Revisiting the Russia-Ukraine War through the Lens of Realism

Politics is war without bloodshed while war is politics with bloodshed.
— Mao Zedong

After 8 years of low-intensity hostilities in the Donbas region of Ukraine by Russian-backed separatists, Russia recognised independence of the self-proclaimed ‘People’s Republic of  Luhansk’ and the ‘People’s Republic of Donetsk’ in 2022. Just three days after this major move, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24th. The attack was by no means a surprise considering the military build-ups across the Ukrainian border and joint military exercises conducted by Russia, in the preceding months.

The coercive military action can be explained through various prisms of social sciences like realism, liberalism, social constructivism, and marxism. This article seeks to bring into the limelight a realist interpretation pertinent to the events of the Russian-Ukraine war; one of the consequential events of the 21 st century. However, before we analyse the situation, we first need to comprehend the context of the invasion.

Background of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Russia and Ukraine both used to be parts of the Soviet Union. Out of 15 Soviet Republics, Ukraine was the second most powerful, behind only Russia, with a very strong influence. Ukraine was the main producer of wheat, had abundant minerals and resources, and was the base of a major part of the union's defense industry (Masters 2022).

On December 1, 1991, the Verkhovna Rada's August Declaration of Independence received support from more than 92% of Ukrainian voters. Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus also signed the Belavezha Accords which reshaped world politics by declaring, “the USSR ceases to exist as a subject of international law and as a geopolitical reality.” (Rutland 2016) A few days later, the Soviet Union disintegrated into 15 states, Ukraine among them.

Ukraine inherited approximately 1900 strategic nuclear warheads, the world’s third largest at that time, from the Soviet Union’s vast nuclear stockpile. However, in 1994 Ukraine gave up its nuclear arsenals in exchange for security assurances and joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty by signing the Budapest Memorandum (Kutchesfahani 2022). In this memorandum, the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom pledged to respect Ukraine's sovereignty over its current boundaries and abstain from using force (Blake 2022). Russia is currently under fire from the international community for breaking the Budapest Memorandum, but it is justifying its actions as an act of self-defense in light of NATO's eastward expansion.

Flash forward. Ukraine's connections with the EU exacerbated tensions with Russia in 2013-2014. Victor Yanukovych, the pro-Russian president of Ukraine, was poised to sign an agreement with the EU in 2013, but after a meeting with Putin, decided to sign one with Russia instead. This decision did not satisfy Ukrainians and, as a result, nationwide pro-Western demonstrations known as the Euromaidan ensued. Yanukovych was overthrown, and the new government succeeded in signing a deal with the EU (Masters 2022). As a result, Russia annexed Crimea in 2014, prompting numerous European countries to impose sanctions on Russia. Additionally, Ukraine accused Russia of backing the separatists in its Donbas regions. Skirmishes between Russian and Ukrainian troops occurred on a regular basis until the conflict abruptly escalated into a full-fledged war in February 2022.

Realist Interpretation of Russia-Ukraine War

Throughout history, war has been a pervasive pattern of interaction between political entities. Despite its destructive nature and negative impacts, it is a potent catalyst for change as it impacts both international and domestic political systems. The Thirty Years War in Europe (1618-1648) ended with the signing of the Treaty of Westphalia which introduced the concept of sovereignty. The Napoleonic wars disturbed the Balance of Power in Europe. The World Wars reshaped the political structure of the entire world to a greater extent. Thus, wars can be viewed as agents of transformation. Moreover, for most of history, war has been utilized as a political instrument and as part of diplomacy. Frederick the Great of Prussia used to say “Diplomacy without force is like music without instruments.” The primary goal of war has always been to force the opponent to comply with our wishes.

The first attempt to better comprehend the nature of war and its causes was made by Thucydides who wrote The History of the Peloponnesian War in the late 5 th century. The aim of this book was to explain the Great War between Athens and Sparta. After examining the background and the events of this war, Thucydides came to the conclusion that fear associated with the shift in the balance of power was the primary factor contributing to this conflict. Since then, War has been a captivating problem in world politics, and international relations scholars continue to analyze it.

Realism is the oldest and most well-known International Relations school of thought. Its origin can be traced back to Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War. Realism is not a single theory, but rather a collection of theories sharing some common assumptions For instance, all realism theories concur that states are the fundamental actors that pursue their interests rationally, the international system is anarchic, and the distribution of power is the primary determinant of international outcomes. Famous realist thinkers include Machiavelli, Clausewitz, Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz.

Realists explicate the causes of war using the concept of anarchy and balance of power. Anarchy refers to the absence of a sovereign, higher power that may formulate or enforce laws within the international system. This dilemma has been referred to as the "911 problem" by John Mearsheimer. The 911 problem means that states do not have an emergency number they can dial to when in trouble. States have to protect themselves as the authority here rests with the powerful state (Mingst, Heather Elko Mckibben, and Arreguín-Toft 2019). The founder of structural realism, Kenneth Waltz, asserts that the distribution of power has a greater impact on international outcomes than the internal characteristics of states. Thucydides explained this in “Melian Dialogue” by saying “The strong take what they can and the weak suffer what they must.” Conflicting interests are the main driving force behind international politics, with each nation-state doing everything possible to advance its own interests. States choose war when peaceful measures of achieving their goals are unsuccessful. War, according to Clausewitz, is a continuation of politics. With this assertion, Clausewitz has legalized the use of force (Levy and Thompson 2010).

If we use assumptions of realism to understand the Russia-Ukraine war, the invasion of Russia can likely be considered an attempt to regain the balance of power which had started to shift more toward America and its Western allies.

I. NATO’s Expansion and Russia’s Perception

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization was founded in 1949 with the sole purpose of countering the USSR. However, NATO has kept growing even after the Soviet Union fell apart in 1991. The two significant rounds of enlargement occurred in 1999 and 2004. Russians considered it a security threat but were not powerful enough to take a firm step. However, in 2008 when NATO issued a statement in favor of Georgia’s and Ukraine’s aspiration to join it, Russia responded by first attacking Georgia in 2008, and later annexing Crimea in 2014. For the first time since World War II, a European state had annexed the territory of another sovereign European state. Russia defended its action by characterizing it as a rescue effort to protect the rights of ethnic Russians in Crimea. Putin also referred to Yanukovich's downfall as a "fascist coup" supported by the West.

Russia’s actions in 2014 were a clear sign to the world that Ukraine was its red line, and that it had a strict zero-compromise policy toward NATO’s involvement there. Despite this, Ukraine’s inclination toward NATO and EU, Russia’s strategic rivals, kept on growing which created a sense of insecurity for Russia. During his speech on 24 th February 2022, Putin constantly referred to the eastward expansion of NATO as a disdainful and ignorant act. In addition, he accused the West of violating James Baker’s pledge of 1990 that NATO would not expand even an inch eastward. NATO denies these allegations, claiming that no such commitment was made and that it is a defensive alliance only interested in the security of its members. However, what counts more is not what NATO says, rather what Russia perceives. The Kremlin, due to its past history, believes that the USA and its Western allies are hostile
toward it, and therefore has long seen the expansion of NATO as a threat to its survival. NATO’s defensive alliance has always been considered offensive by the Kremlin. This perception has in turn made Russia resort to extreme actions (Mearsheimer 2014). Proponents of Realism contend that the West has, albeit to a lesser degree, repeated the mistake it committed with Germany in the Treaty of Versailles. They could have adopted more considerate policies by forming a new security framework instead of expanding the one whose main purpose was curtailing the spread of Soviet ideologies.

The main concern of Russia, like all other states, has always been ensuring its security and survival, both of which directly depend upon how much power a state has. Realists do not regard power as an absolute idea. For them, power is relative, which means it is measured in relation to the adversary's power (Baylis, Smith, and Owens 2020). Relative gains create a sense of safety, whilst relative losses lead to insecurity. Russia, being a great power, had a strong military, but the NATO alliance continued to grow stronger, making Russia feel more and more apprehensive and alarmed, resulting in an unabating security dilemma. One of the major ways of increasing power is by attacking and conquering the territory of another state, so Russia opted to take this step. 

If we look practically, Ukraine was not yet part of NATO, but the mere fear thereof was a strong enough catalyst for a Russian attack. The fear associated with the shift in the balance of power creates a security dilemma which often results in miscalculations from the side of the key decision-maker and ultimately leads to the use of force. The Russian attack was also based on its perception that Ukraine joining with the NATO might hinder its future endeavors. Perhaps, Russia’s invasion was a preemptive strike, aimed at deterring the West to keep NATO as far as possible from Russian borders.

II. Ukraine’s Denuclearisation-A Wise Decision or Not?

Other important questions that sparked scholarly attention included: Whether Ukraine’s decision to relinquish its nuclear weapons in 1994 in exchange for security guarantees from the USA, Russia, and the UK was a wise one. What if Ukraine possessed nuclear weapons today? Would Russia still attack Ukraine if it were a nuclear weapon state?

Realists have very straightforward answers to these questions. They argue that giving up your nuclear weapons and relying on other states for your security was never a wise decision. If Ukraine had nuclear weapons today, circumstances would’ve been very different. International Politics is a struggle for power and only the fittest can survive in this arena. It does not matter who is right or who is wrong; what matters is who is more powerful. There is no equality here, and the standards of justice are not the same for everyone. The one who is strong is the one who gets to decide. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, the United States entered its forces in Kuwait to launch an offensive against Iraq, and the UN supported it by passing a resolution that authorised the use of force against Iraq. Can the UN or the US do the same in case of Russia’s invasion? Given that Russia is a nuclear weapon state, and that there are chances of a nuclear war in case external forces militarily intervene, it is highly unlikely. Moreover, Russia’s vast economic size and disproportionately huge territory make its relative power much more difficult to be challenged today. No state is ever going to take such a great risk for the security of another state. For every state, its own survival is its priority.

Realists believe that the distribution of power within the system is a key determinant of international outcomes. Since the fear of being defeated is what prevents aggressive states from invading in the first place, two nearly equal-power states avoid engaging in combat with one another (Mingst, Heather Elko Mckibben, and Arreguín-Toft 2019). If Ukraine had nuclear weapons today, Russia would have never considered it an easy target to attack. Russia understood from the beginning that due to its military and economic might, no western state would risk sending troops into Ukraine’s territory against Russian forces, and that is exactly what is happening.

III. Continuation of Politics

Putin has consistently questioned the sovereignty of Ukraine and considered it part of Russia. He has long viewed Ukraine as Russia’s little brother who has been deceived and misled by the West. Putin in his last year’s article, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians” highlighted the historical grounds for his claim against Ukraine (Ioanes 2022). He referred to Russians and Ukrainians as one people and accused anti-Russian political entities of creating a rift between them. Even in his speech this February, he rejected Ukraine’s right to exist as a sovereign state and used this argument to justify his invasion. This clearly demonstrates that for Putin, Ukraine’s existence as an independent nation was never acceptable, and he has long been waiting for an opportunity to invade and conquer Ukraine.

Thus, Putin's action can be seen as a last-ditch effort to further his political agenda. For realists, diplomacy and war can never be studied in isolation from each other as war is merely an extension of politics. When states or political actors are unable to achieve their goals through peaceful or diplomatic means, they turn to war. War is politics in action-the final argument of a king. Putin, when failed to achieve his objectives by diplomatic means, decided to use force.

Conclusion

History has witnessed times when the pursuit of the policy of political self-interest, raison d’état, above all has led to the emergence of a state whose continuously augmenting thirst for power becomes an admissible obstacle to the maintenance of the existing status quo. France in the times of Cardinal Richelieu and Germany during the reign of Kaiser Wilhelm II and Adolf Hitler are vivid examples. In the contemporary world order, Russia seems to be following the same plans and patterns raising its comparative power. However, the blame for the Russia-Ukraine war cannot be placed solely on a single party. Political circumstances, power imbalance, a security conundrum, and certain unwise decisions could all have been contributing factors. This conflict also conveys the crucial lesson that no matter how economically powerful a state is, the necessity of a strong and robust military can never be understated.

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