Greater Europe in 2023: Greater EU? – How Contemporary Challenges Reshape the Idea of European Unity and Europe’s Place in the World

This article is the series launch article for our new call on 'What is Greater Europe' please read more about this series launch here!

Greater Europe of Yesterday

After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, as the ice began to thaw between the two sides of the Berlin Wall, the idea of One Europe gained steam in foreign relations, building upon Gorbachev’s quasi-utopian dream of a ‘Common European Home’.[1] While the quest for greater European integration has since undergone a fundamental and continuous revolution, it is conceivable how its initial iteration placed finding a common language with Russia, and more generally the Eastern Bloc, front and centre. Indeed, the relationship, albeit subject to a few trials and tribulations, seemed to be slowly warming up, at least from an economic angle. Just a few years ago, Germany enthusiastically announced the plans for Nordstream 2, an addition to Nordstream 1 – a gas pipe connecting Western Europe with Russia in both a literal, physical and a political sense.

No gas and oil, however, could disguise Russia’s alarming geopolitical ambitions. The Crimean Crisis of 2014 already greatly loosened the frail ties between the EU and Russia and put into question the future of their relationship. Last year, the fateful night of February 24th broke the bond seemingly beyond repair. Russia was left out of the Greater European equation.[2]

The most widespread iteration of the idea of Greater Europe has traditionally underlined the EU’s central role as the regional leader, though that should not be confused by equating Greater Europe with the EU. Despite this, the EU unquestionably is the most relevant contemporary political institution in and representing Europe, and it is difficult to imagine another distribution of power in the near future. Consequently, this contribution will examine how the concept of Greater Europe can soon evolve based on the possible direction the EU itself can take in its development. Direction which is bound to be influenced by a number of contemporary concerns.

The conflict in Ukraine is by no means the only recent test for European cooperation. In 2017, Brexit cast a doubt on the manifest strength of the European bonds and lent unprecedented magnitude to EU-sceptic voices all around the continent. Later, the COVID pandemic and the divergence of national responses triggered questions about the need for an even more unified, EU-wide health legislative order.[3] Similarly, the energy crisis we are right in the midst of raises questions about the need for an energy union.[4] Furthermore, antidemocratic regimes are on the rise, pitting EU Member States against one another. Finally, all of the above factors contribute to a large-scale financial crisis, the biggest one since 2008.

Just trying to condense this amalgam of problems into a paragraph or two could well give one a headache. To say that this is the greatest crisis this continent has ever come up against would perhaps be an overstretch. It is, by no means, the first war, the first extreme inflation, not even the first pandemic. However, it is the gravest combination of events befalling the EU at (ostensibly) the height of its influence.

Europe is most certainly great, but its greatness is now being mercilessly tried and tested. To adapt to our rapidly changing world, the notion of Greater Europe thus is bound to mutate in the following months. Should Europe strive to become stronger, bigger, closer, more cooperative, more unified, or perhaps all of the above?

Wider Europe

The promise of an accelerated EU accession process for Ukraine and Georgia in the wake of the Russian invasion revived the European dream of the Western Balkan states whose candidacy has been in limbo for the past few years. The EU confirmed its renewed ‘full and equivocal’ commitment to the southward enlargement during the first-ever EU-Western Balkans summit in Tirana on the 6th of December last year. In a fortnight the EU doubled down on its promise; Bosnia and Herzegovina was granted the long-awaited candidate status.

The sudden enlargement frenzy may raise eyebrows. The Balkan states’ prolonged waiting period stemmed primarily from their minimal advancement on the path to meet the Copenhagen criteria, with Albania and Montenegro admittedly leading the way, but still a long way from satisfactory democratic and economic levels.[5] The newest addition to the roster, Bosnia and Herzegovina, was also heavily criticised by the EU just a few months ago in a report assessing its progress in the fight against corruption, respect for human rights, and readiness for an open and competitive market, among others.[6] The Copenhagen criteria aside, the geopolitical interests of the candidates do not always seem to align with those of the EU. Recently, Serbia stunned Europe with its unwillingness to condemn Russia for the invasion of Ukraine.[7] For this reason alone, a veto, most likely plural, on Serbian accession appears inevitable.

On the other hand, European hesitancy could be the very catalyst pushing West Balkan states further into Russian arms. Chinese influence in the region is also increasingly difficult to ignore.[8] Ascertaining the EU’s presence in the area might be a last-ditch effort to shield Europe from external force. Already in 2018, Juncker warned of allowing ‘our immediate neighbourhood shaped by others’.[9]

Whether the promise of fast-track eastward expansion is more than an assertion of greater European unity in the face of unprecedented external pressure remains to be seen. Despite the Croatian accession a decade ago, many Europeans still seem to suffer from a certain ‘enlargement fatigue’ which overcame the EU after the large-scale enlargement of the early 2000s.[10] They view greater Europe as an ‘ever-closer Union’, smaller in size but with deeper bonds. 2023 might be their year, too.

Deeper Europe

Despite the obvious divisions running deep in EU societies, the last 5 years underscored the need for greater unity and cooperation in times of crisis.[11] Health, energy security and defence were all areas exposed to seismic shocks. This causes experts to ponder on the potential benefits of greater vertical harmonisation in these areas. While a certain level of further integration could be advanced by consecutive packages of EU policies, a more uniform defence programme necessitates a fundamental restructuring of EU integration.

A common European army may, for now, be but a utopian idea, but between this and the current state of the Common Foreign and Security Policy lie several steps which European federalists are increasingly eager to see taken. Relinquishing unanimity for the sake of qualified majority voting in all areas remains a particularly popular suggestion.[12] The veto power has long been contentious but recently found its way onto the headlines again as Hungary had continuously blocked sanctions on Russia before ultimately deferring.[13]

It’s hardly a coincidence that the most ambitious enlargement campaign since the Eastern expansion of 2004 runs parallel to elevated federalist sentiments. Uncertain times call for fundamental measures. Can Europe sustain the two-track approach of a ‘wider and deeper’ Union or will one approach need to give way to another? Arguably, accepting new states under its aegis - states unmistakably at a more uncertain stage of democracy and economic development - would necessarily involve concessions in the harmonisation of EU policies, slowing down, if not indeterminately shelving the federalisation process. Some envisage a two-step solution - accepting new members before deepening the intra-EU ties.[14] As the EU continues to unify, however, and consequently eradicates regional disparities, the political and economic standards required for accession will only become more difficult to reach.

The EU and Friends

‘The EU, given its level of integration and ambition, cannot in the short term be the only way to structure the European continent’, Marcon recently remarked at the closing ceremony of the Conference for the Future of Europe.[15] Indeed, the ‘wider vs deeper’ question hinges on the presumption of the EU’s monopoly on Europe’s prosperity and safety. Brexit coupled with loud anti-EU sentiments across virtually all Member States has shaken that paradigm.

Whether bigger in size, with a new Balkan limb, or politically and legally closer, the relations between the EU, other European states and their immediate neighbours will remain instrumental.

Macron’s vision is a post-Mitterandian idea of European Political Community where ‘members of the European family can discuss issues of common interests’, a space connecting the EU, EU-hopeful eastern states and long-time EEA allies. Russia, of course, is currently outside of any consideration. However, Macron’s words ring shallow as he fails to offer a plausible formulation of his pan-European organism. Responses from the East have not been particularly enthusiastic, either, as candidates saw it as another attempt to prolong their stay in the EU’s waiting room.

New ideas for regional cooperation emerge after the questionable success of the European Neighbourhood Policy (the ‘ENP’), a revolutionary vision of greater European unification with the EU at the helm. Like Macron’s invention, it never promised inevitable accession. The soft approach of ‘guiding’ neighbouring nations towards democracy and prosperity, with the EU posing as a wise old mentor, promised the vision of close cooperation with simultaneous respect to the differences in development in various areas which would otherwise be encompassed by the uncompromising Copenhagen criteria. It also involved North African and Middle Eastern nations. Despite an encouraging premise, the ENP’s flaws, present from the outset, became more noticeable as geopolitical changes picked up pace in recent years. The eurocentric assumptions at its core have always attracted criticism. Further, it was designed to operate in stable conditions and rely on bilateral engagements and, thus, is entirely ill-suited to the multifaceted challenges of today.[16]

Is the ENP about to draw its last breath? Until a better idea comes along, that remains unlikely. A better idea should come along, however, sooner rather than later. Europe will never be a monolith and to cement its position in today’s tumultuous climate the EU and non-EU governments need a robust framework for cooperation.

A Bond Across the Pond

As indicated, Europe’s greatness could be measured by its position in today’s world. Here, the conclusions are rather bleak. The US has long economically surpassed its older sister, while the Asian giants seem unstoppable, heading towards the future with boldness and determination unseen in ageing and ever-quarrelling Europe in a long while. Unable to keep up, Europe’s future status might turn to depend on clever alliances. The most sensible partner is an old friend, the US, willing to engage with Europe with a renewed post-Trump fervour.[17]

The US and Europe find themselves in a similar, precarious position against the rising eastern empires. Ironically, restricted by a considerable bundle of human rights and climate commitments, they can’t quite match the speed of economic development observed in China or around the Persian Gulf (the extent to which they bend and break these commitments behind the scenes is not a topic of this contribution and would require an article of its own to delve into).

And then there is NATO. The Russian invasion reminded Europeans, living in relative bliss and indifference for the past two decades, that war is not a ‘third-world problem’ and there might still be a place for doubled-down security efforts in the 21st century liberal market democracy. Many Europeans also remembered why they belonged to NATO in the first place, and did so with considerable relief. Support for the often-questioned military alliance with the US skyrocketed across the continent, particularly closer to the Ukrainian border; Sweden and Finland abandoned their scepticism basically overnight and both applied for accession.

It comes as no surprise, therefore, that a certain American-loving front is forming in Europe anew. It is impossible to know how strong the bond would prove in times of even graver unrest, or how eager Biden’s successors will be to preserve it. Nonetheless, it warrants consideration, at least, when attempting to keep the European superpower on life support for a little longer.

Conclusion

In this trying time, the EU is faced with a number of challenges which could determine its future place among the world powers – from a war right at its doorstep, through energy shortage to skyrocketing prices. Its approach to foreign policy in response to the current crises could set the tone for the concept of Greater Europe for years to come.

The EU can continue its quest for enlargement and follow up on its promises on West Balkan accessions. This, however, is bound to be met with staunch opposition from the inside, questioning the candidates’ readiness for the EU commitment. Another popular idea is the tightening of existing European bonds by greater unification and harmonisation of EU policy. The reform of the Common Foreign and Security Policy is once again dominating the headlines in response to the unrest in the East. In examining its foreign policy options, EU leaders seem to be on a quest for a new model to strengthen the EU’s bonds with its allies. As the European Neighbourhood Policy failed to deliver its promises, the following months could see an emergence of a novel approach. Finally, with renewed faith in the NATO project, Europe is turning westward to maintain a fraternal relationship with one of its oldest allies, the US.

The EU can close itself off and labour towards greatness from its ivory tower, with a vision of a federalist superpower with its own army to face the Russians, the Chinese, and come who may. It can spread over mountains and rivers, welcoming developing democracies under its auspices. Finally, it can derive its greatness from a strong bond with its younger sibling across the pond. Whichever the scenario, this coming watershed year is fated to set the route for decades to be.

---

[1] Tom Casier, ‘Gorbachev’s ‘’Common European Home’’ and Its Relevance for Russian Foreign Policy Today 2018 (18) Debater a Europa 17

[2] Stefan Meister, ‘A Paradigm Shift: EU-Russia Relations After the War in Ukraine’ (26 November 2022) Carnegie Europe https://carnegieeurope.eu/2022/11/29/paradigm-shift-eu-russia-relations-after-war-in-ukraine-pub-88476

[3] Anne Bucher, ‘Does Europe Need a Health Union?’ (8 February 2022) Bruegel https://www.bruegel.org/policy-brief/does-europe-need-health-union

[4] Arturo Varvelli, ‘Burn Time: The Case for a New European Energy Union’ (21 April 2022) ECFR https://ecfr.eu/article/burn-time-the-case-for-a-new-european-energy-union/

[5] Corina Stralutat, ‘EU enlargement to the Western Balkans – Three observations’ European Policy Centre (8 November 2021) https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/EU-enlargement-to-the-Western-Balkans-Three-observations~4392d4

[6] EU Commission, Key findings of the 2022 Report on Bosnia and Herzegovina (12 October 2022)

[7] AP News, ‘Serbian president rejects calls for sanctions against Russia’ (4 January 2023) https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-politics-europe-serbia-european-union-6deaa57230993b02e7a67f57693bf7f2

[8] Wouter Zweers et al, ‘China and the EU in the Western Balkans: A Zero-Sum Game’ Clingendael Report (August 2020)

[9] Jean-Claude Juncker’s State of the Union Address (12 September 2018) https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_18_5808

[10] Spyros Economides, ‘From Fatigue to Resistance: EU Enlargement and the Western Balkans’ (20 March 2020) Dahrendorf Forum IV Working Paper No. 17

[11] Tomasz Tadeusz Koncewicz, ‘The Ever Closer Union among the Peoples of Europe’ in Times of War, VerfBlog, (8 March 2022) https://verfassungsblog.de/the-ever-closer-union-among-the-peoples-of-europe-in-times-of-war/

[12] Julina Mintel and Nicolai von Ondarza, ‘More EU Decisions by Qualified Majority Voting – but How?’ SWP Comment 61 (October 2022)

[13] Janos Alenbach-Ammann, ‘Hungary Vetoes EU Financial Aid’ More EU Decisions by Qualified

Majority Voting – but How? (6 December 2022) https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/hungary-vetoes-eu-financial-aid-for-ukraine/

[14] R Daniel Kelemen, Anand Menon and Jonathan Slapin, ‘Wider and deeper? Enlargement and integration in the European Union’ (2014) 21(5) Journal of European Public Policy 647

[15] Emmanuel Macron’s Speech at the closing ceremony of the Conference on the Future of Europe (Strasbourg, 9 May 2022) https://presidence-francaise.consilium.europa.eu/en/news/speech-by-emmanuel-macron-at-the-closing-ceremony-of-the-conference-on-the-future-of-europe/

[16] Stefan Lehne, ‘Time to Reset the European Neighbourhood Policy’ Carnegie Europe February 2014

[17] Steven Blockmans, ‘EU-US Relations: Reinventing the Transatlantic Agenda’ (2021) 56 Intereconomics 5