The Turkish Presidential Election – Another Great Escape for Erdoğan

Editors: Martyna Hanak and Timoteo Cozzio

 

Introduction

 

The elections earlier this year, labelled as one of the most important in the country’s history,
were held the same year as the Turkish Republic celebrated its centenary. Some analysts had
claimed it was the last chance to save the Turkish democracy. Early polls clearly indicated
that Erdoğan’s alliance was bound to lose. Erdogan had previously, however, shown an
incredible ability to turn things around despite an unfavourable starting position and the
analysts asked whether this was going to be another “Great Escape”. The alliance, labelled as
People’s Alliance, consisted of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and two
ultranationalist parties, most notably the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) (Barkey, 2023).

 

However, since none of the Presidential candidates managed to achieve a majority in the first
round held on the 14 th of May, the election went into a second round, disputed between
Erdoğan and the opposition’s candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu of the Republican People’s Party
(CHP). The fact that the election went into a second round clearly diminished the chances for
the opposition. Less surprisingly, President Erdoğan emerged victorious after the second
round was disputed two weeks later.

 

This research piece aims to shed light on how Erdoğan managed to gain political power and
thereafter maintain it longer than any other leader, modern Turkey’s founder Mustafa Kemal
Atatürk included, and how during his tenure, his grip on the power has tightened for every
election.

 

The Political Opposition

 

The opposition, popularly labelled “Table of the Six”, with the CHP as the biggest. The CHP
was founded by Atatürk in 1923 and was crucial to carrying out his reforms in the newly
founded republic. The adherents of his ideal have since been known as Kemalists. Until 1946,
it was the only party associated with the élite and the state bureaucracy, thus alienating it from
the needs of ordinary people. The fact that the state bureaucracy became heavily associated
with a certain ideology paved the way for the perception of the ‘deep state’. Since the 1960s
the party has, however, adopted a leftist perspective on the society’s needs. As a result, the
party has become much less hostile to religion, which means it has slid away from Atatürk’s
ideal. Kılıçdaroğlu belongs to this leftist faction of the CHP (Rodríguez López, 2017: 313).

 

The fact that the leftist Kılıçdaroğlu was considered as potentially able to attract Kurdish
voters made the nomination of him somewhat understandable, not least since the pro-Kurdish
and left-leaning Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) was seen as fundamental to defeat
Erdoğan. Kılıçdaroğlu’s background was not without relevance, as he belongs to the ethno-
religious community of Alevi, an offshoot of Shia Islam. Since the Alevis historically
constitute a disadvantaged group, they have usually voted for the left-leaning CHP, not the
least for considering the party as a means to reduce the influence of Sunni Islam (Hamrin-
Dahl, 2005: 39). Since the original socio-political synthesis of the republic was based on
Kemalist secularism, Turkish nationalism, and moderate Sunni Islam, the Kurds, the
politically aware Muslims, and the Alevis were excluded (Kramer, 2000: 86).

 

Erdoğan’s Way to Power – The Rise of the Islamists 2.0

 

Nowadays, Erdoğan is often portrayed as a nationalist politician. This is, however, just
another one of his moves to maintain power. Contrary to previous Islamist parties, Erdoğan
presented himself with a Western-friendly agenda, actively seeking membership in the
European Union (EU). Since the EU for a long time criticised Turkey for the military’s
intervention in politics, Erdoğan considered approaching the EU a unique opportunity to get
rid of the military’s influence, which constituted the biggest obstacle to an Islamist party
ruling the country (Barkey & Taspinar, 2011: 23, 29, 30).

 

Erdoğan could further benefit from the EU’s demands for religious freedoms. The AKP
differentiated itself from its Islamist predecessors in the sense that its posture was not state-
centric nor based on a “Turkish” perception of Islam as a common denominator (Haas, 2012).
Additionally, Erdoğan’s brand of Islam was urban and focused on individual rights. This was,
accordingly, a posture more in touch with the Zeitgeist in Western Europe at the time.
Accordingly, Western liberalism came to serve as a tool and not an obstacle, to reach his
goals (Rodríguez López, 2017). The previous Islamist parties did mainly attract pious people
in the countryside, to whom Atatürk’s reforms never reached, and therefore had a complicated
relationship with modernisation.

 

Furthermore, Erdoğan’s emphasis on Islam as a common denominator rather than Turkishness
contributed to eliminating the conflict dimension between Turks and Kurds. This contributed
to mending the relations between Turkey and the West on the Kurdish question since the West
for a long time had perceived it as the Kurds were denied their cultural rights by a repressive
Turkish state (Barkey & Taspinar, 2011: 28). It is worth to be mentioned that the vast
majority of the Kurds traditionally have voted for the Islamist parties, such as the AKP and its
predecessors rather than the pro-Kurdish parties, and their support has been crucial in all
previous election victories of the party (Karaveli, 2018). The Kurds’ alliance with the Islamist
parties is easy to understand, given that the Kemalist modernisation and secularisation process
went completely against the Kurds’ conservative and religious lifestyle (Rodríguez López,
2017: 238).

 

Additionally, Erdoğan was, again contrary to previous Islamists, economically liberal,
wanting to connect the country to the global market. The Kemalists, as well as the
ultranationalists, and the Islamist predecessors, lacked an economic model, besides the
existing state-centric economy. Western powers were at the same time keen to embrace
Erdoğan and his ‘liberal’ Islam (Karaveli, 2018), considering it as a counterweight to the
hardcore Islam that had arisen in Iran. Through this stance, the West aimed to avoid a
Huntingtonian ‘Clash of Civilizations’, which was deemed particularly important as the War
on Terrorism quickly spiraled. As the Islamists began to approach the West, the traditionally
Western-friendly Kemalists began to seek relations with China and Russia, but to no avail
(Haas, 2012).

 

The Power of the ‘Deep State’

 

Despite an ostensibly desperate situation, facing a united opposition, Erdoğan’s potential
victory was not inconceivable. During his tenure, he has shown an ability to be innovative and
come up with unexpected solutions. Accordingly, it was likely that he would not shun any
means to avoid a defeat. As a result, he has concentrated all public institutions around himself
(Barkey, 2023), which is also the case with the judiciary.

 

Due to the government’s apparent control over the judiciary, some feared that the former
would turn to the latter in case of election loss. In the local elections of 2019, when Ekrem
İmamoğlu and Mansur Yavaş of the CHP managed to unseat the mayors (representing AKP
or its Islamist predecessors) of both Ankara and Istanbul for the first time since 1994, the
election result in Istanbul was annulled and had to be re-done for unclear reasons. This serves
as a case study, showcasing the judiciary as Erdoğan’s most powerful tool. Regarding the
HDP, the party faced the risk of being banned for supporting terrorism (Barkey, 2023).

 

Moreover, the treatment of his political opponents shows very well that Erdoğan has been
keen on using the same tactics as the Kemalist establishment did to stop the AKP and its
Islamist predecessors from taking power (Barkey, 2023). After coming to power, Erdoğan
was eager to purge his enemies in the armed forces. The AKP’s former ally, the politico-
religious Gülen movement, proved to be impactful in this process due to the latter’s presence
in the bureaucracy (Schlyter, 2015).

 

The Return of Kemalism

 

In the election in the spring of 2015, Erdoğan’s AKP did not achieve a majority in the
parliament, as a major part of the Kurds voted for the HDP. Upon this failure, Erdoğan
surprised observers by forming a coalition with the anti-Kurdish MHP. Later that summer, the
regime launched a war against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), thus labelling Kurdish
separatism as the biggest threat against the state. This meant a definitive end to the
collaboration between the ruling AKP and the Kurds, which previously had gathered under
the umbrella of Islam (Karaveli, 2018).

 

Although Erdoğan stems from the school of thought that aimed to create a decentralised,
multi-ethnic, and Sunni Muslim Turkey (Hamrin-Dahl, 2005: 36), he has due to his alliance
with the MHP adopted a centralist stance while blending his Islamic neo-ottomanism with
national consciousness. Although founded as a secular party, the MHP has since the 1960s
taken a religious turn (Zürcher, 2004: 256), which led the parties to converge on the issue of
religion. Accordingly, this was a reward to the Turkish-Islamic synthesis established after the
military coup in 1980 and indicated a return of Kemalism in the sense that the position of
Turkish nationalism and statism were strengthened while Kurdish identity again was
considered anathema.

 

Foreign Policy as a Tool for Domestic Causes

 

Besides the judiciary, foreign policy is the second of Erdoğan’s tools to remain in power.
Every time the domestic situation looks strained, Erdoğan may place his faith in a well-tried
Turkish strategy, which still resonates among a large part of the electorate: to depict the
outside world as hostile against the country. This is a stance that has leverage, particularly
with the supporters of the MHP (Mango, 2005). Less surprisingly, Erdoğan blames the West
for Turkey’s poor economic situation as well as the coup attempt in 2016 (Barkey, 2023). It
must also be mentioned that the MHP traditionally has been a fierce critic of Turkey’s
collaboration with Western institutions such as the EU, claiming they want to dismember the
country (Mango, 2005: 86).

 

Erdoğan has further stated that the HDP always has been the seventh member of the
opposition while criticising the latter for sharing the same positions as the pro-Kurdish party.
The HDP is further accused of having ties to the PKK, against whom Turkey has fought a war for decades, and which in turn is connected to its Syrian counterpart, the People’s Defense
Units (YPG). Erdoğan additionally claims that the HDP is directed by the PKK from remote
mountainous parts of Iraq. The HDP has, since the interrupted peace process in 2015, been
subject to restrictions and repressions, and dozens of party officials have been detained,
accused of collaboration with the PKK.

 

Ankara has previously threatened to start a new war against the Kurds in Syria, who are allied
with the US. Such a threat is not unprecedented and serves as a means to shift the electorate’s
focus away from domestic issues, such as record-high inflation. Additionally, the NATO
accession processes of Finland and Sweden have given Erdoğan the possibility to show his
country’s impact on the international stage, and that Western institutions cannot make
important decisions without Turkish consent (Barkey, 2023). This is additionally something
that resonates well with a large part of the population which maintains that the country has
underperformed on the international stage given its imperial past (Barkey & Taspinar, 2011).

 

Conclusions

 

The already tense relations between Turkey and the West were stretched to the breaking point
during the Syrian War when the Kurds were given an opportunity to establish some autonomy
in the region. Additionally, Erdoğan’s U-turn in politics in 2015 paved the way for Turkey’s
war against the US-allied YPG making the Turkey-US relations go from bad to worse.
Although the anti-communist MHP was once US-friendly, the party is now hostile to the US,
while seeing Russia as an ally.

 

As of today, the Islamists and the Kemalists seem to have gone back to their more traditional
positions, with the AKP looking eastwards, while the Kemalists are approaching the West
again. The opposition leader Kılıçdaroğlu further stated that he would focus on good relations
with the West rather than with Russia in case of election victory. During his tenure, Erdoğan
has shown incredible ideological flexibility, which not the least his alliance with the MHP
shows. It is also noteworthy that the AKP has adopted the same state-centric ideal as the
MHP. The Islamist parties and the MHP do further have in common that they are hostile to
Turkey’s collaboration with Western institutions.

 

Erdoğan’s ability to maintain power is seemingly a result of his ostensibly Western-friendly
stance to piggyback on Western liberalism. Subsequently, the decision to hail Erdoğan was a
complete miscalculation from the Western liberal establishment. Previous Islamist parties
were locked to their Western-hostile ideology and state-centric economy, and therefore unable
to maneuver and adapt to changes in the outside world. Seemingly, Erdoğan’s AKP has ended
up being as Western-hostile as its predecessors.

 

Additionally, former Islamist parties never managed to control the bureaucracy and were
therefore unable to disarm the Kemalist establishment. The AKP managed to do this due to
their alliance with the Gülen movement. The Gülenists, who previously, most deliberately and
on loose grounds, prosecuted the Kemalists, later became subject to the same arbitrary
prosecutions. Although the Kemalists initially were satisfied with the purges of the Gülenists
from the bureaucracy, these processes made Erdoğan even more authoritarian, centering all
power around himself. As noted, the bureaucracy, which is cleansed from Gülenists, is now
subordinated to Erdoğan.

 

The answer to the question mentioned in the beginning; if this would be another ‘great
escape’ by Erdoğan, was accordingly ‘yes’.

 

References

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