (respectfully) dissent with their perspectives. It is my sincerest hope that you take the reflections of all the authors, editors, contributors, and collaborators and use them as the kindling to more meaningful discussion with your friends, family, and peers. From the other side of the Atlantic, happy reading!

Boston, Massachusetts, United States of America



Updates from the Institute



Since the last number of Europe:Beyond, the Institute has been actively working away on projects and initiatives alike! Deep in concentration on our Book "Places in the Sun," and our Journal!

What we've done

Published "Places in the Sun: Decolonial Encounters in Europe and Beyond," our star project with the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum. We're very happy to have published this 300-page book with a huge range of different topics and subjects. We encourage everyone to check it out on its website pits.europe-lab.net.

The Journal is progressing well as we're moving onto peer-reviewing. It will be published likely a bit later in the year in August/September.

Our events have also been going strong, we ran another event with Profs. Morozov, Zubok, and Merlin on The Legacy of Empire for Russian Foreign Policy, you can find the recording on our Youtube and our social media!

Lastly, the next 5 episodes of the Greater European Talks have been published! Check them out wherever you have your regular podcasting; we'd love to work with you too so if you have any suggestions reach out!

What's Next?

The Places in the Sun project continues! we have another major event in September for everyone to join in Brussels, Belgium. Here you'll be able to get your hands on our book, and also meet some of the team who put it together.

We are also going to the **European Youth Event!** We are glad to announce we were given the green light to run an amazing event at the EYE this year from October 8-10th 2021 and we're bringing along a delegation too!

We're recruiting as well! If you want to become an editor or a content creator, email us at recruitment@institute-greater-europe.com.


Otherwise, Summer is usually a quiet one for us at the Institute, a chance to relax, reflect, and start up again in September. We're always on the lookout for new projects, writers, so do keep in touch!



Places in the Sun



This volume explores and confronts two flourishing and neighbouring intellectual traditions in a timely manner. First, the decolonial and post-colonial movements of the Western World, with their long legacies of struggle and activism still relevant today. And second, the emerging academic trend of decolonialism in the wider post-Socialist space, which is slowly gaining a foothold in mainstream discourse. The volume's many contributors (researchers, academics, writers, activists, artists...) discuss a multiplicity of issues related to the decolonial movements in Europe and beyond, through a variety of formats ranging from essays to fiction. Not content to be only examined separately, both traditions are brought into a dialogue, to find where they diverge and where they meet. Places in the Sun is a multidisciplinary and mixed-media project led by a team of writers and editors from the Institute for a Greater Europe, in partnership with the EU-Russia Civil Society Forum.



Be sure to check out the Institute's newest publication, "Places in the Sun." You can get your copy at <https://pits.europe-lab.net>, and reserve it on the website or via our email.



CSDP MILITARY OPERATIONS :

A Matter of Post-colonial Ties?

Daphné Charotte

I. Introduction

The European Union (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) has been the subject of multiple studies over the past years – the role, ambition and strategy of the EU in this field has been both analysed and questioned. Indeed, foreign policy meets the sovereignty of a state at its heart, and EU members traditionally tend to keep control over it. A major component of the CSDP consists of the deployment of civilian and military missions on foreign soil; since 2003, the EU has launched 38 such missions. Howorth argues that the EU became a ‘military actor’ in 2003 but shows a certain hesitation in qualifying the Union as such. In contrast to civilian missions which are financed by the CFSP budget, military operations are mostly financed by the member states directly because of their military and defence dimensions. The Athena mechanism was established in 2004 to provide financial support for the common costs of EU operations with defence or military implications. Still, it is estimated that Athena only finances 10 to 15% of an operation’s costs. The rest is borne by the member states who contribute to the operation.

As a matter of clarity, hereafter in this paper, the use of the word “operation” refers to a military operation, and “mission” refers to a civilian mission.

While an operation requires the unanimous approval of all EU member states and that of the UN Security Council to be launched, the number of states involved in CSDP operations remains very limited. And even among the few members who send military personnel to these operations, one observes large discrepancies in commitment, for example, France sent 1,636 soldiers to Operation ARTEMIS RDC in 2003, whereas Germany sent only seven. Admittedly, the EU does not have its own army, but one might expect all states to participate in operations since they agree to initiate them. Studies of CSDP burden-sharing have revealed correlations between the size of the economy and the population of a state and its participation in CSDP operations. Scholars have highlighted that certain member states commit more to operations due to their “colonial ties” with the recipient country (ibid.). Yet, no recent study has addressed how factors such as imperialist histories or interests in operations focusing on former colonies affect the commitment of member states in CSDP operations. Hence, this paper asks: How does the colonial past of a member state determine its commitment to a CSDP operation?

The first section reviews the relevant literature in the scope of our study. Various elements of previous research

on military alliances and EU military operations are used in this quantitative research paper.

Certain aspects such as party politics are not included in the analysis, but further research should consider the way military deployment is managed by national political parties and parliaments. Another section explains the rationale driving the analysis, the way the data was obtained, and the choice of multiple linear regression as the statistical method. The results are presented and analysed in later sections. Finally, the limitations of our analysis are discussed and avenues for future research are suggested.

II. Background

In 1966, Olson and Zeckhauser examined the cooperation between states in different international organisations. Their quantitative analysis focuses on the disproportionality of burden-sharing among NATO allies, and to a smaller

extent amongst United Nations (UN) members. Using a statistical model and multiple Spearman's coefficient correlations, they developed an "Economic Theory of Alliances." With this theory, they argue that international organisations, just as governments, produce 'collective goods.' While NATO members act according to their private and common security interests, they all enjoy security benefits produced by the organisation. Hence, the security benefits NATO allies get from the alliance (and computed from their GDP, population, and exposed borders) are not proportional to their defence contributions. The bigger states bore a higher share of the NATO burden. This theory is therefore often referred to as 'exploitation theory,' as it sheds light on the free

riding behaviour of certain allies. Olson and Zeckhauser's paper was published during the Cold War, while the CSDP was introduced in the early 2000s. Other types of threats to security have emerged during the last two decades, such as terrorism. Therefore, one must also consider more recent studies that have tested the economics of alliances in the current global geopolitical context. This is precisely what Eilstrup-Sangiovanni attempted to do in her 2014 research. She compared the nature of NATO to that of the CSDP and concluded that the latter is a "symmetric" alliance. This means that EU states get the same benefits of actions undertaken by the



CSDP, no matter their level of contribution. Her statistical analysis of member states' contributions provides interesting findings for the analyses of this paper. Not only could she confirm the disproportionate contributions of EU members in CSDP operations, but also she

repeatedly mentions that France's interests in intervening in foreign theatres are influenced by its former status as a colonial empire.

In particular, she recalls that the operation launched in Chad in 2008 (EUTM Chad) was proposed, supported, and supplied mostly by France, as Chad is a former French colony. While this aspect is precisely the one that this paper explores, Eilstrup-Sangiovanni does not include any variable(s) to assess it in her analysis, which remains essentially descriptive. Moreover, her work covers the period 1999-2009. Now that the CSDP is celebrating its 20th anniversary, her work deserves an update. And as this paper focuses on the relationship between colonial pasts and (member states') military engagement, one can draw on Eilstrup-Sangiovanni's research.

Literature on alliance burden-sharing is very rich, and this section cannot review all aspects emphasised by scholars of transatlantic and/or European security, especially as this paper focuses on the relationship between colonial pasts and EU member states' military engagement. Nonetheless, certain political aspects of military deployment should be included in future research on colonial links and military engagement. Indeed, the political colour of a government, as well as that of a national parliament, could influence a member state's military ambitions, and therefore the role it plays in CSDP operations. In this regard, Wagner et al. studied the politicisation and role of party politics in the military missions of France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom. Their research relies on a large amount of data. The focus solely on four countries is a limitation for this paper which seeks to observe the behaviour of all EU countries. Nevertheless, their research could be used and extended to assess the evolution of party politics and colonial links and their impact on member states' involvement in CSDP operations.

III. Analytical Framework

In this paper, I draw on Horvath's work that characterises colonialism as "a form of domination – the control by individuals or groups over the territory and/or behaviour of other individuals or groups." As my study does not aim to discuss the differences between colonialism and imperialism, or whether certain states can be considered as former colonial powers, I rely on several reliable sources to straightforwardly presents member states considered as former colonial empires in Table 2 (see the Appendix).

As aforementioned, states must bear most of the costs associated with their

input when they contribute to CSDP operations. The number of personnel sent by a state to an EU operation is used in this study as a proxy for its level of involvement. The more troops a state sends, the more it spends in the operation. A state that involves 0 personnel in the operation is, therefore, less committed than one that sends 10, which is itself less committed than another that provides 100, and so on. While the length of an operation also provides an indicator of the efforts made by states, scholars have explained the absence of any official record of the variation of military personnel mobilised by member states over the length of CSDP operations. Therefore, my analysis does not account for the length of an operation and only provides figures of personnel sent at a particular time point during a CSDP operation. The number of military personnel that an EU member deploys in a CSDP operation is the dependent variable of the study.



Eilstrup-Sangiovanni argues that "due to geography, trade patterns and colonial ties, countries such as Italy, Spain or France are more likely to benefit from successful action to stem political unrest in North Africa, whereas East European states have a vested interest in ensuring stability in the Balkans." Surprisingly, she seems to consider geography as a bigger driver of deployment than 'colonial ties,' as she

does not mention the interests of other major colonising powers, such as Belgium, Portugal, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands, which also formerly had colonies in Africa. In order to understand how the 'colonial ties' influence member states' commitment to CSDP operations, the following hypotheses will be tested:

H1: An EU member state will be more involved in a CSDP operation if it is a former colonial empire.

H2: An EU member state will be more involved in an operation if it targets a country that is one of its former colonies.

The model includes several control variables based on the literature of burden-sharing and international mediation (Table 4).

Data

I created a dataset from several sources in order to test the different hypotheses. The first key source is Di Mauro, Brotz and Wright's database: "EU's Global Engagement." This dataset brings together relevant variables relating to CSDP operations and missions between 2003 and 2017. Most importantly, the dependent variable could be generated from their database since it presents data on the number of personnel sent by each member state in each CSDP operation. The number of personnel deployed by each member state in each CSDP operation allows to assess their level of engagement in the operations. The two key independent variables are dummies, and are operationalised with qualitative data found in the literature and facilitated with evolution maps retrieved from Vox. the key independent variable can be understood as follows:

Key IV 1: former colonial empire (H1)

= 1 if the member state is a former colonial power; 0 otherwise

Key IV 2: former colony (H2)

= 1 if the target country is a former colony of the member state, 0 otherwise

Three of the control variables, namely conflict intensity, cooperation with the UN and NATO, are also operationalised from Di Mauro et al.'s database. The other part of the dataset has been assembled from the World Bank, which allows the inclusion of two additional controls: the size of the army and military expenditures relative to the GDP. I also generated a few dummy variables, such as whether the operation started before or after 2008.

The dataset comprises 333 observations, each corresponding to the number of military personnel sent by an EU state in one CSDP operation. In total, 13 military operations are included in the dataset (Table 1). Palm and Crum (2019) do not take into account EU Support to AMIS (2005-2007), but I include it in my analysis because, although it was launched in support of a civilian CSDP mission, its nature was strictly military. Only states that were EU members at the time the operation was active are taken as observations. For instance, the EUFOR Chad operation ran from 2008 to 2009: Croatia was not yet an EU member at that point in time, so it is not reported in the observations. On the other hand, the EU NAVFOR Somalia operation started in 2008 and is still ongoing. Here Croatia falls within the observations because it could send its soldiers to EU NAVFOR Somalia from 2013 onwards.

A description of the variables is presented in the Appendix (Table 3 and Graphs A to F). Some operations lasted less than a year while others have been ongoing for years (Table 1). In both cases, the independent variables on the size of an EU country's national army and its defence budget take the value corresponding to the year when the operation started.

Method


To test the different hypotheses, I first carried out a linear regression with the number of military personnel sent by an EU state to a CSDP operation as a dependent variable (Table 3 in the Appendix).

This first attempt proved inconclusive: the dependent variable has little variance because many states have sent no personnel to the operations (Graph 1). To overcome this problem, I created another variable to group the number of personnel deployed in an EU operation into categories. This ordered categorical variable does not change the dependent variable, but the way in which its measurement is arranged (Graph 1). It comprises 5 categories and follows the subsequent logic:

- Category 0 = The member state sent 0 personnel to a CSDP military operation
- Category 1 = The member state sent 1 to 20 personnel to a CSDP military operation
- Category 2 = The member state sent 21 to 50 personnel to a CSDP military operation
- Category 3 = The member state sent 51 to 120 personnel to a CSDP military operation
- Category 4 = The member state sent at least 121 personnel to a CSDP military operation.

With the new ordered categorical variable, consistency dictates that I conduct an ordered logistic regression. Scholars have not reached a consensus as to the best option between using a statistical model technically inappropriate but more easily interpretable, and using a technically appropriate model whose interpretation is more intricate. For the sake of a clearer interpretation of the results, I violate some basic principles of the linear model and choose to conduct a multiple linear regression.

Graph 1: Number of military personnel sent by an EU member state in a CSDP military operation on a total of 13 operations (2003-2017).



IV. Findings and Analysis

This section discusses the results of the multiple linear regression I ran to assess the relationship between the dependent variable and the independent variables (Table 4). As explained before, the number of military personnel is a proxy for the level of engagement of a member state, hence both formulations convey the same idea.

The model reveals no significant relationship between a state being a former colonial empire and the number of military personnel sent to a CSDP operation. The null hypothesis fails to be rejected. This finding contradicts what is stated in the literature and although I expected to uncover a positive relationship between the former colonial empire variable and the dependent variable (H1), this analysis suggests that no significant link can be established between the two.

On the other hand, the fact that the recipient country of the operation is the former colony of the member state can explain the varying levels of engagement in the CSDP operations. Indeed, the model shows a positive relationship between personnel deployments and the former colony variable (significant at the 0.01 level). This means that a former colonising state will not necessarily send more troops to an EU operation if it has a colonial past, but it will if the target of the operation is its former colony. Yet, former colonial powers such as Belgium, France, Italy, Portugal, and Spain are the most heavily represented in these theatres of operation. One can reject the null hypotheses and conclude that the engagement of member states in CSDP operations increases if the recipient country of the operation is a former colony of the member state (H2).

Table 1: Results of multiple linear regression for military personnel sent by a state in a CSDP military operation.

Predictors	B	SE	β
<i>Key independent variables</i>			
Former colonial empire	0,202*	0,137	0,0798
Former colony	1,148***	0,276	0,198***
<i>Controls</i>			
Size of national army	0,000***	0,000	0,397***
Defence budget (% GDP)	-0,203*	0,118	-0,086*
Cooperation with NATO	-0,036	0,325	-0,013
Cooperation with the UN	0,385*	0,228	0,127*
Post 2008	-0,743***	0,180	-0,283***
<i>Intensity of the conflict:</i>			
Intensity 1 (minor)	-0,552*	0,309	-0,222
Intensity 2 (war)	-0,990***	0,370	-0,327***
Intercept	1,337***	0,446	


Notes: Dependent variable: Number of military personnel (ordered categorical variable).
Intensity 0 (none) is the omitted variable. Number of observations = 333. Adjusted R² = 0,332.
Asterisks indicate *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.

Such results can be put into the broader debate on the EU's type of actorness. More specifically, the findings raise questions on member states' interests in foreign countries and whether they could be akin to neo-colonialism. Some scholars have worked on the neo-colonialist traits of EU military intervention, mostly highlighting the dominance of French presence in Sub-Saharan Africa. A better understanding of how much interest arising from colonial pasts account for a reason of member states' involvement in CSDP operations could be brought in future quantitative and qualitative research works.

positively influenced when the country where the intervention is launched was a colony of the EU member. Moreover, the launch of an operation from 2008 onwards and a high level of intensity of a conflict (i.e. war) are two reasons that influence negatively the number of personnel sent by an EU Member in a CSDP operation.

Although this paper provides an assessment of the drivers of EU states' engagement in CSDP operations, it proposes a rather broad analysis of the phenomenon. Both significant and non-

Flowchart 1: Presentation of the Results.



Notes: The length of the branches indicates the strength of the relationship between the variables. The shorter the branch is, the stronger the relationship between the variables.

Green bubbles indicate a positive relationship. **Red bubbles** indicate a negative relationship. **Grey bubbles** indicate no significant relationship.

V. Discussion & conclusion

The model discussed in this paper sheds light on the role played by colonial ties in times of personnel deployment in CSDP operations. As Eilstrup-Sangiovanni (2014) previously argued, it from the evidence that EU states' degree of contribution in CSDP operations tends to increase for former colonial powers. Even though no significant relationship was found between being a former colonial. This degree of contribution turns out to be even more

significant results presented in the model contribute to the literature of the EU's common defence policy. From the standpoint of the political debate on European defence, they can point to certain internal divisions within the EU. Though this paper provides some answers to scholars' observations on the unequal contribution of EU countries to the Union's military operations, it presents some limitations.

Firstly, the model did not include any indicator of the political situation in EU member states. Future research should encompass those political indicators that may expose a link between states' involvement in CSDP operations (e.g., political parties) and the role of the national parliament and votes on military deployment (see Wagner et al., 2017). While this would require significant data collection work, it would further explain how colonial pasts affect military deployment from the perspective of the domestic political institutions.

Secondly, this quantitative paper should be completed by qualitative analysis on the political process prior to the launch of an operation, such as by looking at Foreign Affairs Council policy reports on the operations. More light should be shed on states who play an active role in the initiation of the CSDP operations, as well as these operations' goals and outcomes. A process-tracing could complement a reviewed version of this paper's statistics and would focus, for example, on the case of France, the largest contributor to operations to date. This study could explore the causal mechanisms between the different stages that precede the sending of French military troops on foreign soil under the EU flag.

To conclude, the EU has shown its desire to become a military player since 2003 through its civilian missions and military operations. While 34 of these interventions were undertaken under the CSDP to date, the number of member states joining under the EU flag remains limited. Through a quantitative analysis, this paper provides an answer to the limited success of CSDP operations among EU member states by assessing how colonialism influences their level of engagement. Though it presents significant findings, this paper should be a first step to be improved by further enquiries. For instance, political indicators would add relevant substance to our model. Moreover, qualitative analyses should complement the comprehension of

member states' behaviour on common defence issues.

The EU appears to want to assert itself as a military actor, but the analysis suggests that at the CSDP operations level, it is taking on more of the face of a post-colonial actor. The present research can thus be put into perspective with the current political debate on the creation of a common EU military capability. Thirty years ago, the former Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs called the EU a "military worm." In this regard, one might wonder whether more shared work within the CSDP would help the Union to affirm itself as a proper military actor.



Editor's Note: As expressed by the author, a critical component of this piece includes quantitative research to better understand this topic. Initially, Ms. Charlotte included an appendix when she submitted her paper which highlighted empirical evidence in support of her thesis; however, our editorial team made the tough decision not to include this section in the final publication of *Europe: Beyond* in the interest of length and brevity. With that being said, we still believe this component to be an integral part of Ms. Charlotte's overall research and so we have published it as a Web Exclusive at <https://www.institutegreatereurope.com/europe-beyond>. We strongly encourage readers to check out this amazing research and understand this issue in greater depths.

About the Author

Daphné Charlotte is a French student currently studying in the Netherlands. After completing a Bachelor in International Relations at the ILERI Paris, she enrolled in the Research Master European Studies at Maastricht University. There, she has become familiar with research methods and developed her research interests: quantitative methods, defence burden sharing, military alliances, and military operations. She has been sharing her journey as a research master student on social media, as a Student Ambassador of the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences of Maastricht University. After completing her Master, Daphné wishes to pursue a career in academia.



21ST CENTURY COLONIALISM

The British Indian Ocean Territory

Thomas Yaw Voets

I. Introduction

Discussions on colonialism generally deal with the historical practice of domination involving the subjugation of one people to another; or its impacts on society today. As a result, it is often thought to be a thing of the past. Notwithstanding, it might be a surprise to many that colonialism - in the traditional sense - still continues today. And that the process of unravelling European empires is, unfortunately, far from complete.

The British Indian Ocean Territory, a British overseas territory of the United Kingdom situated in the Indian Ocean halfway between Tanzania and Indonesia, is a clear example of this. Since the 1980s, the Government of Mauritius has sought to regain control over this Territory which is known traditionally as the Chagos Archipelago or the Chagos Islands. However, despite a series of litigations in various courts - both national and international - the United Kingdom refuses to cede its sovereignty over the Chagos.

This article will examine the sovereignty dispute between the United Kingdom and Mauritius. To start, a historical overview will explore how the Chagos Archipelago became the current British Indian Ocean Territory. Thereafter, the various international rulings dealing with the sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago will be examined before concluding with

a contemplation on the dispute's future outlook.

II. A Painful History

To understand the contested Archipelago's origins, one has to turn to the late 15th century, when Portuguese explorers began to venture into the Indian Ocean and discovered the location of Mauritius. Soon thereafter, they were joined by Dutch and English sailors, whose respective nations had established East India Companies to exploit commercial opportunities in the Indian Ocean and the Far East.




Flag of the Commissioner of the British Indian Ocean Territory

The first permanent colony in Mauritius was established by the Dutch East India Company in 1638 and existed until 1710 when the Dutch abandoned the island due to droughts, cyclones and pests which prevented agricultural progress. Following their departure, the French government took possession of Mauritius in 1715 and renamed it the île de France.

In 1810, the British captured the Île de France and renamed it Mauritius - as it is still commonly known today. This change of administration was codified by the Treaty of Paris of 30 May 1814, and France officially ceded the Île de France and all its dependencies (including the Chagos Archipelago) to the United Kingdom.

Britain continued its administration of the colony of Mauritius until 1965, when the global decolonisation process had begun to gain momentum. This was the result of the adoption of the pivotal Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples by the United Nations General Assembly five years earlier. As this declaration provided for the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, Britain had to ready itself for the inevitable independence of Mauritius.



Despite clear legal guidance within the declaration prohibiting the breakup of colonies prior to their independence, Britain began to draw up plans to detach the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in order to retain it under British control. They also began discussing the future of the Archipelago with the United States in 1964, with the latter expressing an interest in establishing military facilities on the Archipelago.

A few months later, using a combination of diplomatic pressure and bullying, Britain convinced the representatives of the colony of Mauritius to hand the islands over to British control - something the Mauritians claimed to have "no choice" over. The handover itself was agreed in the Lancaster House agreement which was concluded on 23 September 1965. The reasoning behind the detachment was that, due to geopolitical concerns, the United Kingdom and the United States needed a military base in the Indian Ocean region. However, the base needed to be on British Territory as the United States had no possessions in the region and was deeply concerned about the stability of any other host nation for a potential military base. Thus, they sought an unpopulated territory to avoid the United Nation's decolonisation requirements and the resulting political issues of sovereignty.

What happened next was that on 30 December 1966, the United States and the United Kingdom signed a 50-year agreement to use the Chagos Archipelago for military purposes; and that each island would be without a resident civilian population. To achieve this, between 1967 and 1973 British officials forcibly expelled the entire population of the Chagos Archipelago to mainland Mauritius in order to allow the establishment of a joint military facility of the United Kingdom and the United States. A painful event with lasting consequences for the approximately 2000 native Chagossians who, to date, have been prevented from returning to their homeland.

III. An Array of (Un)successful Legal Proceedings

Since the 1980s, the Government of Mauritius has sought to regain control over the Chagos Archipelago. As such, they have undertaken a series of litigations hoping to legally formalize their claim.

The first relevant ruling in this regard was made by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2015. Mauritius initiated a case against the United Kingdom under the dispute settlement provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea claiming the Marine Protected Area (a no-take area, where fishing is completely banned) established by the British around the Chagos Archipelago to be a violation of the Convention. In this case, the Court ruled in favour of Mauritius and declared the Chagos Marine Protected Area to be illegally instated by the United Kingdom.

The 2015 ruling was followed by perhaps the most consequential one - the International Court of Justice's (ICJ) 2019 advisory opinion, affirming the United Kingdom's unlawful authority over the Chagos Archipelago. In its aftermath, 116 members of the United Nations' General Assembly Resolution broadly


adopted a resolution welcoming the ICJ's opinion and giving the United Kingdom six months to cede the territory.

More recently, on 28 January 2021, in a dispute between Mauritius and Maldives on their maritime boundary, the United Nations' International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea ruled that the United Kingdom has no sovereignty over the Chagos Archipelago, and that control over the region belongs to Mauritius.

Nevertheless, despite these favourable rulings for Mauritius, nothing substantial has been achieved for the country. The United Kingdom has repeatedly refused to abide by the rulings and has subsequently failed to accept and

respect the rights of Mauritius and the Chagossians to self-determination. This is somewhat ironic, as the British government continues to defend the right of Falkland Islanders to self-determination.

Nevertheless, despite these favourable rulings for Mauritius, nothing substantial has been achieved for the country. The United Kingdom has repeatedly refused to abide by the rulings and has subsequently failed to accept and respect the rights of Mauritius and the Chagossians to self-determination. This is somewhat ironic, as the British



VI. Future Outlook

The United Kingdom's subjective interpretation of international law in this case does not seem defensible for much longer. Increasing international pressure and legal costs will inevitably force the United Kingdom to accept that colonialism belongs in the history books. In other words, it can be expected that the United Kingdom will

finally have to fulfil its obligations under international law and allow the return of the Chagossians who were forcibly removed from their homeland. This is imperative, not least because the United Kingdom's refusal to comply with international law sets a disturbing precedent for nations resisting full decolonisation.

Similarly, one would also expect the United States to consider that the only way their military base can be placed on a sound legal footing is by paying rent to Mauritius. This would imply that their access to the Archipelago is based upon consent rather than colonialism - the only sustainable solution for all parties. In addition, a possible return of Chagossians would be entirely

manageable for them, as shown by the coexistence of foreign military bases with civilian communities in other parts of the world.

About the Author

Thomas Yaw Voets is a graduate of the University of Antwerp, who holds a master's degree in Law (with a specialisation in Sustainable Development and Global Justice) and another master's degree in International Relations and Diplomacy. He has interned at the Permanent Representation of Belgium to the United Nations in Geneva - assisting the Belgian delegation during the 41st session of the Human Rights Council, the International Peace Information Service, and is currently doing a traineeship with Member of the European Parliament Kathleen Van Brempt.

In addition, he also writes for the Institute for a Greater Europe on subjects ranging from decolonisation and political branding to multilateralism and European politics.



DECOLONISING THE WEST-CENTERED IDEA OF FEMINISM: HOW CAN IT BE DONE?

INÊS RAQUEL



I. Introduction - Why it matters

The act of decolonisation in itself is quite a recent phenomenon, having taken different rhythms and steps depending on the former colonial power. However, there is more to decolonisation than the withdrawal of the coloniser from its former colony, but a whole complex, and slow process of changing mentalities.

In many contemporary schools, decolonisation is, defined by the Cambridge Dictionary, as "the process in which a country that was previously a colony (=controlled by another country) becomes politically independent." Yet, although physically absent from their former colonial states, some former colonial powers, mostly Western countries, still uphold their values and perceptions as universal and, to some extent, the right ones. In fact, many Western countries have adopted a paternalistic behaviour towards the present countries they formerly ruled, from questionable humanitarian aid to political (or even military) intervention, supposedly in the name of the younger states' interests, most from the Global South.

Knowing this, it is correct to assume that Western powers have a strong influence on how other countries end up building their institutions and defining their laws. Values related to democracy, laicism, human rights, and, in particular, feminism, are no exception. In this short paper, let us consider how the feminist ideal is in general perceived by the West and by certain communities from the Global South, how they differ, and mainly, how can all possible "versions" of Feminism work together to achieve their common goal - equality.

II. Feminism - A Colonial Legacy?

"... white Western feminism existed in the asymmetrical binary of the secular and liberated women from the 'First World' and oppressed women from the

'Third World.'"

It is important to note that this article has no intention to diminish the work and sacrifice of Western suffragists and feminist groups, whose actions and determination gave us a freer and fairer world. Rather it highlights the incorrectness and danger of trying to apply the Western methods of feminine emancipation to different societies with whom Western women might share little in common, in terms of their struggles and challenges.

Some experts on this issue suggest that the dominant European/US-centric versions of Feminism, intentionally or inadvertently, have replicated, somehow, colonialist and racist ideologies.

However, let us check the formal and globally accepted definition of Feminism. Feminism is generally defined as a) the advocacy of women's rights on the basis of the equality of the sexes; b) the theory of the political, economic, and social equality of the sexes; c) the belief that men and women should have equal rights and opportunities; d) the doctrine advocating social, political, and all other rights of women equal to those of men.

Although these seem quite general and "easily" applicable terms, let us briefly consider how Western feminists tend to identify themselves within the feminist concept. Western Feminism advocates a major break with the traditional values of family and religion where a woman is no longer the housewife, mother, care person of the household and the family whilst the man is the principal breadwinner; it also rejects the necessity of obedience towards her husband and her modesty within society, which is oftentimes imposed by conservative and religious authorities and institutions. In fact, in 2013, three researchers from Iowa University in the United States (US) concluded in a

qualitative study - where all subjects were white men who identified themselves as atheists - that people who do not preach any religion "(...) agreed men and women are more similar than different and attributed gender differences primarily to cultural and social influences. (...) they identified gender inequality as a problem within the U.S. and throughout the world." Therefore, and not surprisingly, there is a direct relationship between the separation of traditional values and teachings and the growth of women emancipation.

However, these events so far have been mostly observed in Western, Christian countries from the northern hemisphere. In some cases, however, we will see that a society's religion, for example, is a key part of one's identity, including women. Moreover, regardless of these people's opinions on women's rights in general, some even take pride in being the main carer of a (traditionally perceived) family while standing by core feminist values.

Western feminists seem to wrongly perceive oppression over women as something of a singular nature, and for that reason may think that other women should follow the same path of European and American suffragists.

Unfortunately, it is not that simple, namely because women around the world face varying obstacles such as race, religion, sexuality,

financial status, among others, which differ depending on the social norms and expectations.

In addition, to the conceptions of Feminism in use in the Western world, theories of gender, womanhood and sisterhood, could mostly be linked to the

historical legacy of white patriarchy.

III. Variants of Feminism - Driving Away From the Western Experience

Today, in different parts of the world, we can see new groups defending the feminist doctrine while taking into account the specific problems certain feminine communities face. For instance, and although seen as controversial by some, there are testimonies of the rise of Black Feminism, Arab Feminism, Indigenous Feminism, Asian American Feminism, amongst others. The division between these feminist groups is, in the end, a double-edged sword: on the one hand, it focuses on the struggle of women from different ethnic backgrounds; on the other hand, it can be seen as another tool to promote division between women, and in some cases, it can even pit them against each other.

Nevertheless, it would be wise to attempt to understand what motivates their existence and what still needs to be tackled by mainstream feminist movements, in order to promote more intersection within themselves. Let us examine the cases of Black Feminism and Arab Feminism.



IV. Black Feminism - Concerning Colour and Gender

Nowadays, if education were taken seriously worldwide, it would not be necessary to keep highlighting the indescribable horrors Black people went through during centuries of colonisation. Like in every oppressed community, women and children would be the most affected by this subjugation, and in the case of black women, not only would they have to endure the hardships of slavery in every possible sense, but also in most part, normalise the indifference shown by their white sisters, who later - and even today

would feel entitled to teach non-white women how they should fight for their rights "correctly."

According to Max Peterson, Black Feminism has three foundational principles: Black women's experience of racism, sexism, and classism are inseparable; their needs and worldviews are distinct from those of Black men and white women; and there is no contradiction between the struggle against racism, sexism, and all other-isms. All must be addressed simultaneously. "For black women and other women of colour, race and gender are inseparable, and black feminists resist all movements that ignore this reality."

Black and white women, due to the different hurdles each faced throughout time and history, have very different conceptions of sisterhood, womanhood and, to a certain extent, gender and sexuality. For instance, the current - and perhaps more "woke" wave of Feminism, especially in the US, refers to gender as a social construction, and for that reason should be fought against in order to free women and other sexual minorities, an argument that has been used by many Western/white feminists. Black women, on the other hand, and in general, seem to take great pride in their gender, mostly due to what it means in a historical and human context - the strength and resilience their (great) grandmothers possessed to survive such an oppressive and racist system and still be able to fight against it.

Unfortunately, however, there is still a lot to be done and improved within the feminine Black community itself. For instance, despite originating from the white colonial perspective, the issue of colourism still poses a big obstacle to a complete and firm unity among Black women, if not the whole Black community itself living in white-majority

countries. In the most simplistic way, lighter skin tones are not only more preferred by the dominant (white) population, but also by other non-white ethnic minorities and even a discriminatory aspect between black people themselves. Beauty standards per se, in general, are still very white-driven, leading black women - and other people of colour - to buy products that allegedly make their skin look lighter (which can lead to serious health issues),

"Black Feminism has three foundational principles: Black women's experience of racism, sexism, and classism are inseparable; their needs and worldviews are distinct from those of Black men and white women."

straighten their hair, or otherwise adopt a more "socially acceptable" appearance, in other words, a more white-ish appearance so they will not be too marginalized.

Blackness was (and sometimes still is) associated with ugliness and sin, but today, groups of women celebrate their darker composition, and encourage the younger generations not to be afraid of looking different, but to embrace that difference, hopefully leading them to connect to their roots and community. Black Feminism is, perhaps, the cry of victory of the daughters of those who suffered, endured and revolted throughout centuries of white oppression, so that one day their children would have the chance to be born free.

V. Arab Feminism - A Matter of Islamophobia

On the 11th of September 2001, the world entered a new paradigm that would forever change the lives of people in the Arab and Muslim world, as well as the lenses through which the West perceived them and their culture/values. More than the white Christian patriarchy known in the West, a new "enemy" of women's rights and emancipation allegedly was emerging - Islam.

Although the horrendous attacks frequently in the news are perpetrated by radical organisations, such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Daesh/ISIS, Boko Haram, and other groups, the West rapidly assumed that their shared faith, Islam, was an existential threat in need of thwarting, and not the events that triggered the radicalisation itself. As a result, the growth of Islamophobia in several Western societies reached its peak, and such negative - and ignorant - sentiment towards Muslims not only gained votes for conservative (and Eurosceptic) political bodies, but in many instances, also clouded the judgement of feminist institutions.

In 2012, Md. Mahmudul Hasan, Associate Professor at the International Islamic University in Malaysia, stated that "one important feature of Islamophobia is to caricature Islam as misogynistic and oppressive to women and thus to advance imperialist hegemony. This "gendered Islamophobia" stigmatises the religion even though, compared to other world religions, its treatment of women is arguably preferable and more enlightened. Historically, one treasonous use of feminism has been to misappropriate it in order to serve colonial interests and support imperialist wars of occupation that repress subjugated people including women and children. This article argues

that ignorance about, and prejudice against, Islam contribute to portraying it as a misogynistic creed. Wrong notions of Islam lead many feminists in Muslim societies to denigrate Islamic teachings and borrow Western ideas to advance women's causes."

From here we can understand that Western Feminism would deem Islam as oppressive, as well as everything related to this Abrahamic religion, namely the alleged dress code of Muslim women. Due to such perceptions, many western states kept supporting military operations in certain countries in the Middle East, being the most known events the wars in the destabilised states of Afghanistan and Syria. In the end, women's rights did not substantially improve in several parts of the region - especially with the presence of radical groups in various fronts - and as for Muslim women living in western Jewish-Christian countries, their lives did not become any easier, especially if they'd choose to keep dressing according to their beliefs.



Although the feminist movement was supposed to bring all women together, the fact is that Muslim women are being marginalised by their own peers. The use of the hijab or even the more "problematic" burka, chastity until marriage, and observance of other values labelled as conservative and oppressive, seems to antagonise some

groups of so-called feminists in the West, who believe you cannot endorse women's rights and simultaneously follow a set of religious rules.

From these internalised misconceptions imposed by white feminists, Arab Feminism was born, and although it still needs to become de facto materialised and recognised in the Arab world in general, social media is helping to provide feminists with a range of platforms to communicate and express themselves.

Nevertheless, Feminism, as a movement and concept/idea, "raises a great deal of uproar and ongoing debate on social media among those who think that feminism has its right issues on the one hand and those who accuse it of being a mere 'Foreign' idea that is imported into the Arab world, and an unenlightened attempt to interpret the feminist experience in the advanced liberal countries, on the other."

"Arab feminists (and Muslim, overall) seem to uphold the Islamic teachings in a way they can be channelled to promote justice for women and the respect for their rights as human equals."

For this reason, and as expressed in Hasan's work, feminist scholars in Muslim societies, for instance, should insist on "a feminism that is indigenous" and interpret or reinterpret the Quran and Prophetic traditions through the lenses of gender justice. The pro-feminine emancipation movements must be fully aware of the struggles faced

by local women, and find viable solutions that will not pose a clash of values too great within their society, a logic that unfortunately many Western feminists seem unable to grasp or even try to understand.

In conclusion, similarly to black feminists, who get their strength and pride from their skin colour and womanhood, Arab feminists (and Muslims overall) seem to uphold the Islamic teachings in a way they can be channelled to promote justice for women and respect for their rights as human equals.

VI. Personal Experiences and Perspectives

Although we now might have a general perspective of the impacts of the Western perspective on Feminism in non-Western countries, as well as how it is part of the colonialist legacy, we should also try to understand how these impacts directly affect the lives of women from non-Western/white backgrounds.

Through an online (and informal) survey, I was able to collect the personal opinions of thirteen women about the importance of decolonising the thoughts of Feminism in the West. Out of the thirteen women, eight identified themselves as feminists, whilst the other five indicated that they are still doing their research on the topic. Most of the people who answered identified themselves as mixed race, followed by black and Hispanic, and they live - or were recently living - in European/Western countries.

When asked if when living in a European country they had been treated differently in a negative way by their counterparts, most answered "No", and as for those who answered "Yes", only two of them shared that they

suspected they had been treated in a different way due to their sexuality.

However, another peer shared that a "disproportional amount of attention was given to my opinion than to that of other participants who did not belong to an ethnic minority. I felt as if I had much more 'power' when conveying my opinion than other white women for instance."

Most of the participants agreed that there are clashes between the different feminist variants, such as Black Feminism and Arab Feminism mentioned above, with only one "No" and three "Not sure." From the thirteen people who answered the survey, seven shared their thoughts about these clashes, their existence and what triggers them. Many highlighted the different issues that white and non-white women face and how the first group tends to behave towards the second, pointing that "white mainstream feminism tends to be more liberal, and white women advocate for more equality in the corporate world and political elite. This is not to say all white feminists act or advocate for these same goals. Black women still have a long fight to reach equality in my opinion." Considering most shared this opinion, it would be easy to assume that "white feminism is not intersectional enough", which in other words means that to some extent, Western feminists do not make the effort to understand or even "accommodate" the needs and opinions of their non-white sisters.

There was, however, one participant who considered that "there is no white/black/asian feminism. There is only feminism, this tendency which prevails in Europe of being over the top apologetic towards ethnic minorities is, in my opinion, absurd serving only to further emphasise a divide amongst people instead of unity as feminism

should be. The main point of disparity is an economic one, not a racial one. Let this racial speech end, this is not helpful to anyone. And it should not be the focus of any movement."

Finally, when asked what could be improved on the white/Western part, most of the participants declared that Western Feminism needs more intersectionality - it needs to become a wider and safer space for women who do not share the same historical, cultural and financial backgrounds, the same religious beliefs (or absence of them), or even sexual orientation as those considered "normal" or even "accepted" by the West. In addition, and on a very important note, it was highlighted that easy and direct communication, in the end, is the key: "collaborate with feminists from other parts of the world. Don't make assumptions about what women in other parts of the world need or should need. Drop the saviour complex."

VII. Conclusion

Although the definition of Feminism itself is supposed to aggregate the global struggle of women for their rights, for too long we have let it be mostly the reflection of the white feminist's struggles and achievements. The idea that there is only one correct way to fight for women's emancipation is wrong and dangerous, and in some cases, it could lead some societies to become even more adverse to feminist ideas, even if these would be adapted to the true needs of women of those communities. As stated in the final part of this work, Western/White Feminism needs to become more intersectional and shut down its white saviour complex, and therefore stop being "paternalistic" by assuming that non-Western women, who even might live in countries where their rights have not been secured yet, cannot stand for

themselves and move together in order to attain their deserved rights and equality. Finally, I shall briefly refer to the main limitation to this article: the lack of participation and involvement from more women - or people who identify themselves as such - to express their views and give their opinions on this topic. Perhaps the main reasons for the mentioned problem could be that a) either many do not see, or never thought about, the colonialist legacy in the feminist ideals, or b) that they believe that to divide Feminism according to people's race, religion, sexuality, etc., as it could contribute more to the distancing between women from different social realities.

In the end, the impacts of the processes of colonisation and decolonisation result in a hard, complex, and most of the time, uncomfortable topic to discuss, but its importance is undeniable. One should not expect that the world, namely the communities from the Global South, to forget and easily overcome a system that endured for centuries in a matter of decades.

Editor's Note: As expressed by the author, a critical component of this piece includes quantitative research to better understand this topic. Initially, Ms. Raquel included an appendix when she submitted her paper which highlighted both raw and prepared data gathered from a survey of her peers; however, our editorial team made the tough decision not to include this section in the final publication of 'Europe:Beyond' in the interest of length and brevity. With that being said, we still believe this component to be an integral part of Ms. Raquel's research and so we have published as a Web Exclusive at <https://www.institutegreatereurope.com/europe-beyond>. We strongly encourage readers to check out this amazing research.

About the Author



With a BA in Political Science and International Relations, a Post-graduate degree in Strategic and Security Studies, **Inês Raquel** recently graduated from a Political Analysis and Public Policy (MA) program.

Her main fields of interest include Geopolitics, Migration, and Human Rights, with a special focus on Women's Rights and Education, mainly concerning the regions of Eurasia, the Middle East, and East and South Asia, although she

never misses an opportunity to learn more about other regions of the world.

Currently, she is working as a translator and news writer at the Portuguese language department of Sputnik News, in Moscow. In the future, she intends to either pursue a career in Political Journalism or in Academia as a Political Researcher.



PHOTO SERIES: PLACES IN THE SUN

Part I: Decolonialism in the West

Photograph: Laura Luciani, Brussels, Belgium

Text: Valentin Lutumbue, Brussels, Belgium

Bust of General Emile Storms on de Meeûs Square, Brussels, 400 meters away from the European Parliament. Storms led the violent armed conquest in Southeastern Congo and is infamous for beheading Lusinga Lwanguemba, one of the many warlords fighting over the remains of the Luba Empire, in 1884. Lusinga's skull, along with many other human remains, was brought back to Belgium by Storms, who was rumoured to collect them.



Lusinga's and another ruler's (Marilou) skulls are still at the Royal Institute for Natural Sciences in Brussels, while a third skull, belonging to a prince named Mpampa, has been lost. The Belgian government has committed to return the remains to Africa, and the municipality to take down Storms' statue, yet Congolese are still waiting for any action to be taken. In the meantime, Storms' bust has been regularly covered in blood-red paint.


Part II: Exploring Post-Socialism through Post-Colonialism



David Saveliev, Magnitogorsk, Russia, December 26, 2020

"Magnitogorsk stands in a frozen wasteland over the dividing line between the continents of Europe and Asia. It was brutally settled by Stalinist planners to produce steel and by WWII around half of the Soviet tanks came out of the steel plant you can see in the photo. After the war, the statue was commissioned to commemorate the Soviet rear workers. Due to the plant, the city's air remains one of the most polluted on the planet.

Part III: I A Dialogue of the Second and Third Worlds



Valentin Lutumbue, Moscow, Russian Federation

"Moscow's People's Friendship University of Russia (Российский университет дружбы народов) was established in 1960, at the height of the decolonisation period. The next year it was renamed Patrice Lumumba University, to honour the recently murdered Congolese independence hero. It retained the name until 1992. Aimed primarily at students from non-aligned countries, the university embodied the contradictions of the Soviet Union's (and later Russia's) relation to the Third World. For long, it de facto segregated foreign students, discouraging white candidates from applying, and it was considered the default choice of African and Asian students. The main building contains an indoor tropical garden, as for the students not to feel nostalgic. It did nonetheless train scores of engineers, lawyers, and doctors from purposefully undereducated former colonies – who were enthusiastically looking for an education.

The Peoples' Friendship University is still Russia's most diverse university today, and one of its best engineers' schools. Its numerous alumni include Mahmoud Abbas and Alexei Navalny."



I G E ' S B O O K R E V I E W

World Ordering: A Social Theory of Cognitive Evolution
by Emmanuel Adler

Reviewer: Stephan Raab



There is nothing more stable than change, as many turning points in history have proven. Suddenly, paradigms that seemed to be given forever, start crumbling within a short time span. However, where is mankind changing to? This book introduces the reader to the fascinating concept of evolutionary foreign policy, elaborating why only change is never changing itself.

I. Transition to or Transformation of Transformation From

After more than one and half years, in the middle of a pandemic that seems to hold the grip of the global world, the question is still pending: what would a post-Covid world look like? Throughout history, there are many proponents, who on behalf of the spirit of Enlightenment, claimed, there might be a predetermined purpose of history. Proponents were for instance Immanuel Kant claiming the eternal peace of democratic societies. Principles of "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch" defining some basic human rights found their way into the Charter of the United Nations in 1945. According to Kant, the purpose of world history should be eternal peace promoted through the evolution of republican states and constitutions all over the globe (Friedrich, 1947, 14f.). Other thinkers such as Karl Marx promoted the idea of communism as an emancipatory project of an allegedly more equal society (Marx, 1848, np). Eventually, Francis Fukuyama joins

Hegel's concept of Weltgeist, claiming "The End of History," when after the end of the Cold War, now democracy would be established all over the globe (Fukuyama, 1992). Conversely, in the book "World Ordering," searching for the purpose of history, Emmanuel Adler searches for a different kind of answer. The concept of cognitive evolution in international relations is built on what American pragmatist philosopher Josiah Royce stated already in 1891: "As a fact, however, we cannot describe the perfectly organised character because we have never seen it and are subject in our judgment of what tends toward it to the vicissitudes and the accidents of our age and our nation. Any concrete account and picture of the ideal state that we may attempt will, therefore, have elements of chaos left in it." (Royce, 1891, p. 19) Based on that, educationist Wilhelm Dilthey argued in the 1920s, that predefining the goal of history as forcing mankind into that form without respect to history or culture will lead to revolutions, as it might not correspond to the worldview of people. (Dilthey, 1969, 36f.)

II. From Being to Becoming

"World Ordering" distinguishes from other books about international orders through its evolutionary approach. Often histories of world orders are described as changing from one stable status to another stable status, passing through a rather rough period of transition.

Instead, cognitive evolutionary foreign policy argues, that the only stability of order is the change itself, or put in other words, social orders are in the process of permanent change. "Cognitive evolution thus aims to explain where social orders, and particularly international social orders, come from; how and why the world is organised and governed around certain configurations of practices rather than others; how, when, and why these configurations evolve from one kind to another; and how all this is related to collective learning," (Adler, 2019, p. 2) The social theory of cognitive evolution is based on just a few theoretical principals. Before getting more into the details of this concept, conceiving that there are norms, where every practice to be normative (ibid. p. 5), meanwhile, there is not a general purpose, might take some time to reflect. Those ideas were already discussed in Ancient Greece. On the one side, Aristoteles supported a teleological concept, arguing, everything might happen for a higher reason, yet, only achieving the "good life" that might be a reason by itself. Contrary to that, Empedocles argued for a teleonomic worldview, proposing, that there might be no purpose at all. (Trembl, 2002, p. 653) Taking the process of the European Union might provide some clarification, asking what is the European Union or what is it ought to be. "A major characteristic of the European Union (EU) is its evolving or transitional nature." (Salmon, 2003, p. 2) Having a look back into the history of the European project, the European Union of today is different from the past or the future.

III. Life is Learning

Deviating from other approaches, such as realism or institutionalism, cognitive evolution abstains from any normative claims or looking from the perspective of a certain country or international actor. (Adler, 2019, p. 10)

"World Ordering" builds upon the three principles of evolutionary mechanism of variation, selection and stabilisation through background knowledge. Creative variation describes the multitudes of options a social order might choose from, taking for instance the choice between more or less democratic participation. Selective retention deals with the process of selecting the option, that appears to be the most suitable for a certain social order (ibid. p. 5). Eventually, here background knowledge comes into play, determining the criteria for selecting a certain option. Communities are confronted with a certain social environment. Through those experiences, certain social orders evolve and establish, which seems to be most fitting to the community as its environment (ibid. p. 24). Following this trajectory, the practice of power is enshrined into what Adler defines as "epistemic practical authority." Certain actors get empowered to define the criteria for selecting a certain option. Thus, "epistemic practical authority is the combined result of both types of social power and itself is a cause of practices' selection and social orders' evolution. Practices' epistemic authority is emergent and "earned" in practice" (ibid. p. 27). Only through the process of performing power, the powerful get empowered to do so (ibid. p. 147). As long as those practices are accepted as legitimate within the group, the community of practice seems to be in a stable state. Nevertheless, as soon as contestation about the traditional, previous modes of practices surface, a new process of creative variation is started, requiring a new process of selective retention, changing perceptions, expectations, and identities. Consequently, social orders could be conceived as dynamic processes rather than static products of order (ibid. p. 47). Those changes might be induced from inside through

the reflection of its actors, questioning certain practices. Otherwise, new actors surfacing might query the practices of a certain community of practice. Eventually, due to new actors or unexpected events, the environment of the community might change, requiring new concepts of practice to be performed (ibid. p. 185-189). The graphic below gives an overview of the theoretical implications of this approach.




Figure 1: Concept of cognitive evolution (depicted by the author after Adler 2019)

IV. European Integration as Cognitive Evolution

Throughout the book, Adler covers a wide range of topics from philosophy and natural sciences to illustrate his concept of cognitive evolution. Those concepts are applied along with three subjects of European Integration, the evolution of cyberspace and American corporate law. Given the focus of the Institute for Greater Europe, a focus will be put on the evolutionary dimension of European Integration. "Above all, Europe is a learning process, and of late, learning to break with its past, a past of religious totalitarianism —"cuius regio, eius religio"— of monolingual nationalism, of conquest, plunder, genocide, and self-destruction." (Therborn, 2002, p. 15)

Learning implies change, as there is a time before and there is a time after a certain learning effect has taken place. "Learning is what produces, helps reproduce, and changes the social-structural processes that sustain social life." (Adler, 2019, p. 168) Learning describes a process of sense-making, giving meaning as forming a certain identity as part of a particular community (ibid. p. 113). "Social orders are therefore what communities of practice have learned to become." (ibid. p. 123) Referring to the European Union and its integrative practices, the European Union does not conceive itself as simply an international corporation, yet, rather a project of common identity as values, performing and defending mutual solidarity. (ibid. p. 145)

However, being part of this learning community of practice called the European Union, requires the willingness of all actors to join in. This identification can not be enforced, why European transformative power appears strong in guiding and supporting reformers, meanwhile the powers seem to be limited when grappling with nation-based populism thriving. (ibid. p. 149)

V. History Retold or the Evolutionary Narrative

Concluding, this book review "Evolutionary constructivism sees the world as a project under construction or "becoming." (Adler, 2019, p. 32) Becoming refers to a process, by which the endless possibilities of being are narrowed down (ibid. p. 50), letting various communities of practice evolve, which represent the ever-changing social order of the world (ibid. p. 141). "World Ordering: A Social Theory of Cognitive Evolution" opens a new window in the house of international relation theories, observing history as an open-ended and unpredictable process. Besides this innovative approach to the evolution of social orders through constant change, Emmanuel Adler offers a wide range of concepts and theories from philosophy and natural science, inviting readers and researchers for a more interdisciplinary approach in IR studies.

Critics might argue that the actors themselves, might this be countries or international actors are missing. Others might assume, that international relations require normative claims or certain purposes such as global anarchy in realism or peace through institutionalism. Considering the dark chapter of Social Darwinism adopting evolutionary principles into the world of social sciences appears to be tricky. Appealing to those critics, Adler argues, that evolution has no purpose itself, yet, it is about the human mind to make sense

of evolutionary processes, stating that any concept introduced into social science must go through the feedback loop of human cognition (ibid. p. 82). Every practice performed by a human being includes certain normative aspects, as the consequences impact the self and the community (ibid. p. 300). Already Charles Darwin as one of the founding fathers of evolutionary theory reminds us that a moral being is "capable of comparing his past and future actions or motives and of approving or disapproving of them" (Darwin, 1871, p. 88). After all, Emmanuel Adler provides a great introduction into how to tell the story of mankind through time. Concluding "World Ordering" is a great invitation for learning through history, as one day our time will be history as well.

WORLD ORDERING - A SOCIAL THEORY OF COGNITIVE EVOLUTION

BY EMMANUEL ADLER

FREE FOR DOWNLOAD SEE:
[HTTPS://WWW.CAMBRIDGE.ORG/CORE/BOOKS/WORLD-ORDERING/9A008E7694218C9B5C4D7589814D61C3](https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/world-ordering/9A008E7694218C9B5C4D7589814D61C3)

About the Reviewer



Stephan Raab is a contributor and editor at the Institute for Greater Europe. He holds a Master's in Political Science from the Otto-Friedrich-University Bamberg and a graduate from the European Academy of Diplomacy Warsaw. His interests are located in the field of

digitisation, global education, and the development of democratic dialogue in civil societies.



I G E ' S R E A D I N G L I S T

Summer 2021

The West

- **Imperial Ambitions: Conversations on the Post-9/11 World** by Noam Chomsky and David Barsamian
- **Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism** by Greg Grandin
- **The Autobiography of Martin Luther King, Jr.** by Martin Luther King Jr. and Clayborne Carson
- **The Imperial Nation: Citizens and Subjects in the British, French, Spanish, and American Empires** by Josep M. Fradera (translated by Ruth MacKay)

The East

- **Post-Imperium: A Eurasian Story** by Dmitri Trenin
- **What Does It Mean to Be Post-Soviet?: Decolonial Art from the Ruins of the Soviet Empire** by Madina Tlostanova
- **The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945 - 1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Post-war Imperialism** by William Roger Louis
- **The Palestine Nakba: Decolonising History, Narrating the Subaltern, Reclaiming Memory** by Nur Masalha

The South

- **Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism** by Mahmood Mamdani, Geoff Eley, Nicholas B. Dirks and Sherry B. Ortner
- **The Cambridge History of Africa Series (Volumes I-VIII)** by various authors
- **The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge** by V. Y. Mudimbe
- **The Next Africa: An Emerging Continent Becomes a Global Powerhouse** by Jake Bright and Aubrey Hruby



I G E ' S R E A D I N G L I S T

Summer 2021

And The Global

- **Postmodern Imperialism: Geopolitics and the Great Games** by Eric Walberg
- **Culture and Imperialism** by Edward W. Said
- **On Decoloniality: Concepts, Analytics, Praxis** by Walter D. Mignolo and Catherine E. Walsh
- **The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options** by Walter D. Mignolo
- **Decolonization: A Short History** by Jan C. Jansen and Jürgen Osterhammel (translated by Jeremiah Riemer)

Additional Titles

- **Orientalism** by Edward W. Said
- **Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty** by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson
- **Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty** by Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo
- **World Order** by Henry Kissinger
- **The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order** by Samuel P. Huntington
- **The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire** by Hans-Friedrich Mueller with an introduction by Edward Gibbon and Daniel J. Boorstin
- **A Thirst for Empire: How Tea Shaped the Modern World** by Erika Rappaport

Book List Compiled By: Ruxandra Seniuc



THE NOTION OF AFRICA AND THE EUROPEAN IDENTITY EVOLUTION WITHIN EU OFFICIAL DOCUMENTATION FROM 1973 TO THE NINETIES

Achim Alan de Merlo



I. The Starting Point of the Analysis and Its Context

At the Copenhagen European Summit on the 14th and 15th of December 1973, the Heads of State or Governments of the nine European Community (EC) Member States at that time, affirmed the concept of a "European identity" into their common foreign relations. In the first part of the declaration, "European identity" is based on a common heritage and civilisational history among the member states. In the second part, European identity is related to its relations with the external world. It is in this second part that a paragraph is included citing the historical link between the member states and Africa. Due to the circumstances of the time, this was quite understandable. Additionally, France was no longer the only major former colonialist member in the EC (along with Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Germany), and with the new entry of the United Kingdom, the Euro-African link considerably increased.

Upon that, the need to establish a European identity was based on the ongoing crisis between the EC itself and the United States of America, as a follow up to the collapse of the US dollar and the Vietnam War.

Along this line, the Declaration of December 1973 was, also a primary consequence of Henry Kissinger's 'Year of Europe' speech. Secondly, the oil crisis of autumn 1973, as a result of the Yom Kippur conflict, gave a further push for European leaders to pursue such common goals and distancing themselves from the US, as well as a natural development from the European Political Cooperation (EPC) process initiated within the EC already in 1970.

During this initial stage of the Seventies, the idea of a European identity of the EC was also based on a principle of responsibility towards the rest of the world and the former colonies. It meant, in particular, a responsibility towards the countries of the Mediterranean, Africa, and the Middle East. However, this should be intended as part of an external recognition framework, and should not be confused with a European identity originating within Europe.

II. The Janus-Face of the European Identity Concept

The concept of a "European identity" as an instrument to consolidate Europe's place in the world was definitely a reaction to a recognised weakness of the EC in the framework of the international context at the time. Nevertheless, this aspect is just one side of the process analysed here.

The European identity expressed in the declaration, as evidenced, is more related to the EPC process itself given that Africa is mentioned in Part II of the declaration, instead of being cited in Part I. On the other hand, what becomes clear later on is that since 1973 there has been a parallel process of strengthening an internal weakness, with the intent of "constructing" a European internal identity. Somehow, in order to further develop Part I of the declaration of 1973. Therefore, from the Seventies, two lines of conceptual development diverge the external European identity, as part of the EPC process, and the internal European identity, as part of what later became in the eighties the concept of a "European citizenship." This divergence is a kind of Janus-faced discourse to operationalize European identity internally and externally. In this sense, following such situations, the interesting exercise remains to investigate also how the link with Africa that was expressed in the 1973 Declaration has been considered in these two processes. This is intended always within the official documentation by the EC, and later EU institutions, dealing with both external European identity and internal European identity along the integration process.



III. The External European Identity and Africa

One of the immediate further steps in developing an external European identity that the EC has undertaken since 1973 has been the "Tindemans Report" of 1975. This can be considered

a practical brainstorming exercise following the aims expressed by the European identity declaration earlier. At the time, this discourse focused on the need to assert European identity in all international political discussions and coordinate such efforts. Main targets in 1975 included the United States, as well as other countries such as China, Canada and Japan, which had shown sympathy for European integration. In this regard, the Tindemans report seems to reply more to an internal crisis. This was expressed particularly by the sentence within the report stating "The European identity will not be accepted by the outside world so long as the European States appear sometimes united, sometimes disunited."

In the context of this crisis and the need of strengthening the European identity, the Tindemans report makes no mention of Africa. Nevertheless, the African continent was addressed specifically in a statement, later in 1976, about condemning the apartheid situation in South Africa.

Here, the nine-member states finally reiterated obligations in Part II of the 1973 Declaration which engaged them to co-operate, but only "as far as the African States wish them to do so." Moreover, the EC agreed they should also respect the independence of all African States, and their right to determine their national policy independently and without foreign interference, therefore rejecting any action by any European State aimed at setting up a sphere of influence in Africa. These are also the years when Portugal (even as a non a member state), during the Carnation Revolution, disengaged from its colonies, creating a difficult situation of "sanctuarisation" within the bipolar world. In comparison with the previous declaration mentioning a responsibility of

engagement in 1973, it is possible to notice that there is, in this evolving context, a wish of less active involvement of the EC in Africa. This was justified within the new context by the desire of Europeans to avoid geopolitical troubles within the competition between the two antagonistic Cold War superpowers on the African continent during the decolonisation process. The latter of which was a process catalysed and favoured by the increasing competition between the Soviet Union and the United States of America which then resulted in the common detriment of the European's historical and hierarchical relationship on the African continent and that in fact lead to their withdrawal.

Later on, more efforts to raise a European external identity in the Eighties were initially addressed by the Genscher-Colombo Plan of 1981, which was an attempt by both Germany and Italy to carry the EPC much further. In this regard, European identity in the text of the Plan was matched with a European security identity outside the NATO context. At the same time, looking inward by the second Janus-face, it was reaffirmed that the member states wanted a way to increase solidarity among the "peoples of Europe" while respecting their historical identity, their dignity, and their freedom within the framework of freely accepted common institutions. In this Plan of 1981, on both internal and external policy matters, touching for instance hard politics like defence, there is no mention or further link to Africa.

The Adonnino Report of 1985 has been another step alongside the European integration progression and among the concepts analysed in this piece, in both the internal and external European identity. This time, the report mentions the "third world", which at the

time was used to address that part of the world in the context of the Cold War. Internally, like the previous Tindemans report, it envisaged that the Community should respond to the expectations of the European people to strengthen and promote its identity and its image. This action was required for both the European citizens and for the rest of the world (externally). Again, targeting internal and external European identity the Community would boost the simplification of controls at the internal borders and strengthen the identity of the Community at external frontiers. Africa was mentioned specifically in the Adonnino Report, not about migration as one may assume given a contemporary anachronistic mindset, but instead, within the context of envisaged community actions engaging youth to volunteer against drought and famine in the third world.



As it is possible to recognise again, the international context and the situation that was facing Africa at the time, like the Sahel famine, which mobilised the political milieu at the EC level to insert specific efforts in order to address African problems. In this

way also, the Adonnino Report has been a product of its particular situational context and dominant narratives.

A further link to Africa is expressed in the "Single European Act" (SEA) in 1987. In this subsequent context, a distinction should be made between aims and jurisdiction. In fact, Africa in the SEA is not involved as part of the European identity in external policy matters, as expressed in the preambles, but rather in terms of territoriality and jurisdiction of the treaty, and only for certain cases and member states. Compared to the previous Treaty of Rome and the late amendments, major and inevitable changes due to the decolonisation process happened in the meantime in terms of EC territoriality. Part IV of the SEA

clarifies those changes. This involved in particular matters of free trade linked to some traces of former colonial possession. The Rhodes Declaration of 1988 that followed the SEA for instance, engaged the EC in a constructive dialogue and cooperation with regional groups, as well with the Africa continent and placed a special emphasis on interregional

cooperation. In this way, as it was already expressed in 1976, the EC continued to cooperate and increasing the European identity in foreign affairs, due, in some part, to the circumstances created by the collapse of the Eastern Bloc. From this historical momentum, a report on the Development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) dated 1992, expressed the special importance of North-South relations. It is possible to

note, at this time, a gradual shift toward a "Europe in the world" from the EC. This was justified by identifying support for the Organisation of African Union as a regional organisation, also lately, when in 2000 it became the African Union.

Between the end of the Eighties and before the Maastricht Treaty, the EC was permitted to consider a wider role in foreign relations

Africa as one of the targets of all aspects of European foreign relations, which then included security, economic, and development policies, generally in the context of full respect for human rights. The tragic events of the late 1990s which happened in Africa, like the genocide in Rwanda, contextualised and emphasized within the EU and African relationship the need for democracy and the protection of human rights.

However, the Maastricht Treaty (TEU), which entered into force in 1993, does not specifically mention Africa in terms of a European identity. Instead, it restated, both in the preamble, as well in Article B, that European identity as a concept is critical in order to "promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in the world", and which might in time to time lead to a common

defence. The only trace of Africa in the TEU, as a link in this case, is present in Article 130w, which cites Africa as part of provisions not covered by this article (which is considering the ACP agreements instead).

To identify a trajectory of the external European identity concept at that stage in the nineties, is to consider that the European Union was trying to



link "third world" development with the new Common Security and Foreign Policy pillar of the treaty. As aforementioned, this paper does not look specifically at the European Development Policy, but it is worth mentioning that at the foreign ministers meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen in 1993, the EU Member States took important steps towards deeper and wider cooperation with Africa. They committed to support the democratization process in Africa, including support for good governance, sound economic management, and respect for human rights. Such efforts would be channelled through cooperation with the OAU. In this sense, the pan-African organisation became the target for efforts in European preventive diplomacy and peacekeeping.

Lastly, another milestone of the Nineties was the European Council meeting in May 1998, which pledged coherence in EU external policy by linking the CFSP with aid programmes. In this regard, a particular step worth mentioning comes not from an official document, but from a speech. In a non-binding statement in 1997 about the situation in Algeria, delivered at the European Parliament, the President of the Council at the time stated: "The European Union and Algeria are, if you like, 'condemned' to work together. For reasons of geography, for reasons of history and

Moreover, this possibility of linking a European identity to Africa also faded out within the process of decolonisation itself.

for social and humanitarian reasons, and from the European point of view, we do that with total respect for the cultural and religious traditions of our North African friends and total repudiation of the fundamentalists'

abuse of those traditions." This paragraph is interesting because it seems to reflect the specific heritage of France during a different epoch (e.g. in the 1950s when Algeria was still part of France and therefore was automatically part of the EEC).

On the other hand, from the end of the Nineties until 2009, three important treaties have been ratified among the EU member states, which include the Amsterdam Treaty (entry 1999), Nice Treaty (entry 2003), and Lisbon Treaty (entry 2009); however, there is no mention of Africa in any of them. While, instead, the concept of a European identity is mostly repeated in terms of external relations with the world and within the CSFP. This concept of European identity appears in the treaties both in the preambles and in some following articles, becoming nowadays a constant drafting practice.

Lastly, it is worth comparing such ideas from the bottom up, and frame this question from the point of view of European citizens themselves. For the EU-Africa Summit in Libya on 29-30 November 2010, a special Eurobarometer report on EU-Africa relations was published ahead of the summit. The obvious enquiry was related to development policy, and, as the results indicated, Europeans believed the main challenge in Africa was to tackle poverty (38%). But in cultural terms, (and more important for this paper) the main finding of that survey, were that the European citizens' perspectives on Africa mainly reflected traditional images and perceptions (like the immaculate nature and wildlife, and people living in deprivation). In the context of this widespread stereotype, it is also interesting to report that a question about the future of the EU-Africa relationship was included in the 2010 Eurobarometer survey among the other questions (see on this matter annexe 1 fig. 3). Perhaps motivated by

disappointing and negative "common sense perception[s] of Africa" within the survey's results, the Eurobarometer study concluded that (intended from the official narrative point of view and with a certain flavour of propaganda) "the Africa-EU Partnership in this context constitutes an important geo-strategic effort of linking Europe and Africa in dialogue and cooperation - an effort that deserves increased recognition from the general European public."

IV. Internal European Identity

In all documents on the matter of internal European identity and the possible mention of Africa in the text, no results linking both terms came out from the enquiry. This clearly means that from the 1973 European identity declaration, Africa remained a term linked solely to Part II (external relations) and did not shift to the internal European identity concept, even with the social changes developing among the European



population during the last forty-four years. Despite the several documents examined that mentioned European identity within, for example, Cultural heritage, European citizenship, European remembrance days, cultural policy documents, education, like the Erasmus program and youth policy and initiatives, it appears that the EU legislation and official documentation remains pristine and attached to the core identity aspects of the European discourse. The only exception that

somehow indicates a shift in the concept of internal European identity comes not from an official text, but from a declaration in the 21st Century. An EU ministerial declaration in 2015; states that: "European identity is culturally and religiously diverse. Therefore, it is important to understand the challenges young people are confronted with in terms of linguistic diversity, social inclusion and employment as a key factor for integration (...). Among other aspects, these measures must be geared to protect minority communities, such as Jewish, Christian and Muslim communities, and to promote Islam together with European values."

V. Conclusions

This paper attempted to discover how the concept of European identity interacts with mentions of Africa in the official documents of the EU. It found that this concept is more a discourse of foreign relations rather than that of internal EU identity. In this way, it confirms that one of the EU's longest foreign policy relationships is with Africa. On the other hand, since the Copenhagen declaration and Statement No.13 on Africa on 14 December 1973, there is no mention of Africa intended as part of the internal European identity in binding documents. Moreover, this possibility of linking a European identity to Africa also faded out within the process of decolonisation itself. In contextualising this trajectory, it becomes clear that the link to colonial times, such as those still present in the Schuman Declaration of the Fifties, is nowadays much more eroded and forgotten. Lastly, this exercise indicated that the EU-Africa relationship has gone through a series of stages; ranging from a more donor-recipient relationship linked to the concept of "responsibility" in the Seventies, to one of a more emancipatory kind, based on international partnership and regional dialogue.

Critically, the influx of immigrants from Africa seems to not have challenged the European identity concept in the official documents, in particular in the framework set at the beginning by the Council in Copenhagen in 1973. This conclusion is based only on official documents; obviously, the discourse around such thematic of an up-to-date European identity in the academia and the cultural milieu may be broader and deeper. But this narrative, therefore, seems so far not to have reached any influence on the European identity concept in the official EU documents considered. To draft some conclusions about this circumstance, we should first consider that official documents are drafted with amendments and consensus from member states. Therefore, the fact that an identity link with Africa only concerned European

external relations is probably that otherwise, it may pose a big dilemma for individual European governments. This refers, in particular, to a situation which is already alarming in several EU member states where communitarianism is raising of, communitarianism, parallel society, and secluded areas set by immigrants from Africa with strong identity ties to their original continent and way of living. Consequently, this dilemma corresponds exactly to avoid diluting the concept and discourse of a European identity in a bland and flat inclusive manner for external characteristics manifested within Europe. This justification therefore tries to challenge, and stands directly in clash with, the dichotomy represented by the concept of integration vs. the concept of multiculturalism (and its actual inherent mutual contradictions).

Editor's Note: As expressed by the author, a critical component of this piece includes quantitative research to better understand this topic. Initially, Mr. de Merlo included an appendix when he submitted his paper which highlighted empirical evidence in support of his thesis; however, our editorial team made the tough decision not to include this section in the final publication of *Europe:Beyond* in the interest of length and brevity. With that being said, we still believe this component to be an integral part of Mr. de Merlo's overall research and so we have published it as a Web Exclusive at <https://www.institutegreatereurope.com/europe-beyond>. We strongly encourage readers to check out this amazing research and understand this issue in greater depths.



S O U R C E S

Editorial Note: As a general rule, magazines do not often publish sources with their articles; however, in the interest of full transparency, we have decided to include this section at the end to credit those experts and sources which helped to inform the work of our contributors. Additionally, all images used in this publication are free to use, non-copyrighted, in the public domain, and/or reproduced with expressed permission of the creator(s). The illustrations were designed by Freepik and Canva.

If you have any questions on sourcing, please contact: magazine@institute-greatereurope.com.

CSDP Military Operations

Angrist, Joshua D, and Pischke, Jörn-Steffen. 2008. "Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion", Princeton University Press.

Becker, Jordan. 2020. "Authoritarian Populism and Burden-Sharing in the Transatlantic Community." SSRN Electronic Journal, March 2020, <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3531703>.

Becker, Jordan M. 2019. "Accidental Rivals? EU Fiscal Rules, NATO, and Transatlantic Burden-Sharing." *Journal of Peace Research*, 56 (5): 697-713. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343319829690>.

Daly, John C. K. 2014. "Counterterrorism or Neo-Colonialism? The French Army in Africa". Jamestown Foundation, *Terrorism Monitor*, 12 (5). <https://jamestown.org/program/counterterrorism-or-neo-colonialism-the-french-army-in-africa/>.

Di Mauro, Danilo, Krotz, Ulrich, and Wright, Katerina. "EU's Global Engagement: A Database of CSDP Military Operations And Civilian Missions Worldwide", 2003-2017, Codebook Version 2.0.

CSDP Military Operations (Cont.)

Dorussen, Han, Emil J. Kirchner, and James Sperling. 2009. "Sharing the Burden of Collective Security in the European Union." *International Organization* 63 (4): 789-810. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818309990105>.

Duke, Simon. 2018. "The Enigmatic Role of Defence in the EU: From EDC to EDU?" *European Foreign Affairs Review*, 23 (1): 63-80.

Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Mette. 2014. *Europe's Defence Dilemma*. *International Spectator*. Vol. 49. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2014.910728>.

Erforth, Benedikt. 2018. "Catherine Gegout, Why Europe Intervenes in Africa: Security, Prestige, and the Legacy of Colonialism." *ERIS - European Review of International Studies* 5 (1): 106-9. <https://doi.org/10.3224/eris.v5i1.11>.

Gegout, Catherine. 2019. "Realism, Neocolonialism and European Military Intervention in Africa: The Return to Realism?" In *Fear and Uncertainty in Europe*, Palgrave Macmillan, 265-288.

CSDP Military Operations (Cont.)

Horvath, Ronald J. 1972. "A Definition of Colonialism", *The University of Chicago Press*, 13(1), 45-47.

Howorth, Jolyon. 2017. "The EU's Security and Defence Policy", In *International Relations and the European Union*, Oxford University Press, 341-364.

Kim, Wukki, and Todd Sandler. 2020. "NATO at 70: Pledges, Free Riding, and Benefit-Burden Concordance." *Defence and Peace Economics*, 31 (4): 400-413. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2019.1640937>.

Manners, Ian. 2002. "Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?" *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 40 (2): 235-58. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5965.00353>.

Olson, Mancur, and Richard Zeckhauser. 2016. "An Economic Theory of Alliances Author (s): Mancur Olson, Jr . and Richard Zeckhauser Source : *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol . 48, No . 3 (Aug ., 1966), 48(3), 266-279, The MIT Press Stable <http://Www.Jstor.Org/Stabl>."

Oma, Ida M. 2012. "Explaining States' Burden-Sharing Behaviour within NATO." *Cooperation and Conflict*, 47 (4): 562-73. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836712462856>.

Pavličková, Kristýna, and Monika Gabriela Bartoszewicz. 2020. "To Free or Not to Free (Ride): A Comparative Analysis of the NATO Burden-Sharing in the Czech Republic and Lithuania." *Defense and Security Analysis*, 1-17. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2020.1790810>.

CSDP Military Operations (Cont.)

Riedl, Maximilian, and ., & Geishecker, I. (2014). Keep it simple: estimation strategies for ordered response models with fixed effects. *Journal of Applied Statistics*, 41(11), 2358-2374. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02664763.2014.909969>.

Ringsmose, Jens. 2010. "NATO Burden-Sharing Redux: Continuity and Change after the Cold War." *Contemporary Security Policy* 31 (2): 319-38. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13523260.2010.491391>.

Robison, Rebecca R. 2020. "NATO Burden-Sharing: A Comprehensive Framework for Member Evaluation." *Comparative Strategy* 39 (3): 299-315. <https://doi.org/10.1080/01495933.2020.1740574>.

Sandler, Todd, and Hirofumi Shimizu. 2014. "NATO Burden Sharing 1999-2010: An Altered Alliance." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 10 (1): 43-60. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2012.00192.x>.

Scalera, Jamie E., and Wiegand, Krista E. 2018. "The motivation of European Union mediation in civil conflicts", *European Security*, 27(4), 434-452. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09662839.2018.151438>.

Soder, Kirsten. 2010. "EU Military Crisis Management: An Assessment of Member States ' Contributions and Positions," no. May.

Wagner, Wolfgang, Anna Herranz-Surrallés, Juliet Kaarbo, and Falk Ostermann. 2017. "Politicization, Party Politics and Military Missions: Deployment Votes in France, Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom." *Wissenschaftszentrum Berlin Für Sozialforschung Discussion* (January).

21st Century Colonialism

Bowcott, Owen. "'It's Heartbreaking': the Chagos Islanders Forced into Exile." *The Guardian*, February 26, 2019. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/feb/26/its-heartbreaking-the-chagos-islanders-forced-into-exile>.

Chagos Marine Protected Area Arbitration, *Mauritius v United Kingdom*, Final Award, ICGJ 486 (PCA 2015), 18th March 2015, Permanent Court of Arbitration.

Delimitation of the maritime boundary in the Indian Ocean (Mauritius/Maldives), Judgment of 28 January 2021, ITLOS Case No. 28.

Fahner, Johannes Hendrik. "Déjà Vu in The Hague – the Relevance of the Chagos Arbitral Award to the Proceedings before the ICJ." *Questions of international law*, January 31, 2019. <http://www.qil-qdi.org/deja-vu-in-the-hague-the-relevance-of-the-chagos-arbitral-award-to-the-proceedings-before-the-icj/>.

General Assembly Resolution 1514, Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, A/RES/1514 (14 December 1960).

General Assembly resolution 73/295, Advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the legal consequences of the separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965, A/RES/73/295 (24 May 2019).

"General Assembly Welcomes International Court of Justice Opinion on Chagos Archipelago, Adopts Text Calling for Mauritius' Complete Decolonization." *United Nations*, May 22, 2019. <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/ga12146.doc.htm>.

Harris, Peter. "Decolonise Diego Garcia: Why America Should Not Fear Mauritius." *The Interpreter*, July 15, 2020. <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/decolonise-diego-garcia-why-america-should-not-fear-mauritius>.

21st Century Colonialism (Cont.)

Katselli, Elena. "Chagos Islands: UK Refusal to Hand Back Archipelago Disregards International Law and Echoes Era of Colonialism." *The Conversation*, June 11, 2019. <https://theconversation.com/chagos-islands-uk-refusal-to-hand-back-archipelago-disregards-international-law-and-echoes-era-of-colonialism-118290>.

Kohn, Margaret, and Kavita Reddy. "Colonialism." *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, August 29, 2017. <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/colonialism/>.

McKenna, Miriam Bak. "Chagos Islands: UN Ruling Calls Time on Shameful British Colonialism but UK Still Resisting." *The Conversation*, February 28, 2019. <https://theconversation.com/chagos-islands-un-ruling-calls-time-on-shameful-british-colonialism-but-uk-still-resisting-112464>.

Pierce, Karen. "Resolution on the British Indian Ocean Territory." *UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office*, June 21, 2019. <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/resolution-on-the-british-indian-ocean-territory>.

Rickard, Carmel. "UK Hold on Chagos Archipelago Declared Unlawful." *African Legal Information Institute*, February 4, 2021. <https://africanlii.org/article/20210204/uk-hold-chagos-archipelago-declared-unlawful>.

Sand, Peter. 2009. *United States and Britain in Diego Garcia – The Future of a Controversial Base*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

The High Court of Justice Queens Bench Division, *Chagos Islanders v. Attorney General*, HQ02X01287, 2003.

21st Century Colonialism (Cont.)

"UK Racks up Nearly £6m Legal Bill over Chagos Islands." *Scottish Legal News*, February 23, 2021. <https://www.scottishlegal.com/article/uk-racks-up-nearly-6m-legal-bill-over-chagos-islands>.

Decolonising the West-centered Idea of Feminism

Anne Sisson Runyan (2018) Decolonizing knowledge in feminist world politics, *International Feminist Journal of Politics*, 20:1, 3-8, DOI: 10.1080/14616742.2018.1414403.

Aune, Kristin. 2011. "Why feminists are less religious." *The Guardian*, March 29, 2011. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/belief/2011/mar/29/why-feminists-less-religious-survey>.

Caprino, Kathy. 2017. "What Is Feminism, And Why Do So Many Women And Men Hate It?" *Forbes*, March 8, 2017. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/kathycaprino/2017/03/08/what-is-feminism-and-why-do-so-many-women-and-men-hate-it/?sh=33796b27e8e6>.

Dhillon, Carla M. "Indigenous Feminisms: Disturbing Colonialism in Environmental Science Partnerships." *Sociology of Race and Ethnicity* 6, no. 4 (October 2020): 483-500. <https://doi.org/10.1177/2332649220908608>.

Gearon, Jihan. 2021. "Indigenous Feminism Is Our Culture." *Stanford Social Innovation Review*. https://ssir.org/articles/entry/indigenous_feminism_is_our_culture#.

Hasan, Md. (2012). Feminism as Islamophobia: A review of misogyny charges against Islam. *Intellectual Discourse*. 20. 55-78.

Decolonizing the West-centered Idea of Feminism (Cont.)

Ismaik, Hasan. 2021. "Egypt Independent Egypt Features World Middle East Business Science Culture Life & Style Search for RSS Twitter Facebook Opinion Arab Feminism: A Luxury or a Necessity?" *EGYPT INDEPENDENT*, April 1, 2021. <https://egyptindependent.com/arab-feminism-a-luxury-or-a-necessity/>.

Jackson, Sarah. 2011. "Feminism in the global south hasn't come from the north." *The Guardian*, (October). <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2011/oct/20/feminism-south-women-development-response>.

Lubelska, Mairi. 2018. "What is Postcolonial Feminism?" *Medium*, January 27, 2018. <https://medium.com/verve-up/what-is-postcolonial-feminism-de3391325407>.

Macleod, Catriona Ida, Sunil Bhatia, and Wen Liu. "Feminisms and Decolonising Psychology: Possibilities and Challenges." *Feminism & Psychology* 30, no. 3 (August 2020): 287-305. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0959353520932810>.

Miró, Gisela C. 2020. Encountering the colonial: religion in feminism and the coloniality of secularism. N.p.: Netherlands Research School of Gender Studies. 10.1177/1464700119859763.

Peterson, Max. 2019. "THE REVOLUTIONARY PRACTICE OF BLACK FEMINISMS." *Smithsonian National Museum of African American History & Culture*, March 4, 2019. <https://nmaahc.si.edu/explore/stories/collection/revolutionary-practice-black-feminisms>.

Decolonizing the West-centered Idea of Feminism (Cont.)

Ross, Avina. 2016. "Black feminist discourse analysis of por emminist discourse analysis of portrayals of gender violence als of gender violence against Black women: A social work dissertation." (November).

<https://scholarscompass.vcu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5633&context=etd>.

Stinson, R.D., Goodman, K.M., Bermingham, C. and Ali, S.R., 2013. Do Atheism and Feminism Go Hand-in-Hand?: A Qualitative Investigation of Atheist Men's Perspectives about Gender Equality. *Secularism and Nonreligion*, 2, pp.39-60. DOI: <http://doi.org/10.5334/snr.ak>.

Tillet, Salamishah. 2015. "The Panthers' Revolutionary Feminism." *The New York Times*, October 2, 2015. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/04/movies/the-panthers-revolutionary-feminism.html>.

The Notion of Africa and the European Identity Evolution...

I. Search engines for primary documents:

Official journal of the EU

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/>

EU Commission documents

<http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/regdoc/?fuseaction=search>

EU Council documents

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/register/en/content/int/?lang=en&typ=ADV>

II. Primary Sources Used on External European Identity and Africa (in chronological order):

"Declaration on European Identity. Copenhagen European Summit of 14 and 15 December 1973". Copenhagen, 14 December 1973.

"Report by Mr. Leo Tindemans to the European Council" In: Bulletin of the European Communities No. 1/76.

"Solemn declaration of the European Council Stuttgart 19 June 1983". In Bulletin of the European Communities, No. 6/1983.

The Notion of Africa and the European Identity Evolution... (Cont.)

"A People's Europe". Reports from the ad-hoc Committee. In: Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 7/85.

"The Single European Act" In: Official Journal of the European Communities No L 169/1 29. 6. 87.

"Treaty on European Union". In: Official Journal of the European Communities, C 191, 29.7.1992.

"Report to the European Council on the Likely Development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) with a View to Identifying Areas Open to Joint Action vis-à-vis Particular Countries or Groups of Countries", Lisbon, 26-27 June 1992.

"Conclusions of the Twelve Foreign Ministers on Africa" Copenhagen, 21-22 June 1993" SN 180/1/93.

"Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts" In: Official Journal of the European Communities C 340, 10.11.1997.

"Common Position of 25 May 1998 defined by the Council on the basis of Article J.2 of the Treaty on European Union, concerning human rights, democratic principles, the rule of law and good governance in Africa" 98/350/CFSP.

"Treaty of Nice" In: Official Journal of the European Communities, C 80, 10.03.2001.

"Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union" In: Official Journal of the European Union, C 326, 26.10.2012.

"Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union" In: Official Journal of the European Union, C 326, 26.10.2012.

The Notion of Africa and the European Identity Evolution... (Cont.)

III. Primary sources used on internal European identity and Africa (in chronological order):

"Decision No 1904/2006/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12 December 2006 establishing for the period 2007 to 2013 the programme Europe for Citizens to promote active European citizenship, 12 December 2006". In: Official Journal of the European Union, L 378, 27.12.2006.

"Europeans, Culture and Cultural Values Qualitative Study in 27 European Countries. Summary Report" Brussels: European Commission – Directorate-General for Education and Culture. September 2007.

"Decision No 1358/2008/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008 amending Decision No 1904/2006/EC establishing for the period 2007 to 2013 the programme Europe for Citizens to promote active European citizenship, 16 December 2008". In: Official Journal of the European Union, L 350, 30.12.2008.

"Decision No 1194/2011/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 establishing a European Union action for the European Heritage Label, 16 February 2011" In: Official Journal of the European Union, L 303, 22.11.2011.

"Impact Assessment accompanying the document Proposal for a Regulation of the Council establishing for the period 2014-2020 the programme "Europe for Citizens" to promote European citizenship" Brussels, 14 December 2011. SEC (2011)1562.

"The Development of European Identity/Identities: Unfinished Business. A Policy Review" European Commission Directorate-General for Research & Innovation. Brussels, 2012.

The Notion of Africa and the European Identity Evolution... (Cont.)

"Measuring the impact of the Europe for Citizens Programme" European Commission. Directorate-General for Communication. Brussels, May 2013.

"Regulation (EU) No 1288/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2013 establishing 'Erasmus+': the Union programme for education, training, youth and sport and repealing Decisions No 1719/2006/EC, No 1720/2006/EC and No 1298/2008/EC (Text with EEA relevance)". In: Official Journal of the European Union, L 347, 20.12.2013.

"Council Regulation (EU) No 390/2014 of 14 April 2014 establishing the 'Europe for Citizens' programme for the period 2014-2020". In: Official Journal of the European Union, L 115, 17.4.2014.

IV. Mentioned references:

Adekeye Adebajo and Kaye Whitman eds (2012) "The EU and Africa. From Eurafrique to Afro-Europa." London: Hurst and Company.

A. T. Grove (1986) "The state of Africa in the 80s" The Geographical Journal, Vol. 152, No. 2 (Jul., 1986), pp. 193-203.

Bo Stråth (2002) "European identity - To the Historical Limits of a Concept" European Journal of Social Theory 5(4): pg. 387-401.

Ramses A. Wessel (2007): "The Multilevel Constitution of European Foreign Relations" Centre for European Studies (CES) University of Twente, The Netherlands CES Working Paper No. 1/04.

V. Further References:

Peo Hansen (2002) "European Integration, European Identity and the Colonial Connection" European Journal of Social Theory 5(4) 483-498.

The Notion of Africa and the European Identity Evolution... (Cont.)

José Lingna Nafafé (2012) "Europe in Africa and Africa in Europe: Rethinking postcolonial space, cultural encounters and hybridity" European Journal of Social Theory 16(1) 51-68.

Supporting Staff

Philippe Lefevre, IGE Chairman

Ruxandra Seniuc, Supporting Editor

Thank You!

Thank you so much for your support of our newest endeavour at the Institute for a Greater Europe!

If you have any comments, suggestions, questions, or concerns, please do not hesitate to reach us at:

magazine@institutegreatereurope.com



INSTITUTE FOR A GREATER
EUROPE

124 AVENUE DE LA COURONNE,
BOÎTE 1,
1050, IXELLES, BRUSSELS
CAPITAL REGION,
BELGIUM.

communications@institutegreatereurope.com

magazine@institutegreatereurope.com