Why Turkey blocks Sweden’s NATO bid - The role of the Kurdish diaspora in Swedish foreign policy and the importance of national interest

Editors: Jannis Gesemann & Martyna Hanak

 

Turkey’s unwillingness to accept Sweden’s bid can be traced to the domestic power struggle in Turkey as well as the volatile situation in the country’s near vicinity. The situation accentuated after the election in 2015 when the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) failed to win a majority, which caused a paradigm change in Turkish politics. To fully understand the situation, one needs to go back to the events that occurred in the wake of the Arab Spring. 

 

 

 

Together with Hungary, Turkey is the only country that still has not approved Sweden’s bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). While Turkey has lifted its blockade on Finland, the country still objects to Swedish membership. Ankara claims that the Swedish government does not have enough instruments to cope with the requests. A new counterterrorism law, which will come into force on the 1st of June is, nonetheless, supposed to facilitate Sweden to take action (Kınık Oz, 2023). 

 

 

Turkey has demanded Sweden to fulfil requests and conditions (Hedlund, 2023), such as extraditions of sympathisers of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a lift on restrictions on arms exports to Turkey, and a withdrawal of support for Kurdish groups in Syria (Kudo, 2022). The President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, furthermore demands 33 persons with connection to either the PKK or the politico-religious Gülen movement, which is supposed to have staged the coup attempt in 2016, to be extradited, the majority of whom reside in Sweden (Dorsey, 2022).

 

 

There is no doubt that Turkey, a member of NATO since 1952, being located in a crucial area at the crossroads of continents as well as possessing the second largest army in NATO (Moriyasu & Tavsan, 2021), is one of the most important members of the alliance (Liechtenstein, 2022), and therefore has an important say on the expansion.

 

 

The grounds for Turkish accusations

 

Since Kurdish separatism is now considered the biggest danger to the Turkish state, and to maintain support among the ultranationalists, Erdoğan has eagerly called for the extradition of PKK sympathisers based in Sweden (Dorsey, 2022). Erdoğan’s main objective is to win the upcoming election, and the demands on extraditions he has put on Sweden may strengthen his image as a determined person (Hammargren, 2022). Although Ankara has accused Sweden of collaboration with the PKK, Swedish governments have denied that such exists. Turkish pro- government media, nonetheless, reported that Swedish anti-tank weapons were found in a cave in northern Iraq, where the PKK reside (Dorsey, 2022). Last July, however, Sweden accepted to impede the PKK’s activities as well as those by individuals affiliated with it.

 

 

Ankara’s concern about Swedish membership is mainly based on the following issues: the Kurdish diaspora amounts to about 100.000 people, many of whom sympathise with the PKK (Hedlund, 2023). Additionally, Sweden has aided hundreds of millions of dollars to groups in northern Syria. According to Ankara, this money has gone directly to the Kurdish militia in Syria, the People’s Defence Units (PYD/YPG). What further upsets Turkey is what is seen as an indulgent attitude against people belonging to terrorist organisations, which has made Turkey call for the adoption of a new terrorist legislation in Sweden (Hedlund, 2023). Such legislation will be introduced on the 1st of June 2023 and will make it easier to prosecute members of terrorist organisations (Kınık Oz, 2023). It is, nonetheless, noteworthy that Sweden already deemed the PKK a terror organisation in 1984 (Hammargren, 2022). 

 

Due to the shift in Erdoğan’s stance to the Kurds, and due to the large number of Kurds that reside in Sweden, Ankara considers Sweden a ‘harbour for terrorism’. Additionally, the fact that leftist political and media elites have proven to be affiliated with the Kurdish cause, further fuels Turkish accusations (Hedlund, 2023). Former Swedish Defense Minister, Peter Hultquist, a social democrat, has proven to be a devoted supporter of the Kurdish cause. 

 

Some members of the Kurdish diaspora have made careers as parliamentarians (Hammargren, 2022), most notably in the leftist parties (Hedlund, 2023). Less surprisingly, Pro-Kurdish groups have sided with members of the Swedish Left Party in their opposition to NATO. Their actions have included acts such as waving with flags of the PKK at rallies. In late January, during an anti-Turkey and anti-NATO rally, demonstrators showed a doll of Erdoğan hanged upside down, further fueling the tensions between Sweden and Turkey, and thereby impeding the Swedish NATO accession (Hedlund, 2023).

 

 

To fulfil Turkey’s requisitions, Sweden has had to promise to refuse support to Kurdish groups in Syria, since these are supposed to have ties to the PKK (Levin, 2022). Such a concession has made politicians of Kurdish origin furious, claiming that Sweden sacrifices the Kurds to achieve membership in NATO. Furthermore, adherents of the leftist parties have seen it as a chance to maintain support among diaspora groups with leftist inclinations, as well as to bash the government for ‘creeping for a dictator’. This is, however, something that is arbitrarily used, not the least if one takes into account the left’s activities with the Iranian regime, such as subjecting to the controversial obligation to wear the hijab during a visit pertaining the women’s situation in the country (Hökmark, 2022).

 

 

Conflicts of interest between Turkey and the West

 

Since the end of the Cold War, it became obvious that the EU, the US, and Turkey did not share the same view on the Kurdish issue. Contrary to Turkey, the EU had the perception that Turkey denied a minority group its rights to express its culture (Barkey & Taspinar, 2011). Since the Kurds were supported by the US and other Western powers during the Syrian war, the split between Turkey and them augmented. Ankara made the conclusion that Kurdish advances in the near vicinity should encourage separatist aspirations within the country (Moriyasu & Tavsan, 2021). The Kurds’ advance in Syria coincided with the rise of the pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP).

 

 

Turkey’s purchase of the Russian S-400 air defence system has further tensed the relation to the US. This act by Ankara may be seen from the perspective that the US has backed the Kurds in Syria. Since Ankara’s security issues do not always correspond with those of the rest of NATO, as in the case of the Kurds, Ankara aims to diversify its purchases to have some independence in its actions (Liechtenstein, 2022). Seemingly, Turkey alternates between seeking cooperation with various partners depending on the threat situation. The country is accordingly conducting a multi-faceted foreign policy by collaborating with Europe, the Islamic world, Central Asia, and Russia (Moriyasu & Tavsan, 2021).

 

 

The war in Syria and its implications on Turkish politics

 

The failure to reach a majority in 2015 made Erdoğan surprise everybody by forming a coalition with the ultranationalist, and anti-Kurdish National Movement Party (MHP). During the same year, the regime launched war against the PKK, thus labelling Kurdish separatism as the biggest threat against the state. This meant a definitive end to the collaboration between the AKP and the Kurds, which previously had gathered under the umbrella of Islam. It is worth to be mentioned that the vast majority of the Kurds traditionally voted for the Islamist parties, such as the AKP and its predecessors, and their support was crucial in all previous election victories of it (Karaveli, 2018).

 

 

The nationalism introduced by modern Turkey’s founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in the 1920s was mainly territorial and based on a common culture and language. Furthermore, all kinds of secessionist aspirations have been deemed as a threat towards the social harmony of the republic (Mango, 2005: 10). The PKK, with roots in Marxism, was founded by Abdullah Öcalan in 1984 with the goal to establish an independent Kurdish state, which besides parts of Turkey would also comprise the Kurdish regions in Iraq and Syria (Hinchcliffe & Milton-Edwards, 2004: 81). The organisation has for a long time attacked non-military goals in Turkey, causing the death of thousands of civilians (Mango, 2005: 84ff). At the same time, the Western community has equalled the PKK’s secessionist aspirations with the Kurdish people’s longing for independence. This has furthermore reinforced the nationalist Turkish perception that the West wants to weaken the country, and the MHP is accordingly a fierce critic of Turkish collaboration with Western institutions (Mango, 2005: 84ff).

 

 

In Syria, the Kurds, backed by the US, managed to establish their own territory. Turkey wants to curb the independence of the Kurds in Syria by all means, to limit similar aspirations among the Kurds in the country. In addition, the PYD/YPG in Syria have ties to the PKK, which is deemed a terrorist organisation by both the EU and the US (Liechtenstein, 2022). Nevertheless, neither the EU nor the US share Turkey’s perception of the PKK as a threat (Mango, 2005: 86). Similarly, Turkey has for years tried to persuade NATO to list the PYD with the YPG as its armed branch as a terror organisation, which the US has objected to (Hammargren, 2022). One may argue that given the fact that the PKK is by many deemed a terrorist organisation, Turkey’s actions against its counterparts in Syria should be considered adequate (Liechtenstein, 2022).

 

 

The role of the Kurdish diaspora in Swedish politics

 

The previous Swedish government, led by the Social Democrat party, had secured their stay in power through a deal with the left-wing politician and left party defector Amineh Kakabaveh. According to the deal, Kakabaveh would support the then Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson in exchange for Swedish support for the YPG (Hedlund, 2023), which caused fury among the Turkish regime (Thorén, 2022). This issue has also raised the question about the loyalty of the Kurdish diaspora politicians to Sweden. Kakabaveh, an Iranian Kurd, embodied that dilemma when she, on the question if Sweden’s security or the security of the Kurds is the most important, answered that “they are equally important” (Sidenvall, 2022). 

 

 

Sweden’s self-image of a moral superpower has further caused a negative view on its NATO accession (Hedlund, 2023). The current Prime Minister, Ulf Kristersson, of the rightist Moderate Party, however, immediately after being elected claimed that NATO accession has the highest priority for Swedish national security, and that nothing else comes even close (Hedlund, 2023). Due to the Kurds’ strong affiliation with the political left, there should be no surprise that Ankara was delighted with the outcome in the Swedish election held last September, in which the rightist coalition emerged victorious.

 

 

Furthermore, Sweden’s withdrawal of support to the PYD/YPG is considered somewhat controversial for parts of the Swedish public, since it considers the Syrian-Kurdish organisation important in the defeat of the Islamic State (Hammargren, 2022). Subsequently, Erdoğan’s former allies among the Kurds, who are dissatisfied with the withdrawal of support for Kurds in the region, are now eager to show their dissatisfaction with the Swedish government. It should be mentioned that Sweden’s previous support for Kurdish groups has been the result of strong lobbyism by the Kurdish diaspora for their cause in the region, thus contributing to the split between Turkey and Sweden. Ankara’s eagerness to terror list Kurdish groups has furthermore made it clear that Sweden’s and Turkey’s definition on terrorism differ.

 

 

Conclusion

 

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the following application to NATO by Sweden may in some regards be considered as beneficial to Erdoğan, since it has given him the possibility to call for extraditions of groups labelled as terrorists and ‘enemies of the state’, and thereby to please his electorate, which nowadays to large extent consists of ultranationalists. Erdoğan, although coming from the political branch that aimed to decentralise the traditionally centralised Turkey, has gone back to a state-centric policy, where all means are permitted to ensure the state’s survival. Clearly, if the state is depicted as under attack, people are more willing to accept limitations on democracy. Accordingly, state leaders such as Erdoğan are dependent on creating enemies to portray the state in this way.

 

 

The volatile situation in Turkey’s neighbourhood, deriving from the Arab Spring and the following war in Syria played an important role in the shifting dynamic in Turkish politics, in the sense that it created an opening for the Kurds to seek independence. Seemingly, the war in Syria and the shift in the Turkish political landscape it provoked has once again made the PKK the country’s main enemy. The US’ and the EU’s approach to this issue should be taken into consideration, since it has not converged with Ankara’s perception. Although the expansion of NATO has exposed the conflicts of interests between Turkey and the West, it may, however, give Turkey the possibility to re-establish a security concept in NATO that corresponds better with the one of Ankara.

 

 

Although the former Swedish Prime Minister and actual leader of the Social Democrat Party, Magdalena Andersson, is in favour of a NATO accession, many of her party members are against it. That should be considered as nothing but a means to gain support among the Kurdish diaspora. Subsequently, it is not difficult to understand why Turkey considers Sweden as an anti-Turkish country. Sweden’s behaviour has rather reinforced the Turkish perception of Sweden as a leftist country, where also rightist parties are actually leftist parties, and where minorities, such as the Kurdish diaspora, always exert great influence on the political majority. Seemingly, there is little reason for Ankara to accept Sweden. Instead, Turkey’s acting is a statement of national interest.

 

As shown, domestic and foreign policy may be deeply intertwined, not the least in countries with ethnic minorities and others hosting big diasporas. It also indicates how diaspora groups can exercise influence on the host country’s foreign affairs, thus risking the latter’s security. In the case of Sweden, the security threat has proven to be overarching ‘moral superiority’. The development has shown that Sweden does not have the luxury anymore to act like a self-appointed moral superpower that wants to stay outside organisations like NATO. It is evident that it is easy to criticise other countries, as long as oneself does not face the risk of being attacked. Now those days are over, as in the wake of its NATO bid, Turkey has demonstrated to Sweden the importance of national interest.

 

References

 

Barkey, H. & Taspinar, O. referred in: Gasiorowski, M.; Long, D. & Reich, B. (2011). The Government and Politics of the Middle East and North Africa. 6th ed. Philadelphia: Westview Press.

 

Dorsey, J. M. (2022). “Playing games in Nato, Turkey eyes its role in a new world order”. The Daily Star. May 29.

 

Hammargren, B. (2022). “There is a limit as to how far Sweden can go to meet Erdoğan’s
demands”. English Bianet. November 27.

 

Hedlund, S. (2023). “Sweden may sink their own NATO bid”. GIS Reports Online. February 27.

Hinchcliffe, P. & Milton-Edwards, B. (2004). Conflicts in the Middle East 2nd ed. Abingdon: Routledge.

 

Hökmark, G. (2022). “Socialdemokraterna har flirtat med Irans regim”. Upsala Nya Tidning. November 16.

 

Karaveli, H. (2018). Why Turkey is Authoritarian: From Atatürk to Erdoğan. London: Pluto Press.

 

Kınık Oz, F. (2023). “Türkiye leaves door open to Sweden’s NATO bid: Turkish presidential spokesperson”. Anadolu Agency. March 26.

 

Levin, P. referred in: Kudo, P. (2022). “Turkietkännare: ’Slutet för svenska Natoansökan’”. Svenska Dagbladet. June 7.

 

Liechtenstein, P. M. of (2022). “The risks of ignoring Turkey”. GIS Reports Online. December 13.

 

Mango, A. (2005). Turkey and the War on Terror – For Forty Years We Fought Alone. Abingdon: Routledge.

 

Moriyasu, K. & Tavsan, S. (2021). “Making Turkey Great Again: Erdoğan throws out the rule book”. Nikkei, December 22.

 

Sidenvall, J. (2022). “S-romantik kom före säkerheten”. Smålandsposten. June 8.

 

Thorén, T. (2022). ”Turkiet bäddar för bråk med Sveriges nästa regering”. SVT Nyheter. September 2