Russia-Ukraine war: the ASEAN response

by Antonella Benedetto

Introduction

On the 24^th of February 2022, the world was shocked when the Russian Federation militarily invaded Ukraine. There are two factors accounting for the grave and unique nature of this war. First, despite the technical capabilities, conventional war with a rising number of victims (direct casualties, refugees, etc.) and boots on the ground is fought. Second, due to Russia’s global interconnectedness as one of the world's biggest economies^[1], the spillover effects of this aggression can be observed worldwide. States have responded differently, depending on their relationship with and dependence on Russia. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has overwhelmingly been condemned by the International Community. Indeed, on the 2^nd of March, the General Assembly of the United Nations (UNGA) adopted a resolution demanding that Russia immediately stop its military operations in Ukraine: 141 countries over 193 UN member states voted in favor ^[2]. Western nations, in particular the United Kingdom, the European Union (EU), and the United States (USA) have jointly imposed "unprecedented sanctions" – as US President Biden declared – on Russia, which shall make the Russian economy fall^[3]. This contribution will look further East, discussing the impacts of the war in Ukraine on South East Asia and the reaction taken by members of the Association of Southeast Nations (ASEAN).

The not-so-silent observers

Unlike the West, the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) and the majority of its member states did not make noise. The ASEAN foreign minister’s declaration on the 26^th of February demonstrated their heedful approach to the ongoing war. In the official statement, they declared that they are “deeply concerned over the evolving situation” and “armed hostilities in Ukraine”^[4]. However, the text does not refer to any violation of international law and does not mention words such as "aggression" or "invasion."^[5]. A week later, on the 2^nd of March, the ASEAN foreign ministers released another statement calling for a cease-fire in Ukraine, believing that "there is still room for a peaceful dialogue."^[6]. The majority of analysts have described the statement as vague and tepid^[7]. Singapore was the only country that decided to join 81 countries in support of the initial UNSC resolution (later defeated due to the Russian veto) in condemning Russia's invasion. As the conflict escalated, the regional response became more homogeneous: eight ASEAN members, joining 141 countries, voted for the UNGA Resolution condemning the Russian invasion while Vietnam and Laos, two of the most vital Russian partners of the region, abstained together with other 35 countries.

The South-East Asian countries' response to the war varied significantly. The governmental responses can be divided into three groups: those condemning the war, those searching to keep a neutral position as well as those who express their support for the actions taken by Moscow. The biggest cleavage can be observed between Singapore strongly condemning the war and Myanmar supporting Putin's actions. The other ASEAN members manifested various levels of concern: some adopted neutrality, others remained cautious not to mention the word "aggression" and risk their relationship with Russia^[8]. Some ASEAN nations buy a significant number of Russian weapons: in Singapore the number is derisory; in Vietnam, on the other hand, it amounts to 80 percent, in Laos 47 percent, in Myanmar 40 percent, and in Malaysia 26 percent ^[9].

The diverging ASEAN response

Having introduced the various political positions, this section delves deeper into the individual reactions of the ASEAN members. Here, their different historic relations with Moscow need to be borne in mind. Exceptionally, only Singapore imposed unilateral "appropriate sanctions and restriction^[10]” due to the “unprecedented gravity of the situation^[11]”. Sanctions constitute a significant response from the diplomatic point of view^[12]. Previously, the last time Singapore had adopted sanctions was forty years ago - in 1978 when Vietnam tried to overthrow Cambodia's Khmer Rouge communist dictatorship. Moreover, Singapore strongly condemned the 1990 Iraqi occupation of Kuwait and the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea. The Foreign Affairs Minister of Singapore, Vivian Balakrishnan, declared that the country strongly supports international law and the principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter. ^[13]. While Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong stated that: “f international relations were based on might is right, the world would be a dangerous place for small countries like Singapore”^{^[14]}. As well as reported by “The Diplomat”^[15], the main reasons behind this strong and unusual position reflect "its own perception of vulnerability" due to its small territory and “its concern for the fate of the world’s small states”. Indeed, during the 19^th century, the number of small states declined; in the 20^th century, they entrusted their survival to the collective security system.^[16]. Singapore advocated for the respect of international law which has always stood against invasions, above all big states, such as Russia and Ukraine. ^[17]. Although experts say that the sanctions will not have a big impact on Russia's economy due to Singapore’s limited economic and military trade, they will certainly reduce the capacity to conduct military operations and impede circumventing western sanctions by Russia^[18].

Myanmar, in contrast, is the only country in the region to blatantly support Moscow's actions. The Russian Federation was the first considerable power to recognize the legitimate government of Myanmar after the coup in February 2021. On the contrary, the government in exile supported Ukraine's stance, condemning the aggression. The Special Rapporteur in Geneva for the UN Human Rights Council, Tom Andrews, calls for the stop of weapon supply from Russia (together with China and Serbia) to Myanmar, which has been the cause of death of numerous civilians, including children, since the military coup in February 2021. He also insisted on calling the UN Security Council to start an emergency session to emit the resolution on the trade ban^[19].

Both Malaysia and Thailand expressed "deep concern", hoping for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Wishing to maintain good relations with Russia, the Prime Minister of Thailand, Prayut Chan-o-cha, emphasised the country’s neutrality.

Vietnam abstained from criticising the military aggression since the country was able to modernise its armed forces owing to Russia-manufactured weapons to rival China in the South China Sea. Laos and Cambodia followed the same path.

Indonesia, as well as Brunei and the Philippines, criticised the attack on Ukraine. Indonesia avoided naming Russia as the aggressor, however, it pleaded for a cease-fire from "all parties", warning that a possible conflict would slow the economic recovery from the pandemic. Military and commercial ties between Indonesia and Russia have improved recently since Russia helped to preserve peace and security in the Indo-Pacific area. In the future, Indonesia will have difficulty choosing the best diplomatic stance as both Russia and Ukraine are its vital economic partners. According to “MIT's Observatory of Economic Complexity” (OEC), Indonesia is a significant provider of (semi-finished) iron, coal briquettes, and potassic fertilisers, while Russian shipments to Jakarta are expected to reach $671 million in 2020. Jakarta depends heavily on imported fossil fuels, so additional sanctions may endanger its energy security and raise government oil and gas payments. Politically, the G20 presidency is the main focus for Indonesia, which sees it as a platform to address the global post-COVID recovery gap as a representative of a developing economy and ready for the return of investments, tourism, and attention toward Indonesia and Southeast Asia as a whole^[20].

The Philippines' priority was to evacuate its citizens from Ukraine. Since his election, President Rodrigo Duterte, elected in 2016, has tried to adopt a more balanced foreign policy by developing better relations with Russia and China.

The possible economic, political, and security consequences of the war for ASEAN countries

The Ukraine crisis has enormous ramifications for the future of demand in Asia. Asia comprises nearly 60% of the world's population and 32% of the world's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), it also has enormous ramifications for the future of global security and the economy^[21]The isolation of Russia will become visible first in the negative effects on the tourism sector, very important, especially for Thailand, Vietnam, and Indonesia. As well to the Chinese tourists, whose travel is minimal by Beijing's zero-Covid policy, Russians made up a large portion of the clientele. With the suspension of most international air connections to and from Russia, it will be even more difficult for them to visit South-East Asia. This is a further blow to ASEAN tourism which is already coming from two extremely difficult years due to Covid^[22]. Especially larger sectors of the society living upon tourism will be affected directly by the invasion taking place far away.

The economic relations between Russia and Southeast Asia are relatively potent: in 2020, Russia was ASEAN’s 11^th biggest trade partner. Therefore, a potential decline of the Russian economy due to the international sanctions will not cause enormous consequences to the region^[23]. Nevertheless, the rise of energy, food and commodity prices slows the economic recovery from the pandemic^[24]. The economic impact of the war will hit the poorer segments of the population the most, exposing them to rising food and fuel prices. ASEAN economies are strongly export-oriented and consider the European Union a key partner (9% of total exports). European countries are the most affected by the disruption of trade relations with Russia and will have fewer resources to buy ASEAN goods and invest in South East Asia. The decrease in European demand will have more critical consequences in the Philippines and Vietnam due to the 2019 free trade agreement between Hanoi and the EU^[25]. Food costs would likely increase as well, as they were already on the rise globally before the invasion due to inflation. In this regard, ASEAN nations are subject to greater direct exposure. More than a quarter of Indonesia's wheat imports in 2019 came from Russia and Ukraine. Nearly 16% of the wheat imported by the Philippines, valued at $1.45 billion, came from Russia and Ukraine^[26]. Also, the manufacturing sector is likely to suffer, since Russia and Ukraine are the major suppliers of semi-finished iron and steel, a crucial component in equipment, automobiles, and electronics production. Thailand purchased 21.4% of its semi-finished steel from Russia and Ukraine in 2019, 25% from Indonesia, and nearly half from the Philippines^[27].

About the energy market, although ASEAN has just a tiny amount of direct exposure to Russia, it is a significant energy exporter. In 2019, Singapore imported refined petroleum oil worth $38.8 billion. However, just 5.7% came from Russia. A similar scenario exists in Thailand, which imported crude worth $16.6 billion in 2019 but just 3.3% of it came from Russia^[28]. Vietnam, which received 15% of its coal imports from Russia, may be more vulnerable, although it is likely that Australia and Indonesia would increase exports to make up the difference. However, while big European and American companies interrupt the relations with Russian energy giants, their counterparts in ASEAN countries do not question these ties. For example, Malaysia's Petronas will continue cooperating with Gazprom in Iraq's mining activities. In Indonesia, the state company Pertamina, active in oil and gas extraction, is developing a large refining plant together with Rosneft^[29].

Russia's main security activity in Southeast Asia is weapons sales, worth almost $11 billion since Putin became President in 2000. The economic sanctions and the export controls imposed by European states, the US, and other countries may affect the arms sales and the weapons systems for the countries in the region. Moreover, it is probable that “The Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions Act” (CAATSA), which puts sanctions on nations that conduct business with Russia's military-industrial complex will be strengthened by Washington. However, Washington might suspend CAATSA sanctions against Vietnam since both are interested in containing China's provocative actions in the South China Sea. It is too early to predict how the conflict would impact America's military stance. Both the Trump and Biden administrations designated the Indo-Pacific as the US's top strategic theatre. However, the Russia-Ukraine war and the intensifying tensions between NATO and Russia mean that, at least in the short term, Europe will occupy a significant portion of Washington's strategic involvement.

The ASEAN – US Summit

The United States renewed interest in ASEAN is also related to the conflict in Ukraine and the goal of isolating Russia. In fact, the South-East Asian region is important to the extensive diplomatic relationship between the West and the Russian Federation. The US-ASEAN Summit represented the occasion to consolidate the relations between the two counterparts. On 12 and 13 May, the long-awaited and often postponed meeting between ASEAN and the United States took place in Washington. Only eight of the Organisation's ten member countries participated in the event. Myanmar's absence due to the US refusal to welcome members of the ruling military junta was compounded by the Philippines' announced absence due, according to Duterte, to the post-election transition. The US-ASEAN summit had as its main goal to reaffirm the centrality of Southeast Asia in US strategy and try to stem its slide into the Chinese orbit. After Trump’s economic protectionist measures, characterised by customs duties and the withdrawal in 2017 from the “Trans-Pacific Partnership” (TPP), the US wishes to return to the protagonist in the region, limiting Beijing’s influence and isolating Moscow, strengthening their economic and diplomatic ties, beyond the military one^[30]. The summit, marking the 45 years of diplomatic relations between the US and ASEAN, was also the occasion to announce the creation of a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”, to formalise in November 2022[31]. However, the renewed US focus on ASEAN is also linked to the war in Ukraine and the goal of isolating Russia. As we have seen above, ASEAN's position is not unequivocal, in fact to date, only Singapore has imposed sanctions on Moscow; Indonesia, Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand still maintain cordial relations with the Kremlin; while Vietnam, Myanmar and Laos are largely dependent on Russian weapons systems and military technologies.

A turning point was the July diplomatic mission by Indonesian President Joko Widodo to Ukraine and Russia. He became the first Asian leader to visit Kyiv since the beginning of the war. The visit put Jakarta at the centre of international political dynamics and thus the entire ASEAN of which Indonesia is the main economy, also considering the G20 Indonesia rotating presidency in November. Indonesia maintained a neutral position since the beginning of the war, acting as a mediator between the two counterparts. Widodo said that the Russian President had given him “guarantees” on the safe transport of food and fertiliser through the sea routes not only from Russia but also from Ukraine^[32]. "My mission is to build peace because the war must be stopped and (its effects) on the food supply chain must be lifted”, he said^[33]. The political stance is valid not only for Indonesia, but also for other developing countries which risk suffering from poverty and hunger.

Conclusions

It is difficult to foresee how the situation might evolve. All eyes turn to the November G20 in Indonesia^.: the rise of commodities and energy prices, inflation, the war in Ukraine, and the reduction of carbon emissions are likely to take the centre stage. What we do know is that more coordinated worldwide action is urgently required, together with the support of international organisations, to prevent possible crises and increase growth and productivity. The world's wealthier nations should urgently support those in need, including with new bilateral and multilateral funds, mainly through the World Food Programme, in order to prevent more hunger, malnutrition, and migration. Expectations regarding carbon reduction emissions are low^[34]. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has forced various governments to utilise coal for more time than they had intended. Russian aggression against its neighbour, according to Australia's environment and water minister Tanya Plibersek, has "complicated negotiations.". What is sure is that in the future ASEAN will continue to rely on its history of impartiality and inclusivity in diplomacy, based on multilateralism. ASEAN serves best as a bridge-builder in fostering an exchange of views between leaders in the event of divergent viewpoints domestically and among its dialogue partners, including China, the United States, and Russia^[35].

^[1] https://www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/view-southeast-asia-asean-indonesia-and-ukraine-war-35058

^[2] https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152

^[3] https://www.aljazeera.com/economy/2022/6/2/shooting-themselves-in-the-foot-western-sanctions-on-russia

^[4] https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ASEAN-FM-Statement-on-Ukraine-Crisis-26-Feb-Final.pdf

^[5] https://www.policyforum.net/asean-members-responses-to-the-invasion-of-ukraine/

^[6] https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/ASEAN-Foreign-Ministers-Statement-calling-for-Ceasefire-in-Ukraine-EN.pdf

^[7] https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/asean-foreign-ministers-express-deep-concern-about-ukraine-crisis/

^[8] https://www.policyforum.net/asean-members-responses-to-the-invasion-of-ukraine/

^[9] https://thediplomat.com/2022/03/why-singapore-has-chosen-to-impose-sanctions-on-russia/

^[10] https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3168648/ukraine-invasion-singapore-impose-unilateral-sanctions-russia

^[11] https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/explainer-will-singapores-sanctions-against-russia-have-any-impact-1833386

^[12] https://www.todayonline.com/singapore/explainer-will-singapores-sanctions-against-russia-have-any-impact-1833386