Analysing Brussels Agreement: Limitations of Constructive Ambiguity

by Jakub Stepaniuk

Introduction

The rise in tensions leading to blockades at border crossing points prove how delicate is the conflict between Serbia and Kosovo. In particular , Kosovo, historically speaking, is a great example of conflicting interpretations in terms of a “cradle of the nation” or “who was the first here” dilemma. Serbian mythologisation of the Kosovo Battle from 1389 together with the heritage of orthodox monasteries conveyed in folk culture serve as the fundament for both Serbian national identity and sacred symbolism of the Serbian Orthodox Church. This has been challenged by Albanians’ interpretation of the history who portray themselves as direct successors of Illyrian tribes, thus, the people who were in Kosovo “before Serbs” and who have the “historically” grounded right to self-determination (Daskalovski, 2003). Therefore, this should not be a surprise that the “eternality” of the Kosovar dispute contextualised in historical lenses as one community settling down on the given territory before the other makes many scholars to compare Kosovo with a classic case of historically ingrained and hence equally “irreconcilable” conflict, namely, Palestine (Ben-David, 2019), (Koinova, 2018), (Metz, 2014).

Though this is not going to be the main focus of this paper, I believe that understanding historical complexity of Kosovo is crucial to analyse limitations to potential “solvability” of the dispute for both Serbian and Albanian sides. Various historical interpretations simultaneously lead toward other interdisciplinary analyses of Kosovo’s status. In terms of international law, Kosovo is unique as it deviates from the uti possidetis principle assuming only republics of federal Yugoslavia or Soviet Union to have the right to self-determination (Hasani, 2003), underpinned in Yugoslav case by the guidelines of Badinter Commission (Gruda, 2005) which recognised independences of Yugoslav republics only (e.g. Slovenia, Croatia but not Serbian proclaimed republics in Croatia and Bosnia). Consequences of treating Kosovo as a sui generis case could have severe consequences for regional stability (the status of Republika Srpska or other potentially separatist territories around Tetovo, Preševo or Herzegovina), post-Soviet security (self-determination of Crimea and redrawing borders in Caucasus) as well as challenges of global significance (post-colonial question of borders in Asia and Africa).

In this paper, I would like to analyse the effectiveness of the Brussels Agreement with theoretical references to constructive ambiguity and, to a lesser degree, various models of state-building and stabilocracy and conditionality policies. The work will be based on the following research question:

Why decisions of the Brussels Agreement have not been yet implemented?

 I will apply the following order. In the first section, I will briefly explain the state of affairs with regards to crucial events leading to signing of the Brussels Agreement. Secondly, I will suggest three different hypotheses. Thirdly, I will analyse available literature on relevant theoretical frameworks and propose my own models of constructive ambiguity for the case of Kosovo. Fourthly, I will evaluate hypotheses with regards to technical provisions of the Agreement. Finally, I will confront my findings with some counterarguments.

State of affairs

Albanians who make up the demographic majority in Kosovo (64% in 1921 (Leurdijk & Zandee, 2001) and 92% in 2011 (Woehrel, 2011)) never appreciated being under the rule of Belgrade. Ideologically excluded from identity ramifications of the other three Yugoslav states as ethnically and culturally not belonging to south Slavs, Albanians mark their presence in Yugoslav state-buildings by constant rebellions. Let it be the conquer of Kosovo by Serbian army in 1912 from waning Ottoman Empire defied by Albanian peasantry, local Albanian resistance towards Titoist liberation in 1945 of such cities as Ferizaj/Uroševac or Gjilan/Gnjilane (Selmani, 2006), insurgencies of 1968 and 1981 calling for extended autonomy and republican status of Kosovo, eventually peaceful resistance movement of Ibrahim Rugova in the nineties that led to an armed revolt in 1999. After NATO bombed Yugoslavia and expelled the Yugoslav army and administration from the territory of Kosovo its area came under the international protectorate. What are the key lessons to be drawn from the first decade of the new century? Firstly, as the insurgency and ethnic clashes of 2004 demonstrated, negative peace status is not guaranteed and inept peace-keeping and state-building could evoke a spark that might turn into a revival of interethnic violence. Secondly, as failed Ahtisaari’s Comprehensive Proposal proved in 2007, tangible provisions in terms of decentralised and independent Kosovo are as inacceptable for Albanians fearing partition of the country and establishment of the new “Republika Srpska” in Serbian northern provinces as it is inacceptable for Serbia to recognise the independence of Kosovo. Thirdly, despite the supposed decline Serbia’s international support as the responsibilities of the main state-builder were conveyed from the UN (thus veto power of Russia and China lost its relevance) to the EU, five EU members including Spain, Hungary, Romania, Greece and Cyprus still do not recognise the independence of Kosovo. Fourthly, even though the conditionality policy of the EU was effective to push Serbia’s democratisation and compliance with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) to proceed with the EU association process, confer candidate status and open negotiations, the highest stake mentioned in literature as the “EU membership for Kosovo’s independence recognition” seems to exceed the conditionality mechanism as being inacceptable for both Brussels and Belgrade (Obradović-Wochnik & Wochnik, 2012). Fifthly, advisory opinion issued in 2010 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) states that unilateral declaration of Kosovar independence in 2008 did not breach international law. Nonetheless, this does not prevent Serbia from continuing the policy of non-recognition and constantly referring to 1244 Resolution from 1999 recognising autonomy status of Kosovo within Yugoslavia, thus maintaining Serbian state sovereignty over self-managed Kosovo.

With these five lessons, the Brussels Agreement was signed in 2013 under the supervision of the EU between Belgrade and Pristina. Leading towards “normalisation” of mutual relations and supposed “Europeanisation” once the Agreement would be implemented (Mladenović, 2021), the document contains 15 loosely drafted points coined in considerably ambiguous language that does not replicate the tangible proposals of Ahtisaari’s provisions. Completely detached from local ownership and perceived as imposed from above in the opinion of my interviewees during my fieldwork in Mitrovica in spring 2021, the Agreement’s negotiations and introduction serve as an allegory of the EU Western Balkan strategy whose bureaucratic and protracted implementation standards resemble similar “eternality” of Thessaloniki declaration from 2003 foreseeing Western Balkan states to join the EU in future (Kurtović, 2019). Despite minor technical provisions, pace of implementation has been constantly disrupted by such events as Kosovar Constitutional Court stating unconstitutionality of the Agreement in 2016, dispatching “Kosovo is Serbia” adorned train in 2017, increasing the import tax on Serbian goods from 10% to 100% in 2018 or suggesting alternative conflict solutions such as redrawing borders to better represent ethnic divisions (Preševo for Mitrovica). With brief contextualisation of the circumstances around the implementation process of the Agreement, I will now proceed to the overview of three various hypotheses.

Hypotheses

I Hypothesis: Constructive ambiguity of the pre-Agreement communication indeed facilitated negotiations convincing Belgrade and Pristina to conclude the Brussels Agreement, however, consequently, this constructive ambiguity paved the way for post-Agreement manipulation which prevents implementation of the Agreement’s decisions.

By this hypothesis, I would like to argue that the EU endeavoured not to replicate the mistakes made by the UN in terms of keeping both sides at the negotiation table. Aptly utilising the combination of favourable circumstances including decision of the ICJ undermining Serbian position of non-recognition strategy, efficient conditionality mechanisms and Serbia’s compliance with ICTY, pro-European regional tendencies as Serbian neighbours gradually joined or were supposed to join the EU (2004, 2007, 2013) or change of government and emergence of the new ruling party of SNS willing to demonstrate its pro-European commitment made Belgrade to sign a historical in terms of symbolism bilateral agreement with Pristina. Nevertheless, ambiguity of provisions encouraged both governments to manipulate own electorates supposedly declaring victories with the detriment to the other side that made policies non-implementable.

II Hypothesis: Short-term technocratic accords might partially regulate relations between Belgrade and Pristina within specific policy but cannot offer any comprehensive solutions for sensitive and structural political issues in neo-functional understanding

By this hypothesis, I would like to argue that the technical provisions of the Agreement provide some benefit to Kosovars as they solve burdens of daily life in contested state structures and administration with reference to such aspects as car plates or university diplomas. Nevertheless, this neo-functional model of state-building would not lead to the efficient establishment of institutions if the prerequisite of social legitimacy is not realised. By referring to Lemay-Hébert’s theoretical findings, I would like to argue that the contested state of Kosovo without precisely defined and agreed ramifications of state identity and integrated civil society is going to replicate the Bosnian scenario and will not establish a functioning structure in positive peace understanding. This would only maintain the status quo as Serbia and Kosovar Serbs would not see any benefits from independence recognition and leave Kosovo dependent on international aid and supervision.

III Hypothesis: Brussels Agreement cannot be implemented without Serbia recognising Kosovo

This would be the final argument of this paper. I believe that Kosovo without its determined status as either autonomous region within Serbia or independent and fully recognised state cannot function as an efficient administrative structure, reliable economic partner and potentially stable member of the EU with well-established democracy and rule of law. Since Kosovar independence seems to be a more feasible scenario than its autonomy within Serbia especially as the Serbian administration of the region is limited to some communal services in the north such as education or healthcare, I would like to argue that Brussels Agreement would be only implementable if Serbia agreed to recognise Kosovo as an independent state.

Theoretical framework throughout literature review and beyond

Doubtlessly, constructive ambiguity is an inherent element of contemporary international relations, especially in the sphere of diplomacy and security negotiations. To adopt Michael Byers’ definition (2014), constructive ambiguity stands for the “deliberate” use of an ambiguous language in order to “achieve an agreement” between conflicted sides but also to avoid sensitive issues or simply realise political aims (James & Lloyd, 2012). Hence, the use of ambiguities is perceived as intentional, namely, precisely drafted ambiguous, negotiable and achievable to be signed agreement is regarded as a diplomatic success although seemingly convoluted language suggests the agreement to be practically useless. Ambiguities are present in numerous texts of international law which provide general provisions to be later further articulated and specified in minor agreements. Some assume that this strategy upholds also the Brussels Agreement whose 15 points would serve as a guideline scaffolding to be negotiated and defined in minor agreements between Belgrade and Pristina through national and local legislations. However, constructive ambiguity does not only limit to the application of a generalised language of the agreement. This might include contrary and conflicting provisions as well. Taken from the analysis of the UN Security Council (UNSC) statements, constructive ambiguity involves such aspects as to include different authorisations for specific parties of an agreement to be allowed or legitimised to undertake concrete actions, provide different analyses of factual understandings, communicate decisions differently in different language translations or focus on the action of negotiations avoiding potentially sensitive obstacles and challenges that might disrupt the action of negotiations (Reykers, 2017). All of these can find their own counterparts in the case of Kosovo. For instance, it is unclear whether Kosovar Serbian police forces would retain autonomy from state Kosovar forces, what sort of authorisations they would obtain or would they be authorised to cooperate with the forces of the Republic of Serbia. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the Agreement recognises the factual status of the border between Serbia and Kosovo as a state border or an administrative boundary line. It is unclear how to translate and interpret association or community of Serb municipalities as the Agreement provides both names while Serbian and Albanian sides apply the designation that better conforms own national interests. Ultimately, it is unclear where the negotiations are leading as the action dwarfs the aim of the Agreement whereas problems and obstacles are replaced with the need for further negotiations. The processes of “normalisation” and assumed “Europeanisation” of relations do not assume conditions according to which current supposedly “abnormal” relations become “normal”. In this sense, the burden of binding decision-making is shifted from pre-Agreement negotiations onto post-Agreement implementation whereas the Agreement does not foresee any legal measurements of decisions entering into legal force as it is signed between ambiguously conceptualised Belgrade and Pristina not the state, government or even administration units. By referring to the first hypothesis of this paper, I would like to argue that, indeed, the EU managed to invite Serbian and Kosovar sides to the negotiations table and develop together a piece of bilateral agreement. Nevertheless, the problem that was mentioned in the quoted literature here will be articulated in the following paragraph and that is the hitherto neglected lack of distinction between peace-making on the one hand and peace-keeping and state-building on the other.

The UNSC statements usually apply to the mission to terminate the violence, in Kosovar case the task  already being fulfilled by NATO and the UN. Therefore, for the purposes of peace-making, the Brussels Agreement does not provide anything new to the aspects of armed crimes and violence. As such, constructive ambiguity should now be analysed  in terms of state-building. The essential question to be posed here is the aim the EU is going to achieve by distinction between negative and positive peace. If the Brussels Agreement was to be signed in order to maintain negative peace, hence, the normalisation of relations to denote the sole prevention of the revival of interethnic violence (Visoka, 2020), then the EU could celebrate a trilateral diplomatic success. Why? Firstly, the Agreement reduces the risk of violence revival by keeping two sides at the table of ongoing negotiations, thus, retaining the leverage to immediate reaction in case of emergency. Secondly, the Agreement satisfies Serbia as it does not recognise Kosovar independence and prolongs status quo, therefore, it serves as a leverage power for Belgrade which can still pressure Balkan and European security on behalf of own national interests if needed. Thirdly, until 2020 the Agreement satisfied Kosovar ruling elite of Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK) and Hashim Thaçi’s environment as their readiness to negotiate with Belgrade assured legitimacy from the EU side despite concerns over committed in 1999 war crimes, corruption and engagement in organised crime (Lewis, 2011). The last point, however, lost its relevance with the change of government and victory of Vetëvendosje party agreeing to arrest and hand over Thaçi to the Court in the Hague (Oxford Analytica, 2020). Nevertheless, assuming that the normalisation of relations in terms of the Agreement suggests establishment of the positive peace in Kosovo, and consequently, a formation of the stable and institutionalised state structure with mutual legitimacy and recognition between Serbs and Albanians (Noite-Laird, 2022) then the Agreement seems to be far from any success.

The period of PDK’s rule accompanying protracted negotiations with Belgrade along EULEX mission has demonstrated two things. Firstly, with reference to the first hypothesis, many scholars assumed the EU was satisfied with the course of stabilocracy policy.  They maintined tht, despite rising democratic backsliding in Serbia and inefficient EULEX mission to Kosovo failing to strengthen institutional rule of law, Brussels did not put more effort beyond granting support to both Belgrade and Pristina in their ambiguous direction of negotiations and maintaining status quo (Osland & Peter, 2019). The belief of negative peace being better than nothing was the consequence of deteriorating stability on European borderlands including the Arab Spring, Mediterranean refugee crisis or Russian gradual aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, prioritisation of the pure fact of negotiations taking place regardless of implementability of the provisions for the sake of violence prevention neatly inscribing into inefficiency of EULEX being “the mission for itself” confirms the first hypothesis. Secondly, with reference to the second hypothesis, I would like to argue that efficient state-building can be reached neither with the use of constructive ambiguity nor in a neo-functional understanding of state-building strategy. EULEX serves as a good indicator demonstrating setbacks of institutional and functional state-building that does not take into consideration many aspects that Lemay-Hébert calls a social legitimacy (2009). They include social reconciliation, support for a strong civil society and civil society organisations (CSOs), interethnic dialogue and mutual legitimacy between the state-builder (EU), respective governments (central and decentralised institutions) and society whose multilayer identity model shall prioritise identities overarching ethnic divisions such as the state Kosovar identity and local urban identities over conflict driving ethnic identities. As his (Kappler & Lemay-Hébert, 2015) and many other analyses demonstrate (Chavleishvili, 2011), (Lončar, 2016), (Yabanci, 2016), the realisation of the abovementioned elements of social legitimacy is not being fulfilled in Kosovo.

The correlation between EULEX neo-functional state-building and Brussels Agreement is underpinned by constructive ambiguity and demonstrates two essential issues. Firstly, since Brussels Agreement disregards completely the potential of social legitimacy its implementability is going to be as reduced as limited is the progress of EULEX rule of law campaign. Minor technical provisions might indeed regulate some cumbersome administrative challenges including mutual recognition of documents, car plates or recognition of university diplomas but they are unable to address strategic aspects of relations between Belgrade and Pristina. In the same way, EULEX fails to address strategic challenges of Kosovar democracy and rule of law limiting its effects on the work of the judiciary within the same political system preventing systemic eradication of corruption and implementation of democratic reforms. What is the value of judges receiving “European” guidelines and standards knowing that state structure remains intact in the sphere of nepotism and corrupted decision-making (Jackson, 2020)? Secondly, in the same way the neo-functionalism included in EULEX and replicated by Brussels Agreement prevents its implementation, the Brussels Agreement prevents the implementation of EULEX as it does not determine the status of Kosovo and therefore, for instance, the extent of autonomy of supposed new Serb institutions. From a comparative perspective, a similar phenomenon can be observed in Bosnia where the contested and ambiguous status of constitutional order precludes neo-functional state-building deprived of social legitimacy element in the context of strife between national constituencies and administrative centres of Sarajevo and Banja Luka (Keil & Perry, 2016). Therefore, I would like to confirm the second hypothesis and argue that neo-functional state-building makes constructive ambiguity of the Agreement not implementable.

Constructive ambiguity from the perspective of Belgrade and Pristina

In this section, by referring to three hypotheses of the paper, I would like to analyse the consequences of constructive ambiguity included in the Brussels Agreement on its recipients, namely Belgrade and Pristina, and see how the same approach is being utilised by communicating the significance of the Agreement to own constituencies. I would like to use an argument claiming that both governments make the use of constructive ambiguity in order to balance between two extremes delineated by national interest, mutual security and the EU. Therefore, in the same way that the EU applies constructive ambiguity in order to keep the negotiations going, Belgrade and Pristina construct ambiguous narratives for the sake of maximisation of legitimacy and political support. The following graph presents the “dilemma of extremes” from the perspective of Serbia:

Undoubtedly, the core of Serbian politics defined by constructed national interest since 2008 is based upon the policy of non-recognition of Kosovo. It is expressed with such aspects as the legal guideline and preamble to Serbian constitution from 2006 stating Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo, internal policies and administration supporting functioning of parallel institutions in northern Kosovo, foreign policy preventing recognition of Kosovo in terms of a state member in international organisations or promoting the policy of derecognition of Kosovar independence by third states. Switching the policy trajectory from de-recognition towards recognition would have tremendous and dramatic consequences for the government deciding on such a step as it would risk electoral failure, loss of legitimacy, and probably a violent revolt leading to the threat of revoking the decision on recognition and undertaking new measures to the peril of regional security. Therefore, one of the aims of the EU side is to avoid juxtaposing recognition with the expected outcome of the Agreement’s implementation or the “conditionality carrot” in a form of the EU membership. Nevertheless, one has to take into consideration that the other “extreme” point of the decision-making, namely, the eternality of non-recognition status quo, practically hinders both governments from the EU integration but also gradually undermines Belgrade’s policies for their lack of decisiveness, redundant costs of financing parallel institutions on the one hand and letting the Serbs integrate with Kosovar administration as it is happening in other parts of Kosovo such as Gračanica on the other. Therefore, by reference to the first hypothesis, the EU was right to apply constructive ambiguity that contained no information on the recognition and suggested participation in negotiations to correspond with the EU integration that convinced Belgrade to join the Agreement. It would be interesting to see whether Belgrade would sign the Agreement today observing, firstly, decreasing willingness to join the EU from the Serbian side (promoting cooperation with China and other international partners) and, secondly, decreasing  legitimacy of the EU and the leverage of conditionality experienced by North Macedonia which, despite numerous concessions to Greece and Bulgaria, still faces resistance to proceed with integration. By reference to the second hypothesis, indeed, Belgrade might enjoy some benefits from the regulation of minor administrative challenges throughout the negotiation process. Constructive ambiguity allows conceptualisation of sufficient autonomy which would grant many privileges to Kosovar Serbs whereas the complete implementation of the Agreement would eventually denote the recognition of the Kosovar government as a separate and sovereign subject. Referring to the third hypothesis, one can see the Agreement to be non-implementable without Kosovar independence or any other ultimate and agreed by both sides status of Kosovo.

The following graph portrays the analogous perspective on Agreement from the side of Pristina:

As already mentioned, the change of government and victory of Vetëvendosje in 2019 changed the trajectory of Pristina’s policy and interest. Since then, the aim of Kosovar elites is not only to strive for universal recognition of independence but also to grant independence upon certain political conditions preventing Serbs from obtaining considerable autonomy and turning northern provinces into the “Republika Srpska” model, thus, making the state of Kosovo dysfunctional. In terms of “extremes” of decision-making as well as the application of constructive ambiguity strategies Pristina replicates which are similar to Belgrade’s dilemmas. Referring to the first hypothesis, joining the Brussels Agreement was at the time  the first opportunity to make a decisive step towards universal independence as Pristina kept communicating to sign and participate in negotiations with Belgrade, thus, Serbia treating Kosovo as the separate subject. Constructive ambiguity of the provisions allowed Pristina to envisage Serbian autonomy at the minimum being underpinned by prospective EU membership making the Agreement acceptable. The second hypothesis tells us how little the Agreement is actually implementable if Vetëvendosje agenda was to reflect acceptable extent of Serbian autonomy. Despite the change of government in 2019, knowing that the EU is still engaged in state-building projects such as EULEX, prolonging the status quo ensures Kosovo with a constant influx of state-building funds. Hence, paradoxically, some Kosovar policymakers might interpret maintaining hybrid recognition as a security guarantee from the side of the EU and a pretext for receiving endless financial aid which to some extent coincides with the status quo advocated from Belgrade. Therefore, constructive ambiguity allows aggregation of mutually exclusive decisions referring to recognition and non-recognition that upholds negative peace, legitimacy of ruling elites and the EU integration as well as the need to continue negotiations. Eventually, the lack of ultimate and agreed status of Kosovo makes the Agreement as non-implementable from the perspective of Belgrade as it is in the eyes of Pristina.

Technical provisions of the Agreement

This penultimate section of the paper is supposed to analyse the ways how constructive ambiguity makes technical provisions of the Agreement non-implementable. There are four identifiable elements stemming from  the Agreement and implementation negotiations I would like to mention here. The first one concerns the establishment of the Association/Community of Serb municipalities. As Kartsonaki has argued, the provision will lead to mutual frustrationover negotiations on hybrid autonomy on both sides(2020). Not only is the wording confusing (association and community concepts diverge even more in translations to Serbian and Albanian) but also there is an utter lack of envisaged competences and authorisations. As Serbs tend to claim, Association/Community would guarantee the access to central policy-making endowing the Serbs with a constituency status predicated on the same conditions as the Albanian one whereas Albanians argue Association/Community would solely be responsible for self-governance at the local level of administration. Ultimately, Serbs would be preoccupied with Association/Community granting less autonomy than current parallel institutions, Albanians in the same way share concern over excessive autonomy leading towards the paralysis of central institutions which make the provision non-implementable. The second element regards Article 9 of the Agreement on regional police commanders for Serbian municipalities. Similarly to the previous case, the scope of autonomy competences and impact on centralised security structure is as unclear as the Serbian and Albanian interpretations are conflicting. Since there is a concern of autonomous police forces being affected by the Republic of Serbia, exercising arbitrary obligations or even making security forces dysfunctional across the country makes the provision unacceptable and currently non-implementable. The third aspect concerns the Integrated Border/Boundary Management. Referring to the second hypothesis, despite the fact that establishing border/boundary cooperation significantly reduced illicit practices and smuggling, the borderland area is still the security hotspot which tends to escalate tensions when emergency occurs. Therefore, constructive ambiguity did not solve security challenges regarding functioning of the border/boundary as its unclear status encourages both sides to use it as an escalation factor by arbitrary decisions on who and when is authorised to cross it. Eventually, the fourth aspect worth mentioning is the agreement on university diplomas that obtained mutual recognition, however, the most poignant element of diplomas issued by the Serbian university in Mitrovica is still an administrative and legal vacuum that constructive ambiguity did not solve (Bieber, 2015).

Counterarguments

Even though Brussels Agreement is criticised by many scholars for its ineffective bureaucratic diplomacy that offers little substance in terms of actual conflict resolution, I would like to suggest some counterarguments to my claims. Firstly, by looking at other reconciliation processes and applications of the international law one can come to the conclusion that constructive ambiguity is simply a universal practice and Brussels Agreement is nothing unusual in the sphere of diplomacy. Therefore, it is more than common to have non-implementable, ambiguous and contested decisions that require years if not decades to find more specific and agreed regulations. Secondly, as already claimed in the section on negative peace, the so-called “fight over interpretations” is definitely better than the physical fight. That in the prism of lack of any institutional alternative towards Brussels Agreement and constructive ambiguity, the protracted pressure to negotiate should be continued despite challenging and currently impossible implementation. Thirdly, de facto status turning into de jure still might be the matter of time, generational change or political reconfiguration, observing current reconstruction of European security with Russian attack against Ukraine, new decisions around the Brussels Agreement under emergency conditions might occur sooner than anyone could expect. Fourthly and finally, switching the course of negotiations towards such local initiatives as redrawing the borders to correspond with ethnic divisions poses an excessive security threat to other disputed territories and opens a new sui generis for international law.

Conclusion

The conclusion will sum up all essential findings with references to three hypotheses:

• Firstly, the hypothesis of Agreement being the pretext to initiate dialogue and keep both sides at negotiations table regardless of the efficiency of outcomes is confirmed by: (1) the analysis of theoretical understanding of negative and positive peace, (2) communication of the agreement from the side of the EU towards recipients of provisions in Belgrade and Pristina, (3) local interpretation of security threats to legitimacy, (4) political stability and EU integration as well as formulation of technical provisions;
• Secondly, as narrative discrepancies demonstrate, constructive ambiguity is unable to reconcile both sides with an unclear neo-functional approach toward state-building and conflict resolution as the aspect of mutual legitimacy and agreed identities is missing. The paper supports the second hypothesis on negotiations solving minor administrative issues that only regulate de facto status, however, strategic decisions in the sphere of Serbian autonomy remain unresolved;
• Thirdly, the paper argued the policy of universal recognition of Kosovar independence to be the solution meeting de facto status of current institutional arrangement. Nevertheless, without clearly defined status of Kosovo, be it as an independent state or any other hybrid administrative subject exercising full sovereignty and autonomy under Serbian protectorate, technical provisions on the border/boundary status, the autonomy of Serb municipalities and structure of security forces remain non-implementable.

Bibliography

Ben-David, Anat (2019) National Web Histories at the fringe of the Web: Palestine, Kosovo, and the quest for online self-determination. In: Brügger, N., & Laursen, D. (Eds.). The Historical Web and Digital Humanities: The Case of National Web Domains. Routledge. pp. 89—109

Bieber, Florian (2015) The Serbia-Kosovo Agreements: An EU Success Story?, Review of Central and East European Law, Vol. 40, No. 3/4, pp. 285-319

Byers, Michael (2021). Still agreeing to disagree: international security and constructive ambiguity. Journal on the use of force and international law, 8(1), 91-114

Chavleishvili, G. (2011). Isomorphic processes and social legitimacy of institutionalizing municipal community safety councils (MCSCs) in Kosovo. Journal of public administration and policy research, 3(3), 62-67

Daskalovski, Židas (2003). Claims to Kosovo: Nationalism and self-determination. Understanding the war in Kosovo, 13-30

Economides, Spyros & Ker-Lindsay, James (2015) 'Pre-accession Europeanization': the case of Serbia and Kosovo.  JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 53, No. 5, pp. 1027-1044

Elmehed, Mikael (2016) Disambiguating the Brussels agreement: A study of ambiguity in the Serbia-Kosovo normalisation process. Lund University, Department of Political Science

Gashi, Krenar, Musliu, Vjosa & Orbie, Jan (2017) Mediation Through Recontextualization: The European Union and The Dialogue Between Kosovo and Serbia, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 533–550

Gruda, Zeinullah (2005). Some Key Principles for a Lasting Solution of the Status of Kosova: Uti Possidetis, the Ethnic Principle, and Self-Determination. Chi.-Kent L. Rev., 80, 353

Hasani, Enver (2003). Uti possidetis juris: from Rome to Kosovo. Fletcher F. World Aff., 27, 85

Jackson, Christopher M. (2020). The EU and rule of law development in Kosovo: EULEX, domestic spoilers, and a two-level commitment problem. Journal of European Integration, 42(7), 955-973

James, Alan and Lloyd, Lorna (2012) Dictionary of Diplomacy, Palgrave Macmillan, 3rd ed

Kappler, Stefanie, & Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas (2015). Hybrid local ownership in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Local ownership in international peacebuilding: key theoretical and practical issues. London: Routledge, 74-93

Kartsonaki, Argyro (2020). Playing with Fire: An Assessment of the EU’s Approach of Constructive Ambiguity on Kosovo’s Blended Conflict. Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies, 22(1), 103-120

Keil, Soeren, & Perry, Valery (2016). State-building and democratization in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Routledge.

Koinova, Maria (2018) Critical junctures and transformative events in diaspora mobilisation for Kosovo and Palestinian statehood, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 44:8, 1289-1308

Kurtović, Amer (2019) European Commission’s Western Balkans Discourse: An Analysis of its Performative Structures.

Lemay-Hébert, Nicolas (2009). Statebuilding without nation-building? Legitimacy, state failure and the limits of the institutionalist approach. Journal of intervention and statebuilding, 3(1), 21-45

Leurdijk, Dick; Zandee, Dick (2001). Kosovo: From crisis to crisis. Routledge. p. 14

Lewis, Paul (2011). Report identifies Hashim Thaci as ‘Big fish’in organized crime. The Guardian, 24

Lončar, Jelena (2016). State-building and local resistance in Kosovo: Minority exclusion through inclusive legislation. Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 49(3), 279-290

Metz, Corinna (2014) The Way to Statehood: Can the Kosovo Approach be a Role Model for Palestine?. Wiener Verlag für Sozialforschung

Mladenović, Nikola (2021): The 2013 Brussels Agreement and the Political Discourse of the Serbian Leadership: Pro-EU Adaptation with Anti-EU Rhetoric, Europe-Asia Studies

Nolte-Laird, R. (2022). The Conditions of Positive Peace. In Peacebuilding Online (pp. 177-202). Palgrave Macmillan, Singapore

Obradović-Wochnik, Jelena, & Wochnik, Alexander (2012). Europeanising the ‘Kosovo question’: Serbia’s policies in the context of EU integration. West European Politics, 35(5), 1158-1181

Osland, Kari M., & Peter, Mateja (2019). The double proximity paradox in peacebuilding: implementation and perception of the EU rule of law mission in Kosovo. European security, 28(4), 493-512

Oxford Analytica. Solving Kosovo’s problems becomes harder without Thaci. Emerald Expert Briefings

Reykers, Yf (2017). Constructive ambiguity or stringent monitoring? Towards understanding UN Security Council oversight over non-UN-led forces. Global Affairs, 3(1), 17-29

Selmani, Aliriza (2006). LUFTA E GJILANIT DHE MASAKRAT NDAJ POPULLIT SHQIPTAR NË DIMRIN E VITEVE 1944/1945. Gjurmime Albanologjike-Seria e shkencave historike, (36), 41-56

Visoka, Gezim (2020). Kosovo: a hybrid negative peace. In Research Handbook on Post-Conflict State Building. Edward Elgar Publishing

Visoka, Gezim & Doyle, John (2016) Neo-Functional Peace: The European Union Way of Resolving Conflicts, JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 54, No. 4, pp. 862–877

Woehrel, Steven (2011). Kosovo: Current issues and US policy. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS WASHINGTON DC CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

Yabanci, Bilge (2016). The (Il) legitimacy of EU state building: local support and contention in Kosovo. Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 16(3), 345-373

Cover image credits