Russia-Ukraine War: The Black Sea at stake

Introduction

Since 24 February 2022, with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Europe is facing a war on its territory. The conflict between the two countries dates back to 2014 when Russia annexed the Crimean Peninsula. This was related to the collapse of the USSR in 1991. Indeed, for Russia, Crimea was an important territory. The peninsula had been Russian and then Soviet. Its position in the region of the Black Sea has also a geopolitical value for Russia. Losing Ukraine in 1991, which was essential for the existence of a great Russian empire, was really hard (Michailova, 2022). Russia still sees Ukraine as its land with a common identity (Casier, 2022). So, according to Casier (2022, p.78), “the invasion of Ukraine was […]  a conscious attempt at dissolving the Ukrainian state and expanding Russia’s territory”.

This article will focus on the Black Sea issue of the Russia-Ukraine war. There is a maritime dimension to the invasion. Russian naval forces are indeed involved at the operational level in the conflict (Germond, 2022a). However, Germond (2022a) also highlights strategic and political elements linked to the maritime aspect. These concern particularly the Black Sea. Russia has always been interested in dominating the Black Sea and this is characteristic of its foreign policy (Germond, 2022d). The article will examine to what extent and why the Black Sea is at stake in the war between Russia and Ukraine. First, the article will present briefly the Russian strategy in the Black Sea from 2014. Then, two issues and one event of the conflict will be highlighted. These show, as Germond (2022a) explained, the strategic/political elements and the maritime dimension of the conflict. They will be explained in order to understand and answer the research question. Other issues or elements could have been emphasized but those selected are among the most prominent in the literature or the media.

From a hybrid strategy to war in the Black Sea

Since the 2014 turning point of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Black Sea (or at least a part of it) has become a “gray zone” (Kormych and Malyarenko, 2022, p.1). This term is generally used to describe situations in the Asia-Pacific and refers to a dispute over territory or sovereignty for example, but that does not lead to war (Ministry of Defense of Japan as cited in Kormych and Malyarenko, 2022). “Gray zone” situations are accompanied by specific strategies. In this case, the zone comprises the coastal waters and the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of occupied Crimea. Following the annexation, different zones in the coastal waters of Crimea have appeared where different set of rules overlap and are contested. In practice, a de facto regime, comprising arrangements between Russia and Ukraine and informal norms, is applied by the two countries (Kormych and Malyarenko, 2022). 

According to Kormych and Malyarenko (2022, p.6), “Russia’s expansive strategy also means that Moscow has never considered Ukraine as the only adversary in the Black Sea, instead viewing the conflict over the Crimean coastal waters as a part of greater geopolitical competition”. Indeed, Crimea has a geostrategic interest for Russia in terms of competition with NATO in the Black Sea. Regarding the invasion, NATO remains in the Russian justification. From 2014 to 2022, Russia has undertaken a military reinforcement in the Black Sea. This was critical for the maritime aspect of the conflict that followed. The invasion has marked a change from a hybrid confrontation to a conventional war between the two countries, including in the Black and Azov Seas (Kormych and Malyarenko, 2022). At sea, Russia tries to “consolidate, legitimize, and expand its success in the projection of power, which it achieved after the annexation of Crimea” (Kormych and Malyarenko, 2022, p.3).

Sea routes and maritime trade

Access to sea lanes of communication is an issue for Russia. In particular, access to the Turkish straits that connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean Sea is an objective for the country. It allows Russia to be linked to global sea lanes and warm waters (Germond, 2022a; Germond, 2022d). This is also a point of entry for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. The annexation of Crimea has supported this goal (Germond, 2022a). However, as the Turkish straits are now closed to military vessels and Turkey is a member of NATO, the straits are “clearly off limits” (Germond, 2022d, para. 2). Nevertheless, one objective of Russia could be to control the Black Sea coast of Ukraine. If Russia achieves this goal and Odessa falls, Ukraine will not be able to access to global sea routes and as we will see, global food security will be impacted (Germond, 2022d). 

Linked to sea routes, maritime trade is also an important aspect. The majority of foreign trade in Ukraine is dependent on sea routes and ports (Ukrinform as cited in Kormych and Malyarenko, 2022). It is particularly the case for commodities like grain (Mykhailov Kormych and Malyarenko, 2022). With the conflict, “attacks on shipping and commerce become one of the primary forms in which the Russian navy applied its command of the sea” (Armstrong as cited in Kormych and Malyarenko, 2022, p.19). Ports of the Black Sea and the Azov Sea were closed because of the Russian occupation or blocked because a naval blockade was put in place by Russia. This constituted a powerful element (Ukrinform as cited in Kormych and Malyarenko, 2022; Kormych and Malyarenko, 2022). 

In July 2022, a deal was signed between Ukraine and Russia, under the aegis of Turkey and the United Nations, to open Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea. One of the reasons why Russia has changed its strategy and has reconsidered the blockade is that it has led to a global food crisis. Russia did not want to lose credibility in Asia and Africa because it became clear that it was responsible for that food crisis. Shortly after, Russia still launched missile strikes in the direction of the port of Odessa (Germond, 2022b). The deal has been renewed for four months from 18 November 2022 (Nichols, 2022).

Strategic place: Snake Island

Another stake in the conflict is Snake Island. This is a rocky piece of land of less than one square kilometer in the Black Sea, located 77 nautical miles south of Odessa. The island was ceded to the Soviet Union in 1948. After the end of the USSR, it became Ukrainian. Despite its small size, it has geostrategic importance up to the global level (Colibășanu et al., 2022). Russia has occupied the island for four months, from the first day of the war until the end of June 2022 (Colibășanu et al., 2022; Germond, 2022c).

First, a maritime area was disputed between Romania and Ukraine. In 2009, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) decided on the question and Romania received the majority of the surface of the disputed zone. However, with the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Romania has a de facto border in the Black Sea with Russia. So, an occupation of Snake Island by Russia means that the country could call the ICJ decision into question and claim a part of the Romanian and Ukrainian EEZs (Colibășanu et al., 2022).

Then, if the conditions on site are difficult for a permanent deployment of troops, “the deployment there of surveillance equipment and aerial denial systems enable operations covering the entire northwestern Black Sea region” (Colibășanu et al., 2022, para. 9). Moreover, a military presence has an impact on the shipping lanes that allow connecting Ukraine and its ports to the other countries. The island is also 37 kilometers from the port of Sulina in Romania and the mouth of the Danube, the latter being important because it links Europe to the Black Sea (Colibășanu et al., 2022). This must also be taken into account, knowing that Sulina was used as an alternative for Ukrainian goods when the Ukrainian ports were blocked by Russia (Reidy as cited in Colibășanu et al., 2022). The island is thus located on this sea lane, which is also connected to Bosporus Strait allowing access to the Mediterranean Sea. The control of the sea lanes in this region influences the security and prosperity of Europe (Colibășanu et al., 2022).

Russia’s occupation of the island allowed the State “to monitor all air and naval traffic in the area, as well as use the island as a platform for electronic warfare and anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) missions” (Colibășanu et al., 2022, para. 15; Ozberk as cited in Colibășanu et al., 2022, para. 15). As mentioned before, Snake Island could constitute an important military platform with permanent equipment and systems installed there. The country establishing this could control the North-West of the Black Sea (Colibășanu et al., 2022). 

In addition, Romania has discovered gas deposits in its EEZ near the island (Ilie as cited in Colibășanu et al., 2022). This could have an influence on the energy security of Europe and the reduction of the dependence on Russian gas (Colibășanu et al., 2022; Emerging Europe as cited in Colibășanu et al., 2022). Thus, a potential reoccupation of the island by Russia could prevent Romania to exploit the gas discovered (Scutaru and Colibășanu as cited in Colibășanu et al., 2022).

A naval strike

During the war, Ukraine has tried to weaken the naval dominance of Russia (Germond, 2022c). On 13 April 2022, Ukrainian Neptune missiles struck the Russian Black Sea flagship “Moskva”, which sank on 14 April (Kormych and Malyarenko, 2022; Germond, 2022c). This constitutes, in the words of Germond (2022c, para. 5), “the first major victory for Kyiv”. 

According to Armstrong (as cited in Kormych and Malyarenko, 2022, p.16), with this strike, “Ukrainian forces challenged Russian command of the sea and showed the ability to deny Russia easy use of the Black Sea”. This made the Russian military vessels move away from the Ukrainian coasts to protect themselves, which gave Ukraine more manoeuvring space near the coasts (Armstrong as cited in Kormych and Malyarenko, 2022). Germond (2022d) also explains that this has a symbolic impact because large warships are a sign of prestige. So, for Germond (2022d, para. 3), the loss of this vessel “contributes to Ukraine’s morale (which is crucial when fighting a war of attrition as the underdog)”. The operational capabilities of Russia have been impacted. As explained before, the Turkish straits are closed to belligerent vessels. The replacement will thus be difficult. The closure of these straits may be to the detriment of Russia because naval reinforcements are not possible. Nevertheless, the Ukrainian navy is unable to confront the Russian navy at sea. So, this latter can de facto blockade the country (Germond, 2022d).

Moreover, the sinking shows that the Russian navy is not secure near the Ukrainian coast because of the presence of land-based Neptune and Harpoon anti-ship missiles as well as drones (Germond, 2022c; Germond, 2022d). It is difficult to search and destroy preventively these mobile missiles (Germond, 2022d). An “anti-access/area-denial strategy” allows Ukraine to contest the Russian control of the Black Sea and to prevent an amphibious attack on Odessa (Germond, 2022d, para. 4).

In addition, this event has also influenced the strategic importance of Snake Island. Indeed, this one has increased because of the fact that it can constitute a base for air defense systems and electronic warfare. Thus, Ukraine tried to retake control of the island on several occasions. The island now belongs to Ukraine again, and its strategic position no longer benefits Russia (Germond, 2022c).

Conclusion

In February 2022, a war has started between Russia and Ukraine. One strategic aspect of this conflict is maritime and linked to the Black Sea, even if the interest of Russia to control this sea is not new. In this article, several elements have been highlighted. First, Russia pursued a hybrid strategy from 2014 to 2022 before moving on to a conventional war, notably regarding the Black Sea. Second, two issues, linked to the Black Sea, seem important in the conflict. Access to sea lanes of communication, connected to warm waters, is an objective for Russia. It is also important for Ukraine, in particular for trade and to ensure global food security. A naval blockade of Ukrainian ports was put in place by Russia and led to a food crisis. Then, Snake Island is a strategic place that is coveted, notably because of its location. Finally, during the war, Ukraine struck a Russian flagship. This was symbolically and strategically important.

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