Consensus-based decision-making and expansion: NATO’s organisational dilemma

by Ibrahim Nahushal

The Russian aggression against Ukraine has driven Sweden and Finland to join NATO; whilst the latter is ready to embrace them, one of its members, Turkey shows discontent with the project. NATO’s open-door policy, based on Article 10 of the founding treaty, enforces any state’s right and aspiration to become a member, provided that the applicant state is determined to safeguard the freedom, common heritage, and civilization of their peoples, founded on the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law (Preamble of the North Atlantic Treaty).

The organisational dilemma which I am going to discuss in this article arises due to the expansion of NATO. Hence, looking into the history of NATO expansion is important. In 1952, Greece and Turkey joined the alliance, followed by West Germany in 1952 and Spain in 1982. Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary joined in March 1999, becoming the first former Warsaw Pact countries to do so. They were followed in 2004 by Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In 2009, Albania and Croatia joined, and then Montenegro in 2017, followed by North Macedonia in 2020.

Consensus decision-making is the norm recognized by NATO members from its very first inception (NATO 2022). Such a decision-making regime strengthens collective effort, resolve, and commitment. However, as the number of members with various geopolitical interests increases, such a regime debilitates the group's decisiveness and weakens its resolve. The question we now face is whether it is wise to expand NATO to include more members while having such a decision-making regime within the alliance. In addition, as a security alliance, NATO needs to function on collectiveness, commitment, and unanimity from every single member, for which a consensus-based decision-making regime deserves much credit. There seems to be a dilemma in this regard: whilst NATO needs to continue with its current decision-making regime, the expansion of NATO might make the organisation less decisive.

By breaking away from the norm of neutrality held for years, three months after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Finland and Sweden changed their stances and formally requested membership in NATO. Regarding the accession of Finland and Sweden, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg said that "If they decide to apply, Finland and Sweden will be warmly welcomed, and I expect the process to go quickly," reported Reuters (2022). Considering the decision-making regime, NATO expansion can be analogized to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).

Learning from UNSC

The five permanent members of the UNSC enjoy special privileges. The founding members of the order came together after the Second World War purely for political reasons in an effort to balance their separate domains of influence, avert another catastrophic war, and curb the power-political ambitions of powerful governments acting unilaterally. However, the dictates of power politics have been incorporated into the very provisions regulating the Council’s exercise of its basic mandate. According to the rules of Article 27 of the Charter, the five permanent members – the victorious powers of World War II – are effectively immune from any compulsory measures under Chapter VIl of the Charter in cases of acts of aggression committed by them. Due to the wording of Paragraph 3 of Article 27, they may additionally use their special voting privileges in cases where they are party to a dispute.

The concept of "unanimity" among the permanent members of the UNSC, which is implied in Section 27 of the UN Charter, can be viewed from two perspectives: maintaining consensus among the strongest states to prevent conflicts among themselves, and assuring individual member states that nothing can be decided in the UNSC in regard to world politics without their full cooperation. The first perspective has hampered the very goal for which the UNSC was established, while the second perspective suggests that collective action can be humiliatingly rejected by a single state, despite the fact that states have divergent aspirations on issues pertaining to international peace.

Due to the power-political nature of the UNSC, circumventing existing rules of the world order is prevalent in the contemporary world order. For instance, NATO’s bombing of Kosovo in 1999 avoided UN rules that were established for Collective Security. The move to get the UNSC authorisation for the mission backfired as twelve of the fifteen Security Council members voted against it, demonstrating strong – if indirect – support for the campaign (Soderberg 2008, p. 76). Thus, NATO’s bombing in Kosovo was initiated without explicit UNSC authorization.

As a prelude to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the United States attempted to have at least the majority of the UNSC supporting the use of military force, if not the approval of all the permanent members, so that “a resolution passed even with a weak majority would carry the needed authority to go to war” (Soderberg 2008, p. 182). As the United States was engaged in strong lobbying for nine votes at the UNSC, Secretary-General Kofi Annan said that “the members of the Security Council now face a great choice, if they fail to agree on a common position and action is taken without the authority of the Security Council, the legitimacy and support for any such action will be seriously impaired” (Barringer 2003). However, the invasion that followed was not sanctioned by the UN security council nor in accordance with the UN’s founding charter. In addition, the invasion of Iraq without the required resolution from the UNSC should have diminished the relevance of the UNSC in solving security crises faced by members of the world community, thereby yielding weaker resolve.

NATO and expansion

Theoretically, when decisions need to be made by unanimity of a group of members, consensus decision-making becomes a sensitive process; the more members, the more diversity of opinion. Although as a strategic security alliance, consensus-based decision-making is the ideal approach for NATO, and its current expansion must thus be evaluated through a long-term strategic lens.

In essence, the UNSC is composed of five permanent members, and any decision must be approved by all five of these members. During its history, a number of decisions were dismissed due to internal power struggles. The council's inability to accomplish its goals was evident by its lack of resolve due to internal power struggles.

While NATO was established as a response to the then-Soviet Union, the UNSC was established to serve a wider purpose, specifically to maintain order and peace in the post-war world. As a result, UNSC permanent members represent a variety of geopolitical interests. Considering that, although the fate of the UNSC might not necessarily be the fate of NATO, such a dilemma is possible in the due course of NATO expansion. In addition, as NATO's area of engagement broadens, such as the possible antagonism against China, the window for divergence in opinion among NATO members also opens up. NATO must be aware of this and evaluate its expansion decisions accordingly.

In conclusion, there is much for NATO to learn from the UNSC consensus regime despite the differences between the UNSC and NATO. Considering the current Russian aggression against Ukraine and the geopolitical confusion that followed, the expansion of NATO, in terms of members and its area of focus, also needs to reflect long-term decisiveness and its ability to exhibit resolve – rather than expansion – based on a mere whim of emotional confusion.

Bibliography

NATO. 2022. “Consensus Decision-Making At.” NATO. Accessed February 21, 2023. Access: bit.ly/3yZRF6p.
Reuters. 2022. “Finland and Sweden Could Join NATO Quickly, Stoltenberg Says,” April 28, 2022. Access: bit.ly/40y62L7
Soderberg, N. 2008. The Superpower Myth: The Use and Misuse of American Might. John Wiley & Sons.
Barringer, Felicity. 2003. “THREATS
AND RESPONSES: UNITED NATIONS; Annan Says U.s. Will Violate Charter If It Acts without Approval.” The New York Times, March 11, 2003. Access: bit.ly/3Z4QuwZ