Inside the Mind of Vladimir Putin

Inside the Mind of Vladimir Putin by Michel Eltchaninoff 

Book Review

     Brief introduction & why now?

In light of recent developments concerning the ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine, understanding the intrinsic motivations of such conflict is as important as comprehending all geopolitical factors and historical conundrums. After reading his work - Inside the Mind of Vladimir Putin - we shall understand from the point of view of the author, Michel Eltchaninoff, what has led the Russian President, Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin, to adopt certain views and behaviours that inevitably took his country, its neighbours (namely Ukraine), and the world to the present state of today. 

In 2015, his book Inside the Mind of Vladimir Putin was published, one year after the Crimean crisis broke. In this work, the author decided to approach the events taking place between Moscow and Kyiv from a more philosophical point of view, giving away a clearer image of the Russian leader’s thoughts and logic, and how he uses them to legitimise the Kremlin’s brutal politics.

As the world seems to be approaching a de facto World War III, it is urgent to dive into the mind of Vladimir Putin, as understanding may spark s hopes for fruitful peace negotiations.

The beginning of Vladimir Putin

The first two chapters of Eltchaninoff’s work tackle the origins of the Russian President’s (political) thought, highlighting certain key events in his life, as well as people whom he crossed paths with. 

We discover that Vladimir Putin, to an extent, descends from “both sides of the coin” of Russia. Whilst his father, Vladimir Spiridonovich Putin, was an atheist who fought during World War II as a member of the NKVD (People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs), his mother, Maria Ivanovna Shelomova, was a religious woman who took menial jobs. In addition to his upbringing with clashing norms, the young Vladimir studied and grew up in a social and political environment that envisioned war as an inevitable event, and therefore the people should always be ready to fight the enemy. The sense of duty and loyalty towards the Homeland inserted in his young mind paved the way until his entry into the KGB (Committee for State Security), where he soon realised that the Soviet Communist model was due to collapse.

In Chapter 2, we get to know the true colours of his post-USSR pseudo-pro-European side. After repeatedly quoting the Prussian philosopher, Immanuel Kant, in several of his speeches, the Russian President, similarly to the Western thinker, seemed to be favourable to the principles of modern democracy and peace between nations, claiming to be “against any segregation on the basis of religion and ethnicity”, and “a categorical opponent to resolving international arguments through war”. Reading such declarations in current days sounds rather ironic, if not cynical, but soon enough it is brought to our attention that Putin’s supposed liberalism is limited by his desire for order. After all, the younger Vladimir Putin had at his hands a nation whose main economic model and ideology had recently been shattered. The country was divided between USSR nostalgics, anti-Bolsheviks, pro-Westerners, and conservatives; hence, a new ideology that could produce some sort of harmony amongst them was urgently needed, and the new President would in time deliver a “flexible” political thought to the juvenile Russian Federation.

Before turning to Chapter 3, Eltchaninoff teach us about the proximity and respect the Russian President had for his Eastern (Asian) counterparts, resorting to them whenever relations with the West would not be in the best shape. Just like the imperial Russian two-headed eagle, Putin keeps his gaze both in the West and in the East, for which the author points out that his approaches have been directed to all possible partners in both extremes, showing respect and awaiting a reaction. 

Twisted values and selected philosophies

From Chapter 3 to Chapter 4, we are enlightened on how and why the Russian President built his political thought and philosophy more hostile towards the West. It begins with his favourite philosophers’ ideals, which contributed to his major turn to Conservatism, showed him the “Russian Way” and gave him the “Eurasian Dream”, detailed further on in chapters 5 and 6.

An important key figure that contributed to Putin’s philosophical thought was the Russian filmmaker Nikita Mikhalkov, once an anti-Bolshevik Soviet dissident. Through him, the Russian President got familiar with the works of Ivan Ilyn, who deemed the October Revolution a catastrophe and actively joined the struggle against Bolshevik rule. In Putin’s speeches, the right-wing philosopher would be quoted quite often, once again reinforcing the values of a man’s duty towards the homeland (Russia) and the Christian values that should become the basis of society, contrarily to the decadence (and depravity) of values in the West.

The author explains that for Ilyn, violence does not violate Christian ethics when fighting evil with force is needed. From his point of view, which is valued by Putin, one could wonder if Ilyn’s work could somehow be used to justify the Kremlin's violent interventions, not only against its neighbours (especially Ukraine) but also within the Federation’s borders and towards specific communities. He was against democracy by the Western definition of it. In his perception, elections would not play an important role, and instead, there would be a “Guide” who “will know what has to be done”. At this point, it should not surprise us that the Russian government has nurtured its paternalist nature when ruling its people since the time of Ivan The Terrible - the common citizens are not knowledgeable or capable enough to decide on important matters related to their own country. Therefore the “father of the Nation”, or the “Guide”, will gladly take such weight on his shoulders, and Vladimir Vladimirovich has sought to become that "Guide.

More importantly, the Russian leader needed a social factor that would be a likely receptor of attention by most (Russian) society, as well as its mortal enemy; and he found both - demography and the LGBTQ+ community. This was a key pillar of his conservative trajectory, which was the establishment of demography as a national priority. Putin sought to present this not merely as a social issue, but also as a moral one. The results of such a social and moral quest would be reflected in the drift from defending family values towards open homophobia. Later on, the Russian president would even dare to establish a direct link between natalist policy and the fight against homosexuality, and the Russian Orthodox Church surely was honoured to participate in such a quest.  

The Russian Way and the Eurasian utopia

Shortly before triggering the Crimean crisis in Ukraine in 2014, the head of the Kremlin stated Russia would take the necessary measures to attain its interests and defend itself from any kind of Western aggression. Russia would now follow its “destined” path to bring together regions that should belong to it, starting with Ossetia (Georgia) and, later on, Crimea (Ukraine), charging into the disputed regions of Donetsk, Luhansk, Mariupol and Kherson in the present days.

The Russian president wishes to give back to his country its prestige and its legitimate place and role in the world. As Eltchaninoff states, “after the humiliation of the end of empire (...) status had to be returned to Russia, and Putin wasted no time in calling on national and Orthodox values for help”. Here we get to understand that part of the “Russian Way” consists in becoming the guardian of “authentic Christian values”. Hence, Vladimir Putin professed before the world that his country would not submit to other powers’ values and norms (US and EU, especially); and despite the consequent marginalization and isolation, it had the right to defend its will, to follow “a path that is its own”, and to demand the right for this difference to be heard and respected. 

It is in this order of thoughts that the Russian President takes great advantage of Alexander Solzhenitsyn’s Slavophile ideals. Since the 19th century, such theoretical thought and movement has divided the (ethnic) Russian people into Westernizers and Slavophiles. From the Slavophile movement’s perspective, all sorts of imperialist - as well as the notion of Empire - and colonialist ideals and events are rooted in the Western tradition. 

Although such logic is fully contradicted by Russian History and current events, Putin did (and still does) make use of these thoughts to appease his sympathizers. In the same way, the repression of free and independent media, and the arrest (or worse) of its supporters, is another key factor for the rapid spread of such Slavophile views and the silencing of contrary opinions. Knowing this, it becomes visible how the Russian President used these philosophies to feed his Eurasian dream, which would be shattered in 2014.

Putin, as well as most of his political circle, could not understand and accept the idea of a Eurasian block without Ukraine, who took the Westernizers’ side and enabled the Western enemies (namely NATO and EU) to cross the Kremlin’s “red lines”. Such phenomena weakened the Russian President’s plans to make Russia the “leader and centre of gravity for the whole of Eurasia” and counter-attack the Eurocentric idea of progress in Modern History.

This sympathy towards Eurasianism comes from the possibility of creating a new world order. Knowing this, when Ukraine assumed and defended its own identity and sovereignty, choosing its path closer to the West, the new world order in the mind of Vladimir Putin became endangered and actions had to be taken.

Finding the foundations of Russia’s fifth Empire?

In chapters 7 and 8, Michel Eltchaninoff underlines the importance of (i) Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Nikolay Beryaev’s influence on Putin’s “conservative turn”, and how these entities, to an extent, endorse the (ii) Russian President’s tentative to bring his country to his imperial and powerful old self.

From the perspective of Dostoyevsky, endorsed by Vladimir Vladimirovich, Europe cannot fully exist as a whole without Russia in it. In the same way, Russia longs for its place in the “old continent”. In addition, the Christian ideals of the celebrated Russian novelist just added up to Putin’s appreciation - and desire - for “his Christ-like mildness and ecumenical vision of the bond uniting Russia and Europe”, predictability fuelling more hatred against the more liberal and progressive masses. 

Berdyaev, on the other hand, proves to be a more centralised thinker. He was a philosopher full of dichotomies, such as driving himself away from the Marxist and Bolshevik ideals and yet not being a sympathizer as well of the former Russian regime or any other totalitarian ways of ruling. He was against any scientific reduction of Human History, and instead wished Man to pursue “a profound philosophical interrogation of the ‘meaning of the creative act’, of ‘the destiny of man’”. However, what makes Berdyaev unique is the fact that, according to Eltchaninoff, he was not de facto a conservative. For instance, the Russian philosopher mourned the failure of the February Revolution, and two years later, in 1917, he condemned the fruits of the Red October. From his point of view, this historical event was nothing but an eruption of savagery, which had brought no regeneration of the (oppressed) society. In his own words, “all the same old instincts are active, all the same old feelings. The new man is not being born”, and seems he was not at all wrong.

I may dare to suggest that Berdyaev would present a balanced position where both liberals and conservatives would share plenty of points of view and ideas. However, it would not be a surprise if the Russian President would take advantage of this intriguing philosophical fluidity, using Berdyave as a key name of Conservatism and dribbling his speech in a similar dichotomous manner whenever his plans fail.

Until now, it is understandable how the Russian government has used conservative values to turn part of its population against the West (and against each other), as well as to assert its position in the world. Yet, there is always something more than what is right away visible to our naked eyes as mere observers. 

The author also shares that although Vladimir Putin himself has so far not claimed any imperial wish or nostalgia, his ruling - including during Dmitry Medvedev’s presidency - could suggest otherwise. In an interview with Alexander Prokhanov, founder of the far-right daily newspapers Den (“Day”) and Zavtra (“Tomorrow”), the Russian writer claimed that his ideas could be starting to influence the president’s advisers/inner circle. In fact, Prokhanov firmly believes that a fifth (Russian) empire is emerging, finding its bases in three “axioms”: (i) Russia being, by nature, an empire “with living, breathing frontiers” which vindicates any annexations, (ii) the country’s obedience to divine justice, and (iii) the perception of Russia as theocentric and the West as anthropocentric.

In the end, most of Putin’s frivolous supporters and sympathizers, with a generous amount of the influence of the Orthodox Church, enjoy repeating the idea that Russia is carrying out the divine task to defend its lands and peoples (both inside and outside of the so-called “breathing frontiers”) from the Western decadence and sin. Supposedly pre-destined to succeed in such a divine quest, the “Holy Russia” would be reborn as a strong and steady Eurasian empire, finally claiming its fair place in the world.

Final goal: what is really in the mind of Vladimir Putin?

In his final chapter, Michel Eltchaninoff states what he believes to be Vladimir Putin’s plan for Europe. On the one hand, as mentioned before, the President will do all in his reach to ensure that his country will be given a place worthy of its value within the European political spectrum. On the other hand, he intends to take the lead in Europe’s conservative movement- “conservative in the Putinian sense, opposed to homosexuality, atheism, cosmopolitanism, the Internet and any expression of creativity, which is seen as a symptom of disorder.”

Additionally, Putin shows a distinctive feature when comparing the evolution of the Russian Federation as a power with other states in a similar situation. Normally, when a country rises to such status, its leaders will not only seek the approval of the resident citizens by working on their interests but also take into consideration the interests (and opinions) of different states and their respective citizens. In this field, Moscow chooses to focus more on guaranteeing its citizens’ support inside and outside the Russian world. 

While ensuring his “children” are doing well in foreign lands, the Russian President looks out for opportunities to plant his ideals in the hearts (and egos) of popular movements. In this regard, we have become familiar with a continuous escalation of clashes between different groups among European societies, resulting in an unstable environment for Brussels and the West in general, and in a strategic opportunity for the Kremlin.

I believe we are close to better understand what are the thoughts of Vladimir Putin. For him, he is the “Guardian” of the Russian nation that once was a powerful actor, who held in its hands decisive power that could influence the conduct of other nations. That same actor lost its power and was humiliated, and now it is time for payback. 

Nevertheless, the human mind is very complex, and most importantly it is not statical. Throughout time, we realise that Vladimir Putin learnt from his reality and developed different strategies and policies for different challenges in different periods of time. At the moment, he shows in a clear way his interest in elevating Russia at almost any cost, even if it prejudices his citizens and other countries. However, in time, perhaps the scarcity of important resources and the general social discontentment will compel his mind to elaborate a new plan, leaving us again to wonder how he truly thinks, and what really is going on inside his mind.

References

Eltchaninoff, Michel. 2018. “The Russian Way.” In Inside the Mind of Vladimir Putin, 79. London, United Kingdom: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd